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Abstract
In the recent years, a vast number of economic stud-
ies focused on the art market and on its develop-
ment, as well as on the artists as agents of a labour
market with features that are particular of art mar-
ket. However, really few studies analyzed the func-
tioning of the art market as a whole with a theoret-
ical approach, often considering the artist as noth-
ing more than a simple producer of artworks. This
dissertation aims to enrich the economics literature
with the above-mentioned missing parts.
In Chapter 2 we build a model for studying the price
formation in the private art market in a context of
complete information and full rationality, using a
game theory approach. In this first part, the key
variables in this market are the market powers of
the agents in the market, that define what is the
channel through which a certain artwork reaches
the public market. Chapter 3 firstly better defines
what are the economic and cultural values and how
their formation works for artworks, and then it in-
troduces in the just-created framework the effects
of information asymmetry among the agents oper-
ating in the market, and behavioural aspects in the
choices of some of them: besides market powers,
also information has a key role in the art market,
xxii
and it mainly depends on artists’ characteristics, as
fame and talent. Chapter 4 empirically investigates
these artists’ characteristics, creating a new measure
for them, through the use of hedonic regression and
quantile hedonic regression, finding that this mea-
sure presents a bimodal distribution in all the spec-
ifications we implemented, coherently with the su-
perstar theory in the art market, and that there ex-
ist various effects than influence the ranking created
using our measure.
Chapter 2
Chapter 2 analyses the pricing of artworks just cre-
ated by an artist and sold for the first time in the
art market, investigating the price-formation mech-
anism at work in the private art market. In particu-
lar, a game theory approach is used to consider the
possible channels (paths) that a new artwork can
take to reach a collector or an auction house, assum-
ing price-maximizing agents with full information
on market powers and reserve prices. The study is
aimed to identify the relationships between the art-
work prices and the market power of agents oper-
ating in each channel of the market. What we find
is that the market power of each of the agents is key
to identify the market channel that will be preferred
by the artist and, then, her incentive in creating a
new artwork. At the same time, the importance of
art market intermediaries as the galleries in the for-
xxiii
mation of art prices is attested and their incentives
to enter and remain in the market are confirmed.
Chapter 3
Chapter 3 aims to explore the role of cultural and
economic value, and of the information on private
art market price formation; in this Chapter, we de-
velop a bargaining game model in which we ex-
plicitly consider the effects of these issues. Further-
more, we introduce artists’ fame and talent as de-
terminants of an artwork’s cultural and economic
value. Assuming artists, galleries, and collectors
have different levels of information on the quality of
the artworks and on the characteristics of the artists,
we study the behaviour of these agents and the po-
tential emergence of disappointment for the sophis-
ticated collectors and undertreatment for the unso-
phisticated ones. Artworks will be treated as cre-
dence goods, experience goods, or search goods, de-
pending on the level of information each agent has
at his disposal; this influences the way the price is
formed and how the surplus of the trade is shared
among the agents in certain particular trade chan-
nels.
Chapter 4
In Chapter 4, we aim to empirically analyze those
characteristics of the artists that influence cultural
xxiv
and economic values, in order to understand how
the art market considers them in the formation of
prices. To do so, using a unique hand-collected data-
set from the Artist Re-sale Rights (ARR) archives of
the Societa` Italiana degli Autori ed Editori (SIAE),
we build a novel index of artists’ talent and fame in
the Italian art market. The distribution of this mea-
sure and the ranking of the artists’ index is analyzed
in several model specifications, and the dynamics
of the index is also qualitatively studied. Despite of
the existence of a price effect, a time effect, and an
art genre effect, coherently with the superstars the-
ory, the bimodality of the distribution is confirmed
in all our empirical findings.
xxv
Chapter 1
Introduction
The year 2014 has been a record year for art market, with 68,237
millions of dollars and over 38.8 millions of transactions, as re-
ported by the 2016 TEFAF Art Market Report; 2015 presents
slightly smaller numbers, with, however, over 63 billions of
dollars of total exchanged value.1 Even if some of the biggest
art markets in the world, as the Chinese one, saw a decline
since 2014, other countries’ markets keep on growing, as, for
example, the United States’, that reaches the record level of
27.3 billions of dollars in exchanges in 2015. If one compares
the record results for the worldwide art market exchanges in
2014 with GDP of countries, we have that the art market trans-
actions value accounts for more than the Dominican Republic
and other 125 countries of the World GDP in 2015 (World Bank,
2016).
If we look at the top prices reached for a single artwork, we
have that some of these were sold at more than 200 millions of
1See Kinsella (2016b) for an analysis.
1
Table 1: Top 10 Lots by Living Artists, 2012-16 (from Kinsella
(2016a))
Rank Artist Sale date Auction house Price (USD)
1 Jeff Koons November 2013 Christie’s NY 58,405,000
2 Gerhard Richter February 2015 Sotheby’s London 46,352,959
3 Cui Ruzhuo April 2016 Poly Auction (Hong Kong) 39,564,634
4 Gerhard Richter May 2013 Sotheby’s NY 37,125,000
5 Jasper Johns November 2014 Sotheby’s NY 36,005,000
6 Gerhard Richter October 2012 Sotheby’s London 34,273,027
7 Jeff Koons May 2014 Christie’s NY 33,765,000
8 Jeff Koons November 2012 Christie’s NY 33,682,500
9 Gerhard Richter February 2014 Christie’s London 32,563,228
10 Gerhard Richter November 2014 Christie’s NY 31,525,000
dollars, as Willem de Koonings “Interchange” and “Nafea Faa
Ipoipo” by Paul Gauguin, both sold in 2015 for around 300 mil-
lions, and “Number 17A” by Jackson Pollock, sold for around
200 millions of dollars, through private selling; for what con-
cerns selling at auction, in the same year both Pablo Picasso’s
“Les Femmes dAlger” and Amedeo Modigliani’s “Nu Couch
by Amedeo Modigliani sold for more than 170 millions. Kin-
sella (2016a) presents the top selling lots of living artists for the
period from 2012 to October 2016, sold through auction; Table
1 reports the 10 top selling lots, all of them sold for more than
30 millions of dollars.
This growth of the importance of the art market has drawn the
attention of economists, in particular of scholars from cultural
economics, the branch of economics that focuses on the study
of cultural goods and culture in general: while a Cultural Eco-
nomics Association exists since 1973 and a Journal of Cultural
Economics has been issued for the first time in 1977, this topic
received an increasing attention in the last 20 years, as demon-
strated by the contributions that come from both economics
and management, as the books by Klamer (1996), Caves (2000),
2
Throsby (2001), Candela and Scorcu (2004), Hutter and Thro-
sby (2008), Snowball (2008), and Zorloni (2013), and sociology,
as the works by Olav Velthuis and coauthors (Velthuis, 2007;
Lind and Velthuis, 2012; Velthuis and Baia Curioni, 2015). Cul-
tural goods, nowadays, are not only interest of collectors, that
keep on buying artworks merely for the pleasure they obtain
from their value, and economists, but also financial markets be-
gan to pay attention to the art market, seeing artworks, mainly
from fine arts, as an investment good (Anderson, 1974; Camp-
bell, 2008, 2009; Mandel, 2009). In the recent years, in fact, art
funds became more and more important in the market, buying
fine art pieces, with returns up to 14.9%.2 Clearly a collector can
understand the investment value of an artwork, while he ben-
efits from its aesthetic.3 One of the main issue in this market,
then, consists in understanding how the price of the artworks
is formed. Artworks are usually unique and hence an analysis
of the supply and the demand using standard economics meth-
ods is not possible, that is, there is not an “equilibrium price”;
however, one can study how the price of an artworks is formed
depending on the agents of the market that trade it, which usu-
ally results from a bargaining between the parts. In Chapter
2, we build a complete-information and full-rationality model
based on Nash-bargaining, that describes how the private art
market works and studies the price-formation mechanism op-
erating in it, in order to understand how the bargaining price
is formed and what are its determinants, as well as what are
2See Hodges (2015) and Schwartz (2015). For a discussion about the finan-
cialization of art, see Velthuis and Coslor (2012).
3Baumol (1986), Baumol and Throsby (2012), and Candela et al. (2013) ex-
plain the concept of psychic dividend (or aesthetic dividend) and how it influ-
ences the collectors’ choices when they buy artworks.
3
the rationale behind the existence of different trade channels.
We present necessary and sufficient conditions to observe each
possible market path among those that characterize the private
art market, and demonstrate that every agent makes a choice
which is based on his market power and on the market power
of the individuals that follow him in the potential paths that
start from his node.
In our analysis as presented in Chapter 2 we did not consider
any of the potential market failures that characterize the art
market.4 An important market failure in the art market is the
one related to asymmetric information, which is a particularly
important issue given the difficulty in collecting information
on the value of the artworks and on the artists, together with
the low level of regulation that characterizes the art market.5
The attention the literature paid to the asymmetric information
issue, however, is limited and it consists mainly on qualitative
studies; in fact, only few scholars analyzed this issue with a
theoretical and analytical approach. To fill this gap, in Chap-
ter 3 we modify the model proposed in Chapter 2, introducing
the asymmetric information issue and other aspects of the be-
haviour of the agents in the art market related to the difficulty
they can find in evaluating an artwork. In fact, artworks are
particular products since they contains two distinct but linked
values, that is, the cultural value and the economic value; the
4For example, some particular kind of art productions are public goods,
as musical compositions (see Santagata (1995)) and, in some cases, are subsi-
dized, as discussed for example in Champarnaud et al. (2008). See also Snow-
ball (2008).
5Indeed, some regulation mechanisms exist in this market, as the droit de
suite or Artist Re-sale Rights, the quote of the selling price when an artwork
is resold that goes to the artist if certain conditions are respected; see Candela
et al. (forthcoming) and Chapter 4.
4
former influences the latter, and the evaluation of each of the
two, which has an effect on the price, is characterized by partic-
ular features, that depends on the available information and on
the ability a certain agent has in interpret the components and
the determinants of the artwork’s values. Despite the asym-
metric information issue, we demonstrate that high-quality art-
works are not washed out from the art market, thanks to the
presence of uncertainty on the values of the artworks. The
multiple-value issue of the art products has been studied by
several scholars in both cultural economics and other fields,
as philosophy, sociology, art history, but economics literature
lacks of an overview that would make the various points of
view coherent: in Chapter 3 we also propose a benchmark for
this topic, the one introduced by Throsby (2001), and we lead
the contributions on this topic by other scholars back to this
benchmark, when possible.
Artworks can be considered products of the artist, but the artist
is more than a simple producer; cultural economics literature
considered this agent mainly as an active individual in the la-
bour market6 and for what concerns her income7 while less has
been said on the artist’s characteristics that affect the value of
her artworks and how these characteristics influence the cre-
ation of the artworks themselves. Chapter 3 presents an over-
view of the two main artists’ characteristics, that is, talent and
fame, and link them to the production of cultural and economic
values of the artworks. In Chapter 4, we present a novel mea-
6See for example Towse (1996), Caves (2000), Caserta and Cuccia (2001),
Blaug (2001), Cuccia and Cellini (2009), Menger (2006), and Towse (2006).
7The superstar theory contributions, beginning with Rosen (1981) and Adler
(1985), focus on the relationship between reputation and income; Chapter 4
reports the principal works of this branch of literature.
5
sure for these characteristics, based on a unique hand-collected
dataset from SIAE (Societa` Italiana degli Artisti ed Editori), us-
ing hedonic regression and quantile hedonic regression meth-
ods, and we study how this new measure behaves for what
concerns the ranking obtained using it in various specifications,
as well as how it distributes. We identify different effects on
the ranking, as the price effect and the time effect, and we find
strong evidence of a bimodality in the distribution of the index,
which is not affected by changes in the specification of the mo-
del, and which is coherent with the superstar theory in cultural
economics.
6
Chapter 2
Understanding the
artwork pricing: a
multiple bilateral
bargaining game
2.1 Introduction
“Haggling for art” is a renowned habit in the art market, though
the size of the discount that sellers apply to the price of art-
works is not widely recognized.1 For example, gallery owners
are willing to negotiate but the discount size is not fully ad-
vertised depending on the specific conditions of the sale, and
each gallery can handle it differently. Recently, the Wall Street
Journal published an article in which Daniel Grant wrote:
1Velthuis (2007) reports various discount policies that galleries apply, as for
example the courtesy discount, the museum discount, the flexibility discount,
and so on.
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When it comes to fine art sold in galleries, there’s
the asking price. And then there’s the price most
people pay... “Galleries never have sales, it’s con-
sidered bad taste”, says Manhattan contemporary
art gallery owner Renato Danese. Still most art sold
by him, and other dealers, he says, goes for some-
thing less than the stated price. There is a certain
etiquette to the conversation. “A client comes in
and says, ‘I’m interested in this painting’, Mr. De-
nato says, and I say, ‘I’m glad that you respond to
it positively’. The client asks, ‘What is the price?’ I
tell him the price. He says, ‘Can you help me out
with that?’ and I may offer 10 percent”. Debra
Force, a New York City-based dealer in American
art, agrees. “Every work is discounted”, she says.
“I can’t think of an instance in a long time where
someone paid the asking price”.2
As a matter of fact, the posted prices is a well-known method
of prices formation mechanism, and the haggling for art is still
the most used mechanism in the art market where the “spirit of
the bazaar economy” is dominant (Arnold and Lippman, 1998;
Velthuis, 2011).
The mechanism on how the price is formed is widely studied
in the economic literature within the general framework of the
problem of the optimality of the various selling methods. The
literature presents mixed results regarding the efficiency of the
selling methods (auction, bargaining, and posted price), both
from the seller’s and from the buyer’s perspective, and consid-
2See Grant (2013).
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ering different level of costs.3
How does the art market work for what concerns the price-
formation mechanisms? To answer this question, we need to
know what is the selling method actually used by the sellers of
artworks and we have to study both the behavior of the agents
(artists, dealers, collectors) involved in the artwork trades and
their role (as sellers or buyers) in each transaction, that is, what
are their relationships with the other agents. In the art mar-
ket the selling methods widely used are the bargaining, the
posted-price selling, and the auctions. The posted-price mech-
anism is the galleries’ preferred selling method, auction is the
best-known and most studied mechanism in the economic lit-
3Without auctioning costs, auctioning is always optimal compared to
posted-price selling, while, when bargaining costs no more than posted-price
selling, the bargaining is always optimal compared to posted-price selling
(Wang, 1993, 1995). Bulow and Klemperer (1996) show, under reasonable as-
sumptions, that the auction is always preferable to negotiations, but, accord-
ing to Bulow and Klemperer (2009), when participation is costly the sequential
process is always more efficient than a simple simultaneous auction. Lu and
McAfee (1996) identifies a new advantage of auctions over bargaining, since
auctions are evolutionarily stable equilibria, whereas in a similar setting, Kultti
(1999) shows that auctions and posted prices are practically equivalent. Arnold
and Lippman (1998) compare bargaining and posted-price mechanisms in a
market with discounting, positive transaction costs, private buyer’s reserve
price and buyer’s bargaining ability, stating that a critical value of bargaining
ability exists, so that they can establish when the use of bargaining or of a po-
sted price results to be optimal. Cason et al. (2003) compare posted-price and
bilateral bargaining market institutions finding that efficiency is lower, sellers
price is higher, and prices are stickier under haggle than under posted price.
Campbell and Levin (2006) demonstrate that the posted-price rule may outper-
form the best possible standard auction mechanism when values are interde-
pendent. More recently, Hammond (2010) and Chow et al. (2015), using data
for compact discs and real estate sales, respectively, find empirical evidence
on the performance of the main selling methods: Hammond (2010) finds that
posted-price goods sell for higher prices, while auctioned goods sell with a
higher probability; Chow et al. (2015) find that auctioned properties obtain a
price premium or suffer a price discount compared to negotiated sales proper-
ties, depending on property type and market conditions end properties.
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erature, but the bargaining is the actual mechanism at work for
art: when galleries post a price or auction houses fix an auction
fee, usually, a bargaining process on discounts of posted prices
or auction fees occurs between the seller/buyer and the dealer
(Ashenfelter, 1989).4
Despite the anecdotal evidence, our research question is still
unanswered, since economic theory lacks of a model that fully
depicts the role of the selling methods in the art market and
provides empirically testable implications of artwork prices. To
fill this gap, in this paper we model the functioning of the art
market for what concerns the artworks just created and sold
for the first time by the artist. In particular, following a game
theory approach, we consider the possible channels a new art-
work can take to reach, directly or indirectly, an auction house
or a collector who will not resell the artwork, and we focus on
the relationships between artwork prices and market powers
of agents working in a each channel of the market, assuming
that agents are price-maximizers with full information on mar-
ket powers and reserve prices.5 Thus, every time an artwork is
auctioned, the artwork is out of the particular framework stud-
ied in this paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
4According to the the TEFAF Art Market Report 2014 edited by Clare McAn-
drew, in 2013 48 percent of trades was intermediated by auction houses and 52
percent by galleries. In the domestic markets of developed countries (USA,
France and UK) the galleries market share was 55 percent. In Italy, according
to the NOMISMA Art Market Report 2013, galleries had a market share of 73
percent, while in the Dutch market the galleries’ market share is of 56 percent
(Velthuis, 2007).
5The hypothesis of full information implies that the art goods can be seen
as search goods. For an analysis of information asymmetry in the art market
where the art good can be either a search, an experience, or a credence good,
see Chapter 3.
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tion 2.2, we briefly review the relevant literature and empha-
size our contribution. In Section 2.3, we introduce the theoreti-
cal framework, we solve the model, and we study the effect of
the agents’ bargaining power on bargaining prices. Section 2.4
concludes the paper.
2.2 Contribution to the literature
The interest economists put on the art market has been increas-
ing in the last years (see for example the books by Caves (2000),
by Throsby (2001), by Candela and Scorcu (2004), and by Zor-
loni (2013)), with a main focus on the price-formation mecha-
nism of artworks in the “secondary market” and on the auc-
tioning in particular (Ashenfelter and Graddy, 2003).
In the literature there are several art market’s segments defi-
nitions. A good definition of primary and secondary market is
given by Throsby (1994, p.5): the former is where “unorganized
individual artists provide works to galleries, local art fairs and
exhibitions, small dealers, and private buyers”, while the lat-
ter consists in “established artists, dealers, and public and pri-
vate collectors” who “circulate work by live artists who have
managed to make the transition from the primary market”. An
alternative definition of primary market is given by Velthuis
(2003, pp.181-182), describing it as “the market where contem-
porary artworks are sold for the first time”. Also Scho¨nfeld and
Reinstaller (2007, p.144) give a similar definition, saying that
“[t]he primary market comprises all artworks without prove-
nance, i.e., the market where artworks are sold for the first time.
Art reentering the market is sold in the secondary market seg-
ment”. Zorloni (2013, p.58) contains an alternative description
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of the primary and secondary markets, identifying the former
as the market “where private collectors or dealers buy works
of art directly from the artist or other private individuals” and
the latter as the one where “the exchange takes place between
the individual via the intermediary of the auction house”. Fi-
nally, Candela and Scorcu (2004) define the primary market as
the artist’s market, the secondary market as the gallery’s mar-
ket, and they also introduce the “tertiary market”, defining it as
the auction’s market. In what follows, we adopt the Velthuis’s
and Scho¨nfeld and Reinstaller’s definitions, together with the
definition in Candela and Scorcu (2004) for the tertiary market.
As we hinted above, little attention has been paid to the theo-
retical functioning of the “primary market” and the galleries’
role,6 though there is a series of papers that study this issue un-
der an empirical point of view (both quantitative, as Rengers
and Velthuis (2002), Beckert and Ro¨ssel (2004), Hutter et al.
(2007), and the analysis in Chapter 4, and qualitative, as Velthuis
(2002, 2003, 2007, 2011)), or using a simply descriptive approach,
as Peterson (1997), Kawashima (1999), Benhamou et al. (2002),
and Caves (2003). In particular, Velthuis (2003) focused on the
price-formation mechanism of art galleries identifying the ex-
istence of “pricing scripts” used by the dealers, that generally
consist in a series of rules for which the price is never decreased
but, at most, discounted (Scho¨nfeld and Reinstaller (2007) de-
velop a model of competition among galleries which is con-
sistent with these pricing scripts); under a more marketing-
oriented point of view, Cellini and Cuccia (2014) analyse the
price-formation mechanism in the primary market, consider-
ing the artist and the art dealer as part of the same marketing
6See Shubik (2003) and Scho¨nfeld and Reinstaller (2007).
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channel.
Beside the distinction between primary and secondary mar-
kets, Velthuis (2002) introduces the distinction between public
and private market, based on the availability of the information
about the price of an artwork:
[...] auctions prices differ from gallery prices be-
cause of their public character. Major auctions are
covered by newspapers and magazines while their
prices are publicly available. [...] By contrast, gallery
sales have an exclusive, private character; details
of a transaction, including the price, are difficult to
find out for outsiders.7
Starting from these classifications of the art market, one can
see that there exist several overlapping cases between them:
for example, an artwork in the secondary market could still
have a private price if it was sold by the artist directly either
to a gallery or to a collector; at the same time, an artwork sold
by the artist which reached the market with the intermedia-
tion of an auction house has a public character also if it lays
in the primary market. However, the mechanism of how the
private price is formed in the primary market lacks of a theo-
retical foundation as well as the role of gallery in this market
has been insufficiently investigated by economists; as pointed
out by Benhamou et al. (2002, p.264):
The economics of art galleries has widely been ne-
glected by researchers because of the lack of infor-
mation. In such an economic context, it is more
7Velthuis (2002, p.138). Notice that, as we pointed out above, Zorloni (2013)
defines as primary market what Velthuis (2002) calls private market, while she
defines as secondary market what he calls public market.
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important than ever to open the black box of the
“white cube”.
Our paper contributes to the literature shedding light on
the private price-formation mechanism in the primary market,
a sort of shadow market where the new artworks that have
never been auctioned before are traded, and where the role of
galleries is key. However, our analysis covers also how pri-
vate price is formed in secondary and tertiary markets. Before
proceeding to depict the functioning of the part of the market
that stays at the foundations of the whole art market, we have
to open the black box and explore the bargaining process used
as selling method that stays behind the private price-formation
mechanism.
2.3 The model
In our model of the art market there exist two types of trade
mechanisms (auction (A) and bargaining (B)) and four types of
agents (the auction house (h), the artist (a, “she”), the gallery
(g), and the collectors).8 The market structure of the auction is
a monopoly where several bidders (b) make bids, a single seller
(s) takes bids and sells the artwork to the highest bidder. The
structure of the bargaining is a bilateral monopoly where the
artwork trade takes place after the bargaining between a sin-
gle seller and a single buyer.9 In this framework, the auction
8Another pricing mechanism that actually exists in the art market is the po-
sted price method; however, bargained discounts of posted prices are common-
place in art market, as we pointed out in Section 2.1.
9As stated by Baumol (1986), the owner of an artwork, being it unique,
may be considered as a monopolist in the market of that specific artwork; in
fact, even if they are similar and made by the same artist, are imperfect substi-
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Figure 2.1: Full set of potential bargaining
house intermediates trades between the seller and the bidders;
the artist makes artworks which can be sold in the art market
through auctions or via bargaining with the gallery and/or col-
lectors, so that the artist can only be a seller. The gallery can sell
the artworks bargaining the price with the collectors or with the
tutes. Zorloni (2013) also points out that the relationship between an artist and
a dealer can be seen as a bilateral monopoly.
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auction house, and then it can be either a seller or a buyer.10
Finally, there exist two types of collectors: the insider collector
(i, “he”), who can be either a seller or a buyer, and the outsider
collector (o), who can only buy the artwork and cannot resell
it; the former is a sophisticated collector, who knows how the
art market works and who are its agents, while the latter is a
more naive collector, with less knowledge of the market. As in
Baumol (1986), in fact, in the art market there exist two kinds of
collectors, those who are “people who understand art” (insider
collectors), and those who behave like an “amateur who does
not know what he is doing” (outsider collectors).11
10Cellini and Cuccia (2014) highlight the existence of artist who act as “a
manager of himself or herself”, becoming in some cases also dealer of her own
works, also if this situation is not frequent. In our model, as we will see, this sit-
uation concerns the case in which the artist sell her artwork to the sophisticated
collector. For what concerns the auction house presence in the primary market,
Velthuis (2011) points out that this situation is not standard in the Western mar-
kets, and it happened only on 2008 with Damien Hirst’s one-man auction held
by Sotheby’s (see also The Economist (2008)), and on charity auctions, while
it is a normal habit in emerging markets as China and India; in the past, im-
pressionists and post-impressionists used to sell their works directly through
auction houses. Obviously, only most famous artists that are already recog-
nized by the market as being successful can directly sell their artworks by auc-
tions. Moreover, as noted by Graw (2012) reporting Warhol’s words, galleries
sell also to auction houses “in order to bid up prices in advance of their own
sales” (p.194).
11The terms “insider” and “outsider” were first introduced by Bonus and
Ronte (1997). Zorloni (2013) too describes the segmentation of the art market
identifying two types of buyer: one (the insider) who is “focused on one or
very few sectors of the market and” is “driven purely by the desire to collect
art for its own sake, with a high level of knowledge and connoisseurship”, and
a second group (the outsiders) that includes “collectors, often younger with
considerable wealth and disposable income” that “often had less knowledge
and experience of art market”. McCain (2006) presents a model of cultivation
of taste which is able to generate a bimodal distribution of buyers, in which
each of the two peaks of the distribution can be seen as the average level of
taste of the outsiders (the smaller peak) or the insiders (the bigger peak); a
key variable in McCain’s model is the “arts capital” an individual is endowed
with, which could be linked to exposure to arts in childhood, as pointed out by
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Combining all possible outcomes, we have twelve potential
bargaining: one bargaining between the artist and the insider,
one between the artist and the gallery, one between the artist
and the auction house, and one between the artist and the out-
sider; one bargaining between the insider and the auction house,
one bargaining between the insider and the gallery, two bar-
gaining between the gallery and the auction house, two bar-
gaining between the gallery and the insider, and two bargain-
ing between the gallery and the outsider (see Figure 2.1).
Among these possible negotiations, we can omit the interac-
tion between the outsider and the artist (ao path), since the for-
mer is not able to reach the latter, the one between the insider
and the gallery in the agi path, since the former can avoid to
buy from the latter if he wants a certain artist’s artwork, and
the one between the insider and the gallery in the aigi path,
since the former would repurchase the artwork he sold to the
gallery. We are then left with nine potential bargaining: one
bargaining on the auction fees between the artist and the auc-
tion house, one bargaining between the insider and the auc-
tion house, two bargaining between the gallery and the auction
house, one bargaining on the artwork prices between the artist
and the insider, one between the artist and the gallery, one be-
tween the insider and the gallery, and two bargaining between
the gallery and the outsider. Furthermore, the supply and the
demand channels give rise to three types of markets where art-
works can be traded: the primary markets with three chan-
nels (artist–auction house (ah), artist–insider (ai), and artist–
gallery (ag)); the secondary markets with four channels (artist–
the author, as well as to have attended an art school; this art capital could be
increased through a learning process, however, as pointed out by Stigler and
Becker (1977).
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Figure 2.2: Reduced set of potential bargaining
gallery–auction house (agh), artist–insider–auction house (aih),
artist–insider–gallery (aig), and artist–gallery–outsider (ago));
the tertiary markets with two channels (artist–insider–gallery–
outsider (aigo) and artist–insider–gallery–auction house (aigh)).
In Figure 2.2, we graphically show all the relations between the
five agents in each market and in every channel.
Given the artist’s, the bidders’, and the outsiders’ reserve
prices (respectively, P aR, P
b
R, and P
o
R), in each market there are
multiple bargaining prices P kBj , where k indicates the pair of
agents participating in the bargaining and j is the channel where
the trade takes place. Furthermore, galleries can post a price PG
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for each artwork that these dealers hold in stock and there is a
unique auction price PA, assuming that the auctioneer guaran-
tees the sale price to attract valuable artworks by covering the
seller’s risk of unsold.12 In Table 2.1, we report all prices de-
fined above.
To model bargaining prices, we use a simple Nash bargain-
ing game where each pair of agents simultaneously play a bar-
gaining game on the artwork price,13 assuming that auction
prices guarantee are common knowledge and exogenously gi-
ven, such that:
0 < P aR < PA < P
b
R (2.1)
In particular, we assume that agents have rational expec-
tations and that artists, galleries, auction houses, and insiders
have also perfect information, while outsiders, having imper-
fect information, can only buy artworks from galleries since
they only know the gallery’s posted prices. Thus the artist’s
and the bidder’s reserve price are, respectively, the minimum
and the maximum price of artworks, while the auction price
guarantee is always greater than the artist’s reserve price and
12If the higher bidder’s reserve price is less than the seller’s reserve price, an
artwork is unsold (“bought-in”) (Ashenfelter, 1989; Ashenfelter and Graddy,
2003). In case of “bought-in” or if an artwork’s auction price is lower than the
guarantee price, the auction house buys the artwork for the guarantee price.
Once the auction house is the owner of the artwork (just as a gallery), the auc-
tioneer has to find a potential buyer with a reserve price at least equal to the
guarantee price, or, before the auction, the auctioneer has to find a third-party
guarantee (guarantor) who agrees to pay the guarantee price through an irre-
vocable bid. Thus, if the auction price is higher than the guarantee price, the
seller and the guarantor share the difference between the auction price and the
guarantee price after the buyer paid the auction fee (Graddy and Hamilton,
2014).
13This mechanism assures that all the choices that are made are efficient; at
the same time, it guarantees that, given the bargaining powers, each agent will
maximize his surplus.
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less than the bidder’s reserve price, given that the auction fees
are not null. Moreover, when auctioning and bargaining are
not costly, the galleries’ problem is to post a price PG for each
artwork, which is solved posting it equal to the maximum be-
tween the auction price guarantee and the outsider’s reserve
price.14
In order to make the hypothesis of imperfect information
more effective for the outsiders and to emphasise the role of
galleries, we crucially assume that outsiders never buy at auc-
tion:
P oR < P
b
R (2.2)
On the other hand, we simplify the gallery’s posted-price prob-
lem assuming that:
PG = PA = P
o
R (2.3)
14It is easy to prove that the maximization problem we solve for the bargain-
ing between the gallery and the outsider is equivalent to a minimization of the
discount applied to a posted price, assuming that the bargaining power of the
gallery in the former problem is equal to the complement to one of the gallery’s
bargaining power in the latter, that is, the problem is dual. Actually, the mini-
mization problem for the gallery in discounting the posted price is equivalent
to the minimization problem for the outsider in the bargaining problem with
the gallery.
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Table 2.1: Nomenclature (prices)
P aR is the artist’s reserve price
P bR is the bidder’s reserve price
P oR is the outsider’s reserve price
PG is the gallery’s posted price
PA is the auction price guarantee
P kBj is the bargaining price between the agents k in the channel j (from now on P
k
j )
P ahah is the bargaining price when the artist and the auction house bargain in the primary market
P agj is the bargaining price when the artist and the gallery bargain in the primary market and channel j = agh, ago
P aij is the bargaining price when the artist and the insider bargain in the primary market and channel j = aigh, aigo, aih
P igj is the bargaining price when the insider and the gallery bargain in the secondary market and channel j = aigh, aigo
P ihaih is the bargaining price when the insider and the auction house bargain in the secondary market
P ghagh is the bargaining price when the gallery and the auction house bargain in the secondary market
P goago is the bargaining price when the gallery and the outsider bargain in the secondary market
P goaigo is the bargaining price when the gallery and the outsider bargain in the tertiary market
P ghaigh is the bargaining price when the gallery and the auction house bargain in the tertiary market
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Since the bargaining power of each agent is the relative abil-
ity to influence over each other, in Table 2.2 we define a mea-
sure of relative bargaining power of every agent for each bar-
gaining game, assuming that the seller’s bargaining power (mar-
ket power), that lays strictly between 0 and 1, is the comple-
ment to one of the buyer’s bargaining power (buying power).15
These market powers in first approximation are assumed to be
exogenous variables, but they could vary thanks to shocks on
observable or latent variables: for example, a positive shock
on artist’s fame will increase her market power towards all the
other agents she may interact with; similarly, a decrease in the
market concentration of the galleries will very likely decrease
the galleries’ market power towards both the auction house
and the outsiders, as well as towards both the artist and the
insiders.
Table 2.2: Nomenclature (bargaining powers)
α is the artist’s bargaining power versus the insider on P aij , j = aih, aigh, aigo
1− α is the insider’s bargaining power versus the artist on P aij , j = aih, aigh, aigo
β is the artist’s bargaining power versus the gallery on P agj , j = agh, ago
1− β is the gallery’s bargaining power versus the artist on P agj , j = agh, ago
γ is the insider’s bargaining power versus the gallery on P igj , j = aigh, aigo
1− γ is the gallery’s bargaining power versus the insider on P igj , j = aigh, aigo
δ is the gallery’s bargaining power versus the outsider on P goj , j = ago, aigo
1− δ is the outsider’s bargaining power versus the gallery on P goj , j = ago, aigo
µ is the insider’s bargaining power versus the auction house on P ihaih
1− µ is the auction house’s bargaining power versus the insider on P ihaih
ν is the gallery’s bargaining power versus the auction house on P ghj , j = agh, aigh
1− ν is the auction house’s bargaining power versus the gallery on P ghj , j = agh, aigh
η is the artist’s bargaining power versus the auction house on P ahah
1− η is the auction house’s bargaining power versus the artist on P ahah
15For an analysis of the theory of supply chain intermediation and efficiency
within a bargaining theoretic framework, see Wu (2004).
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2.3.1 Tertiary market
We now introduce the problems and the solutions of the bar-
gaining games we described above.
aigh channel
In the bargaining between the gallery and the auction house on
the aigh channel, the gallery with a bargaining power equal to
ν faces the following problem:
max
P ghaigh
[(
P ghaigh − P igaigh
)ν (
PA − P ghaigh
)1−ν]
(2.4)
which is solved for:
P ghaigh = (1− ν)P igaigh + νPA (2.5)
Given (2.1) and (2.3), we have:
P ghaigh = (1− ν)P igaigh + νP oR (2.6)
aigo channel
In the bargaining between the gallery and the outsider, where
δ is the gallery’s bargaining power, the bargaining price is ob-
tained from the following maximization:
max
P goaigo
[(
P goaigo − P igaigo
)δ (
P oR − P goaigo
)1−δ] (2.7)
which is solved for:
P goaigo = (1− δ)P igaigo + δP oR (2.8)
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2.3.2 Secondary market
agh channel
In the bargaining between the gallery and the auction house,
the gallery with a bargaining power equal to ν faces the follow-
ing problem:
max
P ghagh
[(
P ghagh − P agagh
)ν (
PA − P ghagh
)1−ν]
(2.9)
that, given assumptions in (2.1) and (2.3), is solved for:
P ghagh = (1− ν)P agagh + νP oR (2.10)
ago channel
In the bargaining between the gallery and the outsider, δ is still
the gallery’s bargaining power, and the problem it faces is the
following:
max
P goago
[(
P goago − P agago
)δ (
P oR − P goago
)1−δ] (2.11)
that is solved for:
P goago = (1− δ)P agago + δP oR (2.12)
aih channel
In the bargaining between the insider and the auction house,
the bargaining is on the price the insider will receive from the
auction house; his bargaining power is equal to µ, and he faces
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the following maximization problem:
max
P ihaih
[(
P ihaih − P aiaih
)µ (
PA − P ihaih
)1−µ]
(2.13)
The maximizing price, given (2.1) and (2.3), is:
P ihaih = (1− µ)P aiaih + µP oR (2.14)
aigh and aigo channel
Here, in the bargaining between the insider and the gallery, the
insider knows if the gallery will sell the artwork to the auction
house or the the outsider once it has bought it. Hence, given
that the bargaining power of the insider is equal to γ, he faces
the following generalized maximization problem:
max
P igl
[(
P igl − P ail
)γ (
Pwl − P igl
)1−γ]
(2.15)
where l = aigh, aigo, and w = gh if l = aigh, while w = go if
l = aigo. The maximizing price is:
P igl = (1− γ)P ail + γPwl (2.16)
If l = aigh, and hence w = gh, we have:
P igaigh = (1− γ)P aiaigh + γP ghaigh (2.17)
If, instead, l = aigo, and hence w = go, the price in (2.16) can
be rewritten as:
P igaigo = (1− γ)P aiaigo + γP goaigo (2.18)
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2.3.3 Primary market
ah channel
In the bargaining between the artist and the auction house, the
artist bargains directly with the auction house on the price of
her artwork and her bargaining power is equal to η, so that the
problem she faces is the following:
max
Pahah
[(
P ahah − P aR
)η (
PA − P ahah
)1−η]
(2.19)
that, given assumption in (2.1) and (2.3), is solved for:
P ahah = (1− η)P aR + ηP oR (2.20)
aih, aigh and aigo channels
In all three bargainings between the artist and the insider, the
artist, having a bargaining power equal to α, faces the follow-
ing generalized problem:
max
Paik
[(
P aik − P aR
)α (
P zk − P aik
)1−α]
(2.21)
where k = aigh, aigo, aih and z = ig if k = aigh, aigo and
z = ih if k = aih. The maximizing price is given by:
P aik = (1− α)P aR + αP zk (2.22)
If k = aigh, and hence z = ig, we can rewrite (2.22) as:
P aiaigh = (1− α)P aR + αP igaigh (2.23)
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If, instead, k = aigo, (2.22) becomes:
P aiaigo = (1− α)P aR + αP igaigo (2.24)
Finally, if k = aih, and hence z = ih, we have:
P aiaih = (1− α)P aR + αP ihaih (2.25)
agh and ago
In the bargaining between the artist and the gallery, the artist
knows if the gallery will sell the artwork to the auction house
or to the outsider. The artist’s bargaining power is β, and she
faces the following generalized maximization problem:
max
Pagj
[(
P agj − P aR
)β (
P yj − P agj
)1−β] (2.26)
where j = agh, ago, and y = gh when j = agh, while y = go
when j = ago. The problem in (2.26) is solved for:
P agj = (1− β)P aR + βP yj (2.27)
If j = agh, and hence y = gh, we can rewrite (2.27) as:
P agagh = (1− β)P aR + βP ghagh (2.28)
If, instead, j = ago and y = go, we have:
P agago = (1− β)P aR + βP goago (2.29)
2.3.4 The gallery’s and the insider’s choices
We present now the results for the secondary and tertiary mar-
ket.
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Lemma 2.1 Whatever the price the gallery pays to buy the artwork,
the gallery will prefer to sell the artwork to the auction house rather
than to sell it to the outsider if and only if:
ν > δ (2.30)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Lemma 2.2 Whatever the price the gallery pays to buy the artwork,
it will be sold to the outsider if and only if:16
ν < δ (2.31)
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
In summary, the choice of the gallery is only based on its
ability in the bargaining process with the potential buyers. In
fact, it is likely that the gallery can exploit its market power
versus the outsider in a more effective way than what it could
do with the auction house, since the auction houses are more
informed than outsiders and the auction houses’ market is less
concentrated than the galleries’ one. Hence, an artwork that
reaches a gallery is more likely to be sold to an outsider than
to be sold to an auction house, and thus the bargaining should
prevail on auctioning. However, this last conjecture should be
empirically tested on prices and market powers data, though
there is a lack of data on this shadow market.
Lemma 2.3 Given Lemma 2.1, whatever the price the insider pays to
buy the artwork, he will sell it to the auction house instead of selling
16A similar reasoning can be applied to the case when δ = ν, but we do
not report it since it is trivial. In particular, also in the following Lemmas and
Propositions we will not consider the cases of indifference, namely when the
conditions present the equality sign.
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it to the gallery if and only if:
µ >
νγ
1− γ(1− ν) (2.32)
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Lemma 2.4 The insider will sell the artwork to the gallery instead
of to the auction house, whatever the price he paid and given Lemma
2.1, if and only if:
µ <
νγ
1− γ(1− ν) (2.33)
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Lemma 2.5 Given Lemma 2.2, whatever the price the insider pays to
buy the artwork, he will sell it to the auction house instead of selling
it to the gallery if and only if:
µ >
δγ
1− γ(1− δ) (2.34)
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
Lemma 2.6 The insider will sell the artwork to the gallery, whatever
the price he paid and given Lemma 2.2, if and only if:
µ <
δγ
1− γ(1− δ) (2.35)
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
To sum up, the dominance of the bargaining over the auc-
tioning in the choice of the insider depends on a comparison
between the insider’s market power against the auction house
and his market power against the gallery, weighted for the mar-
ket power of the gallery in the potential step forward. Given
the fact that the insider collector is not a professional agent, one
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could reasonably expect that the auction house has a high abil-
ity in the bargaining process with this agent. Hence, it is likely
that the artwork will be sold to the gallery by the insider. Fur-
thermore, one could expect that, in the bargaining between the
gallery and the insider, the former, being a professional agent,
will be able to exploit its market power to gain more than half
of the price spread, that is, gallery’s market power is likely to
be higher than insider’s one; currently, the lack of data prevents
us to test this hypothesis.
2.3.5 The artist’s choice
In this subsection we present the main results for the primary
market.
Proposition 2.1 Given Lemma 2.3, the artist has to choose between
selling the artwork to the auction house, selling it to the insider (know-
ing that he will sell the artwork to the auction house if he buys it),
and selling it to the gallery (which will sell the artwork to the auction
house, once the gallery has bought it). The conditions on the parame-
ters for each of these choices to be selected, choosing among the prices
in (2.20), (2.25), and (2.28) are the following:
2.1.1 The artist sells to the insider (aih ≻ agh ∧ aih ≻ ah) if and
only if:
η <
αµ
1− α(1− µ) ∧ β <
αµ
αµ+ ν(1− α) (2.36)
2.1.2 The artist sells to the gallery (agh ≻ aih ∧ agh ≻ ah) if and
only if:
η <
βν
1− β(1− ν) ∧ β >
αµ
αµ+ ν(1− α) (2.37)
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2.1.3 The artist sells to the auction house (ah ≻ aih ∧ ah ≻ agh) if
and only if:
η >
βν
1− β(1− ν) ∧ η >
αµ
1− α(1− µ) (2.38)
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
Proposition 2.2 Given Lemma 2.4, the artist has to choose between
selling her artwork to the auction house, selling it to the gallery know-
ing that it will be sold to the auction house, and selling it to the in-
sider, knowing that he will sell it to the gallery and, then, the gallery
will sell it to the auction house. Hence, the three prices among which
the artist has to choose are those in (2.20), in (2.23), and in (2.28).
Thus, we have the following conditions for the three possible choices:
2.2.1 The artist sells to the insider (aigh ≻ agh∧aigh ≻ ah) if and
only if:
η <
αγν
1− α(1− γ)− γ(1− ν)∧
∧ β < αγ
1− α(1− γ(2− ν))− γ(1− ν)
(2.39)
2.2.2 The artist sells to the gallery (agh ≻ aigh ∧ agh ≻ ah) if and
only if:
η <
βν
1− β(1− ν) ∧ β >
αγ
1− α(1− γ(2− ν))− γ(1− ν) (2.40)
2.2.3 The artist sells to the auction house (ah ≻ aigh ∧ ah ≻ agh)
if and only if:
η >
βν
1− β(1− ν) ∧ η >
αγν
1− α(1− γ)− γ(1− ν) (2.41)
Proof. See Appendix A.8.
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Proposition 2.3 Given Lemma 2.5, the artist has to choose between
selling her artwork to the auction house, selling it to the gallery know-
ing that it will be sold to the outsider, and selling it to the insider,
knowing that he will sell it to the auction house. Hence, the three
prices among which the artist has to choose are those in (2.20), in
(2.25), and in (2.29). The conditions for which each of the three prices
is chosen are the following ones:
2.3.1 The artist sells to the insider (aih ≻ ago ∧ aih ≻ ah) if and
only if:
η <
αµ
1− α(1− µ) ∧ β <
αµ
αµ+ δ(1− α) (2.42)
2.3.2 The artist sells to the gallery (ago ≻ aih ∧ ago ≻ ah) if and
only if:
η <
βδ
1− β(1− δ) ∧ β >
αµ
αµ+ δ(1− α) (2.43)
2.3.3 The artist sells to the auction house (ah ≻ aih ∧ ah ≻ ago) if
and only if:
η >
βδ
1− β(1− δ) ∧ η >
αµ
1− α(1− µ) (2.44)
Proof. See Appendix A.9.
Proposition 2.4 Given Lemma 2.6, the artist has to choose between
selling her artwork to the auction house, selling it to the gallery know-
ing that it will be sold to the outsider, and selling it to the insider,
knowing that the artwork will be sold to the outsider passing by the
gallery. The prices among which the artist has to choose are those on
(2.20), (2.24), and (2.29). The parameter loci in which each of the
possible choice is the preferred one are the following:
2.4.1 The artist sells to the insider (aigo ≻ ago∧ aigo ≻ ah) if and
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only if:
η <
αγδ
1− α(1− γ)− γ(1− δ)∧
∧ β < αγ
1− α(1− γ(2− δ))− γ(1− δ)
(2.45)
2.4.2 The artist sells to the gallery (ago ≻ aigo ∧ ago ≻ ah) if and
only if:
η <
βδ
1− β(1− δ) ∧ β >
αγ
1− α(1− γ(2− δ))− γ(1− δ) (2.46)
2.4.3 The artist sells to the auction house (ah ≻ aigo ∧ ah ≻ ago)
if and only if:
η >
βδ
1− β(1− δ) ∧ η >
αγδ
1− α(1− γ)− γ(1− δ) (2.47)
Proof. See Appendix A.10.
Once the artwork has been created, the artist chooses what
is the path through which the artwork will reach the public
market, maximizing her artwork’s price and hence her surplus.
This is done considering all the market powers of all the agents,
and hence all the agents’ optimal choices that could or will fol-
low the artist’s choice. The dominance of a certain path on the
others depends on the relative ability of the artist to bargain
against each of the potential buyers, in the current step (the
primary market), and on the bargaining powers of the other
agents in the following steps (the secondary and tertiary mar-
ket), only in the cases in which they are reached. In particular,
the choice on which path to follow is based on a comparison
of the relative market powers of the artist “discounted” by the
market powers of all the agents that will operate in each path,
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that is, considering the fall-back positions she faces.
In Table 2.3 we report the necessary and sufficient conditions
such that each of the path can be observed.
Finally, the artist’s choice will lead to a set of equilibrium
prices, since each path will have a set of at least one equilibrium
price, that will depend on the market powers of the agents on
the chosen path only. In the following section we perform a
comparative statics analysis.
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Table 2.3: Conditions for the emergence of each path
Paths iff
ah
ν > δ ∧ η > βν1−β(1−ν) ∧
µ > νγ1−γ(1−ν) ∧ η > αµ1−α(1−µ)
µ < νγ1−γ(1−ν) ∧ η > αγν1−α(1−γ)−γ(1−ν)
ν < δ ∧ η > βδ1−β(1−δ) ∧
µ > δγ1−γ(1−δ) ∧ η > αµ1−α(1−µ)
µ < δγ1−γ(1−δ) ∧ η > αγδ1−α(1−γ)−γ(1−δ)
ago ν < δ ∧ η < βδ1−β(1−δ) ∧
µ > δγ1−γ(1−δ) ∧ β > αµαµ+δ(1−α)
µ < δγ1−γ(1−δ) ∧ β > αγ1−α(1−γ(2−δ))−γ(1−δ)
agh ν > δ ∧ η < βν1−β(1−ν) ∧
µ > νγ1−γ(1−ν) ∧ β > αµαµ+ν(1−α)
µ < νγ1−γ(1−ν) ∧ β > αγ1−α(1−γ(2−ν))−γ(1−ν)
aih η < αµ1−α(1−µ) ∧
ν > δ ∧ µ > νγ1−γ(1−ν) ∧,β < αµαµ+ν(1−α)
ν < δ ∧ µ > δγ1−γ(1−δ) ∧ β < αµαµ+δ(1−α)
aigo ν < δ ∧ µ < δγ1−γ(1−δ) ∧ η < αγδ1−α(1−γ)−γ(1−δ) ∧ β < αγ1−α(1−γ(2−δ))−γ(1−δ)
aigh ν > δ ∧ µ < νγ1−γ(1−ν) ∧ η < αγν1−α(1−γ)−γ(1−ν) ∧ β < αγ1−α(1−γ(2−ν))−γ(1−ν)
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2.3.6 Comparative statics
In this section we study how the prices changes as the mar-
ket’s power levels change. In analysing the effect of a change in
the bargaining power on a certain price, we first consider only
changes in the parameters that will make the conditions under
which the price is observed to still hold also after the changes.
In other words, if the price Py is observed, it is because a certain
parameter x that enters its expression respects the condition to
be on path y, for example x < x¯; if we want to study what is the
effect of a change in x on Py , that is,
dPy
dx , we need to have that
x+ dx < x¯, otherwise we could incur in a change of the path in
the game modeled in this section and, hence, in the occurrence
of a price different from Py .
Assuming that the condition we just mentioned holds, one can
demonstrate that all the equilibrium prices of each step and in
each possible path are increasing in the parameters of bargain-
ing power that appear in their expressions.
Observing the closed-form expressions of the various prices
(see Appendix A), one can see that their formulas vary depend-
ing on how many steps there are in the path to which the price
is referred and what is its position in this path. Considering the
number of steps in the path, we can distinguish among three
different paths:
• Paths with only one step (ah)
• Paths with two steps (aih, ago, and agh)
• Paths with three steps (aigh and aigo)
Another distinction is based on the position of the considered
price on the path in which it is observed, that is:
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1. Prices in a one-step path (that is, P ahah in the ah path)
2. Prices in a two-step path with a further step in front (that
is, P aiaih in the aih path, and P
ag
ago and P
ag
agh in the ago and
agh paths)
3. Prices in a two-step path with no further steps in front
(that is, P ihaih in the aih path, and P
go
ago and P
gh
agh in the ago
and agh paths)
4. Prices in a three-step path with two further steps in front
(that is, P aiaigh in the aigh path, and P
ai
aigo in the aigo path)
5. Prices in a three-step path with a step behind and a fur-
ther step in front (that is P igaigh in the aigh path, and P
ig
aigo
in the aigo path)
6. Prices in a three-step path with two steps behind (that is
P ghaigh in the aigh path, and P
go
aigo in the aigo path)
From a first analysis of all these prices, we can easily see that
all of them have a similar structure, that is:
Px = (1− ξ)Pz + ξPy
where ξ is the bargaining power of the considered agent, Pz is
either his purchasing price (if the agent is a gallery or an in-
sider) or his reserve price (if he is an artist), and Py is either
the reserve price of the outsider (if the seller is the gallery, or
the artist when facing the auction house, or the insider when
facing the auction house, by assumption (2.3)) or simply the
price that will be obtained in the following step (if the seller is
the artist when facing the gallery or the insider, or the insider
when facing the gallery). Given how we built the model, we
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have that Py > Pz , and hence Px is increasing in ξ.
So, all the prices that appears in Section 2.3 are increasing in
the parameter that appears in them, but this implies that their
closed form, as they result in Appendix A, are increasing in all
the parameters that appear in them as well.
The explanation of this result is as follows: since both the lower
and the upper bound of the interval over which the bargaining
of each of the prices is made are increasing in the parameters
that appear in them, as well as the price itself is increasing in
the parameter it has inside it, an increase in each of the pa-
rameters that appears in each price formula have an increasing
effect on it, assumed that these changes in the parameters do
not change the validity of the condition under which the price
is observed.
However, a change in a parameter could also make one or
more than one of the conditions to not hold anymore, that is, it
could change the path the artwork will follow; this is due to the
effect a parameter have on the equilibrium price of each of the
path, and hence could change the choice of the agents. For ex-
ample, assuming conditions (2.30), (2.32), and (2.38) hold, that
is, assuming the artwork is in the ah path, a reduction in η such
that η > βν1−β(1−ν) does not hold anymore, but η >
αµ
1−α(1−µ)
still holds (that is, βν1−β(1−ν) >
αµ
1−α(1−µ) ) will imply that the art-
work will pass to the agh path; if instead η changes such that
βν
1−β(1−ν) still hold, while
αµ
1−α(1−µ) does not hold anymore, the
artwork will pass to the aih path.
If we assume that the artwork is in the ago path, that is, that
conditions (2.31), (2.35), and (2.46) hold, a reduction in β such
that β > αγ1−α(1−γ(2−δ))−γ(1−δ) does not hold anymore will make
the artwork pass through path aigo instead.
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These examples we presented depict how a particular agent
could emerge in the path the artwork will follow, due to the
effect this agent has on the equilibrium price of this path: an
artist will find profitable to sell her artwork to the insider as
her market power towards the auction house decreases, while
her market power against the gallery is not high enough; the
emergence of the insider within the ago path, transforming it
in aigo, can be explained with a similar argument.
It is worth noting that all the analysis carried through in this
subsection assume the ceteris paribus condition, that is, a change
in one of the parameter is not associated to the change of any
of the other parameters.
2.4 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented a Nash bargaining model of the
private art market in which the new artworks are traded, to
explain its functioning and characterize the main relationships
between the agents that operate in this shadow market. In our
model, the artist creates the artwork and sells it in the primary
market, in which insider collectors and galleries operates; the
insiders can resell the artwork to the gallery in the secondary
market, and the gallery can resell it, both in the secondary and
in the tertiary market, to the outsider collector, depending on
the market in which the artwork has been bought; all these
agents, besides the outsider collectors, can also sell the artwork
in the public market, through the intermediation of an auction
house.
Using the bargaining selling method as actual price mechanism
formation in art trades, we represent the agents’ simultaneous
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choices through the market channels in the private art market
of new artworks. In particular, we identified a set of bargain
equilibrium prices in each possible market channel. All the
equilibrium prices are path-dependent and are positively af-
fected by any increase of the market powers of the agents in
the path in which the price is observed.
With our bargaining games, we can fully characterize the mar-
ket conditions for which an artwork ends up to be sold in a
gallery or at auction, eventually with the intermediation of other
agents, as an insider collector, too. In this way, we defined the
artist’s optimal incentive in creating a new artwork, since she is
able to perfectly identify the private price at which her artwork
will be sold. Furthermore, we are able to explain both the role
of the gallery in the price formation in the private market and
its incentives to operate in the art market.
Our setting provides an ideal framework of this market that
could be used to test the efficiency of the Artist Re-sale Rights
(the royalty an artist could receive when her artwork is resold
through a dealer), as well as other public interventions in the
art market to support one or more agents/paths. When the
data will be available on private market, the testable implica-
tions of our model could be carried through, not only as an
empirical validation of the results, but also as a way to identify
the dominant paths in the real shadow art market.
However, our framework can also be adopted to analyze the
market of patents, where the inventor would take the role of
the artist, the gallery would be replaced by a patent broker, the
auction house by the agents who sell the patents in auction,
that are recently emerged in the market of the intellectual prop-
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erty,17 while the insider and the outsider would be replaced re-
spectively by a more and a less informed firm.
17For an analysis of patent brokerage firms, intellectual property auctions,
and other intermediaries in the intellectual property market, see Hagiu and
Yoffie (2013).
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Chapter 3
Value and information
in the art market: A
behavioural pricing
model
3.1 Introduction
Talking about prices in the art market should be done consid-
ering the role that information and value play in the artworks’
price-formation mechanism. Many scholars from humanities
vastly studied the value issue in the art, and the information
issue in economics has been addressed even by Nobel prizes;
however, when humanists study the value of cultural goods
they often neglect the asymmetric information issue among the
agents, while when economists study the information asymme-
try question they usually ignore the role played by the cultural
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value in the cultural goods’ market.
In fact, cultural goods have the peculiarity to embody both a
cultural and an economic value, and the agents that operate
in the cultural goods’ markets usually have a different level of
available information on these two values. Hence, the two is-
sues are closely related and should not be studied separately.
To date, few cultural economists have considered together the
two questions in the same framework, using theories from eco-
nomics and concepts from humanities, but always without a
pure analytical approach. For this reason, we propose a new
theoretical model of pricing, based on Chapter 2, to take into
account both the information and value issues in the cultural
goods’ market. Starting from the artist’s choice about selling
her artwork, we model the relationships among the galleries’
and collectors’ actions in the private market depending on the
information at their disposal and on their ability in evaluating
the cultural and economic value of the artwork itself. In par-
ticular, using a bargaining theoretical framework developed by
Wu (2004), we analyze two of the channels of the private art
market we proposed in 2, through which the new artwork cre-
ated by the artist may reach a collector with the intermediation
of a gallery, and study what is the role of information and value
in the formation of the price of an artwork in these channels.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section
3.2 we present a detailed literature review on both value of cul-
tural goods (Subsection 3.2.1) and information asymmetry in
cultural goods’ markets (Subsection 3.2.2). In Section 3.3, we
briefly summarize the results of the model from 2 and in Sec-
tion 3.4 we develop the new model considering both artist’s tal-
ent and fame and information issue on quality of the artworks.
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In Section 3.5 we discuss the main results of our model. Section
3.6 concludes the paper.
3.2 State of the Art
In art markets, as well as in general, the price has a double
meaning: it works as an index of value of the good, and it is an
important information signal of quality. However, when study-
ing the art market, the value and the information deserve par-
ticular attention, given the higher number of issues that one
should deal with. For this reason, understanding the price-
formation mechanism of art goods is key. While there exists
a vast number of qualitative contributions on this topic in lit-
erature (see, for example, Velthuis, 2007), the theoretical analy-
sis of the price mechanism in the art market lacks of attention,
besides the works by Shubik (2003) and by Scho¨nfeld and Re-
installer (2007), as well as the model in Chapter 2 of this dis-
sertation; furthermore, all these works overlooked the role of
information in the art market and of value of cultural goods. In
order to take into account these two important features of the
art market, we first present the state of the art of the literature
on the value and the evaluation of cultural goods (Subsection
3.2.1) and on the asymmetric information issue in the art mar-
ket (Subsection 3.2.2).
3.2.1 On value of cultural goods
There are several possible definitions of cultural good in litera-
ture; for example, Throsby (2001) defines the three main char-
acteristics a cultural good should have to be called such: “that
the activities concerned involve some form of creativity in their
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production, that they are concerned with the generation and
communication of symbolic meaning, and that their output em-
bodies, at least potentially, some form of intellectual property”
(p. 4),1 while Klamer (2004) states that “[A cultural good] has
cultural value in that it is a source of inspiration or symbol of
distinction”(p. 138).
Defining the “value” of cultural goods, however, is a contro-
versial issue, since these goods present both a cultural and eco-
nomic value; while there exists a consensus on how economic
value of cultural goods’ can be evaluated, the evaluation of
their cultural value is an open issue, which has recently been
addressed by several cultural economists.2
One of the early contributions on the analysis of the cultural
value in cultural economics is a work by Throsby (1990), in
which the author addresses the problem of the valuation of
the quality of an art piece (in particular, a theater play) given
the difficulty in resuming the several facets of the quality in
an index, and, hence, in measuring it. More recently, Thro-
sby (2001, pp. 281–282) states that the cultural value is “multi-
dimensional, unstable, contested, lacks a common unit of ac-
count, and may contain elements that cannot be easily expres-
sed according to any quantitative or qualitative scale”, and he
decomposes this value in:3
• the aesthetic value, that concerns “properties of beauty,
harmony, form, and other aesthetic characteristics of the
1The same work contains also a definition of the economic value of a cul-
tural good, that is the value which “comprises any direct use values of the
cultural good or service in question, plus whatever non-market values it may
give rise to.”
2For an analysis of evaluation methods of cultural goods’ economic value,
see Throsby (2001) and Snowball (2008).
3See Throsby (2001, pp. 28–29).
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work” and to other possible elements, like “style, fashion
and good or bad taste”;
• the spiritual value, that is, the value given to a work of
art because it has a “significance to the members of a re-
ligious faith, tribe or other cultural grouping”, but also
an importance which is secular-based and hence shared
among all the individuals;
• the social value, the value linked to the sense of connec-
tion with others which the artwork transmits;
• the historical value, related to the way “it reflects the con-
ditions of life at the time it was created”;
• the symbolic value, which is linked to the ability of the
artwork to convey a particular meaning, perceived by the
individual through his reading of the artwork itself;
• the authenticity value, that is, the value that comes from
the fact that the artwork is original.
These sub-values are explicitly said to be only a part of the con-
stituent elements of the cultural value, although they can be
considered the most important. Throsby’s decomposition of
the cultural value has been accepted, either implicitly or explic-
itly, within cultural economics literature, with only few excep-
tions, among which we have the contributions by Klamer (2004,
2008).4 He highlights the presence of characteristics that are
4Also Smith (2008, pp. 36–38) presents an alternative view to Throsby’s,
introducing a totally new categorization of the types of artistic values, “each
associated with the observable properties or the demonstrable effects of art-
works”. Specifically, these values are existent value, representation value, for-
mative value, insight/idea value, transformatory value.
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cultural goods-specific, linked to their ability of being “symbol
of something”, or to their “artistic, aesthetic, or sacred quali-
ties”, which, however, are not considered as components of the
cultural value by the author; conversely, he states that an artis-
tic good can be evaluated on the basis of three different, and
mutually exclusive, values, that is:5
• the economic value, “the value that refers to the prices of
things, or their exchange value”;
• the social value, which operates “in the context of inter-
personal relationships, groups, communities, and soci-
eties” (as, for example, “belonging, being a member of
a group, identity, social distinction, freedom, solidarity,
trust, tolerance, responsibility, love, friendship”);
• the cultural value, that comprehends everything which is
not part of social and economic values.
Lately, Hernando Calero and Campo Martı´nez (2016) present
an alternative characterization of value and its components in
the art market, based on literature from both economics and
marketing, but also from other subjects, as psychology, his-
tory of art, philosophy, and sociology. The authors distinguish
among four components of value in the art market, that in turn
can be made up of different components; the hedonistic value,
the economic value, the social-symbolic value, and the artwork
brand value. In particular, the hedonistic value includes the
aesthetic value, the emotional value, the ownership value, and
the cognitive value; the economic value is composed by the
investment value and the value linked to its being a “good
5See Klamer (2004, pp. 147-150).
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legacy” for future generation, the value attributed by the pre-
scribers, that is, by the experts, and the scientific value, linked
to the authenticity and the origin of the artwork; the social-
symbolic value, which is here linked to the status conferred
by the ownership of the artwork, and the artwork brand value
have not been decomposed in their components by the authors.
The scale of value introduced by Hernando Calero and Campo
Martı´nez (2016), and then tested empirically through qualita-
tive and quantitative data, is centered on the concept of per-
ception, and hence results to be different depending on the
individual considered in the evaluation, while the Throsby’s
and the Klamer’s views tend to be more objective; this does not
mean that the component of cultural value introduced by Thro-
sby are perceived in the same way by each individuals, but that
these components are defined in an objective way, but they can
be perceived differently by different individuals.
Following Throsby’s view and using it as a benchmark, Ta-
ble 3.1 reports other contributions from the cultural economics
literature which addressed this issue providing a decomposi-
tion of the cultural value which is in line with Throsby’s, but
also add original components of the cultural value.
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Table 3.1: Comparison among the benchmark decomposition of cultural value and alternative
views
Aesthetic
value
Spiritual
value∗
Social
value∗∗
Historical
value∗∗∗
Symbolic
value∗∗∗∗
Authenticity
value
Other
values
Throsby (2001) yes yes yes yes yes yes no
Throsby (2003) yes yes - yes yes yes yes
Hutter and Shusterman (2006) yes yes yes yes yes - yes
Dekker (2014) yes - yes yes - - no
Throsby and Zednik (2014) yes yes yes yes yes - yes
Components of the cultural value presented by Throsby (2001) and other scholars’ views in accordance with Throsby’s work. “yes” indicates
that the work points out that the correspondent value exists (being it defined in the work itself or just recalled), “-” indicates that the value is not
recalled in the paper. Hutter and Shusterman (2006) call some of the Throsby’s values with alternative names, but from the definitions we are
able to link together same value with different names, in particular: ∗ Spiritual value is also called “Moral/Religious value”, ∗∗ Social value is
called “Social and Political value”, ∗∗∗ Historical value comprehends both “Art-historical value” and “Art Cult value”, and ∗∗∗∗ Symbolic value
contains “Cognitive value”, the value linked to “Expressiveness”, and the one linked to “Communicative power”.
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The other components of the cultural value, besides those in
Throsby (2001), are: the educational value (Throsby and Zed-
nik, 2014, p. 88), that can be “identified in terms of the works
role in the education of children”; the value linked to the signif-
icance of the good in influencing artistic trends (Throsby, 2003,
p. 280); the integrity of the work of art (Throsby, 2003, p. 280);
the experiential value (Hutter and Shusterman, 2006, p. 198),
that is, the “directly satisfying or pleasurable experience” the
good gives; the art-technical value (Hutter and Shusterman,
2006, p. 199), which “relates to the skill, technique, or technical
innovation displayed by an artwork”.
Other scholars addressed the value issue, even if they did
not decompose the cultural value but focused more on the rela-
tionship between the economic and the cultural value (if any),
or on possible empirical strategies to investigate this relation-
ship. In the first years of the formation of this literature dialec-
tics, the dichotomous distinction among economic value and
cultural value was not explicitly stated, and a particular at-
tention was paid to the “quality” of a artwork, more than to
its cultural value (Throsby, 1990). One of the first contribu-
tion to the analysis of the cultural versus economic value is-
sue was the book by Klamer (1996), “The Value of Culture”, in
which the author collected a series of works by various schol-
ars, from the economics field as well as from other fields, as
philosophy, anthropology, and sociology.6 Bonus and Ronte
(1997, p. 104), highlight the particular feature of the quality of
an artwork of not being objectively judged, stating that “there
is no way to establish the quality of a certain picture or oeu-
6Indeed, Klamer (2004) was partly anticipated by the contributes in this
book.
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vre”, maybe overstating the difficulty that one can find in find-
ing a proxy of this variable or of its components. The issue of
the quality evaluation of an artwork has been treated by Gins-
burgh and Weyers (1999), suggesting to decompose the work of
art in “quantifiable characteristics”, both subjectively and in an
unanimous way, and applying their technique to the movies in-
dustry.7 More recently, the same authors (Ginsburgh and Wey-
ers, 2008) reprise the evaluation of the beauty of a work of art,
identifying three “types of beauty” that can be evaluated and
measured using tools typical of the economic analysis.
After the book by Throsby (2001), also Candela and Scorcu
(2004) addressed the cultural versus economic value issue, call-
ing the former “artistic merit”: the idea is that the same object
can be recognized to have an artistic merit (that is, a cultural
value) depending on how it is considered by the public, by the
experts, or by some other group of influence; there exists a re-
lationship between the artistic merit and the economic value,
also if the evaluation of the economic value of the object can
be made also without considering its artistic merit.8 This dis-
tinction, however, is not easy to make, since the two values
are strongly correlated, and in some cases it is hard to value
an object only for what concerns its artistic merit or its eco-
nomic value. McCain (2006) distinguishes between economic
and non-economic values; in particular, he reviews a series of
7Another empirical investigation on the quality assessment is the one pre-
sented by Chossat and Gergaud (2003), which use the experts official judg-
ments to quantify the quality of gastronomy. Tobias (2004) analyses the rela-
tionship between the expert opinion in the performing arts as a proxy of the
quality and the economic variable, such as production costs.
8The authors bring the example of the artwork “ballet franc¸ais” by Man Ray,
pointing out that one could abstract the artistic merit of the object and consider
only its economic value linked to its value as a broom.
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works on the concept of value, both from economics and non-
economics fields. In his essay, the author recognizes three main
values a work of art can have: the economic value, the cul-
tural value, and the artistic value, admitting the possibility of
an overlap between the last two values. Velthuis (2007) iden-
tifies two approaches in literature to the distinction between
the economic and the cultural value inside cultural goods’ mar-
kets: the “hostile worlds” approach, which focuses on the idea
that comparing art creation and diffusion with the logic of the
market is detrimental for the artistic world, and the “nothing
but” approach, for which the economic value can encompass
the cultural value, that is, the two markets inside the art market
(the one on artistic value and the one on the economic value)
can be reduced to a single market. Velthuis’s view, however,
is that the two worlds cannot be divided and, in particular,
that nowadays one cannot evaluate the artistic merit of an art-
work without considering its economic value, which is a point
of view that is the converse of what Van den Braembussche
(1996, p. 33) points out, that is, that “[O]ne can value a work
of art without being in a position to buy it”. One of the re-
cent works that reprises the issue on the relationship between
the cultural and the economic value of an artistic good is the
one by Hutter and Frey (2010), in which the authors propose
that the cultural value has an effect on the economic value of
the artistic goods, presenting examples to support their thesis;
specifically, they analyze the effect of certain components of the
cultural value on the price of the artworks, the best indicator for
economic value (Throsby, 2001), recognizing implicitly a time
effect on the dynamic of prices. In particular, also if the authors
do not use the Throsby’s classification explicitly, they refer to
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the authenticity value in the Raffaello Sanzio’s “Madonna of
the Pinks” and Rembrandt’s “Man in a Golden Helmet” cases,9
and to the symbolic value together with a historical value in the
Pollock’s case.
Besides the classifications of value we presented above, also
other classifications have been proposed in literature; in partic-
ular:
• vertical and horizontal qualities of a good (Ginsburgh and
Weyers, 2008), the former being the ones of which every
consumer prefers to have more than less, the latter being
all the other qualities; this distinction can be called the
Lancaster’s view of the value;
• objective and subjective value (Throsby, 1990); in particu-
lar, Throsby distinguishes between characteristics of whi-
ch a customer might make an objective scale, those that
depend on subjective interpretation but whose consen-
sus can be predicted among a majority of people, and
those based on a subjective assessment and without a pre-
dictable consensus;
• collective and individualistic value (Throsby, 2001; Thro-
sby and Zednik, 2014), that is, the cultural value an indi-
vidual can recognize as benefiting the others (the former),
and the one that comes from his interpretation that is ef-
fective from himself only (the latter);
• intrinsic and extrinsic value (Van den Braembussche,
1996; McCain, 2006); both the authors agree on the fact
9The importance of this value has been pointed out, later, also by Candela
et al. (2009), analysing the case of ethnic art.
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that the economic value is extrinsic, while the other val-
ues are intrinsic in the sense that they depend on individ-
ual preferences;
• static and dynamic value (Candela and Castellani, 2000);
ideas as well as values can evolve overtime (the dynamic
ones, as for example the historical value of an artwork)
or can be stable (the static ones, as the classical beauty,
which is part of aesthetic value).
The concept of dynamic value can be considered also as an ex-
planation of how the value itself is formed, through a process
of growth/decline which occurs thanks to the exchange and the
interaction between the individuals of the population of a cer-
tain “society”. Because of this, we can borrow Dekker (2014)
words and call it “societal value”, which is not the Throsby’s
social value; in fact, the idea behind this value is that there is
some kind of value-, canon-, consensus-formation, in a process
in which the exchange of points of view is key; in Klamer (2008)
words, cultural goods are “discursive constructs” and their val-
ues are established through conversation. In other words, value
is formed thanks to an institution which works through the ac-
tion of social forces (Pretz, 2016). Although none of the con-
sidered authors defines it explicitly, several of them indirectly
describe its development.10 De Marchi (2008) goes further in
delineate this process, stating that the exchange of points of
view which is at the base of the formation of the cultural value
is helped by the market.11 In this dynamic of value formation
10See, for example, Bonus and Ronte (1997), Candela and Castellani (2000),
Velthuis (2003), Candela and Scorcu (2004), McCain (2006), Hutter and Shus-
terman (2006), Hutter and Frey (2010), and Throsby and Zednik (2014).
11The “social production of art” has been deeply studied in sociology, with
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through the market, an important role is played by the experts,
the critics, the dealers, and, in general, every individual that
may influence the non-informed collectors about some compo-
nents of the cultural value they are not able to evaluate, as we
will see later on in Subsection 3.2.2.
Despite of the attention given to the issue of cultural goods’
value identification, none of these works considered explicitly
the artist’s characteristics as determinants of the economic value
of an artwork; among these characteristics, fame and talent
are those who may indeed have a role on influencing the eco-
nomic value. Since the seminal works on talent and fame by
Rosen (1981) and Adler (1985), the definition of artist’s talent
and fame is well-known by the cultural economists, although
cultural economics literature lacks of an analytical definition of
these characteristics.12 While the artist’s talent has be consid-
ered as an innate creative ability (Towse, 2006), the fame refers
to the reputation concept and is related to the public informa-
tion shared by the audience about the artist identity; the former
is a static concept, since it cannot be modified in time neither
by the artist nor by anyone else, while the latter is a typical
dynamic concept, because it is influenced by the market reac-
tion to everything that concerns the artist life. For example, the
death of an artist has been found to affect her fame (Candela
et al., 2016); at the same time, the artist’s choice of appearing in
a magazine could work as a signal of her popularity that could
be perceived and processed by the audience and affect her rep-
focus on the importance of consensus on the value of the cultural characteris-
tics, on the difficulty in conferring a value to a cultural good, and on the effect
of markets on the creation of the cultural value; see, for example, Wolff (1981).
12Pretz (2016) proposes a critique of these two theories based on the fact that
they ignore the social forces that stay behind the formation of superstardom.
In other words, then, also fame is a societal value.
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utation (Adler, 2006). However, this does not imply that talent
cannot have different effects on cultural value in different time
periods, since there could be a change in how society consid-
ers certain components of the cultural value; at the same time,
fame can be influenced also by societal aspects not related to
artist’s life.
Our idea is that both these artist’s characteristics influence pos-
itively the economic value: the fame directly affects it, through
a brand effect (Schroeder, 2005; Zorloni, 2005; Mun˜iz Jr. et al.,
2014), while the artist’s talent, influencing the aesthetic value
and the art-technical value (and thus the cultural value) with a
series of stylistic choices, indirectly affects the economic value.
Specifically, we assume that the artist’s talent has no effect on
the other components of cultural value, as well as fame has no
effect at all on any of the cultural value components.
Figure 3.1 depicts the relationships between the artist-specific
(the diamond-shaped nodes) and artwork-specific character-
istics (the circle-shaped nodes), representing also the cultural
value components (the rectangle-shaped nodes): the thick ar-
rows represent the direction through which the influence of one
of the measure goes (for example, artist’s fame influences the
artwork’s economic value). Clearly, the figure does not contain
all the artist’s characteristics that could have an effect on the
cultural and/or on the economic value, but it is limited to the
two artist’s characteristics considered to be the most important
in cultural economic literature;13 moreover, it represents a static
mechanism of value formation.
13For example, if an artist studied in an art school, increasing her “craft-
ing”/technical ability, her human capital could affect positively the art-
technical value of her works (Towse, 2006).
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Figure 3.1: Artwork’s values, artist’s characteristics, and their relationships
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3.2.2 On information in the art market
In order to emphasize the role of information in both the eco-
nomics and in the cultural economics literature, in the follow-
ing subsections we focus on the main works in these fields, and
we present our contribution to the literature.
The role of information in the economics literature
Since Stigler (1961), the acknowledgment of the importance of
information in economics has been increasing. Akerlof (1970)
highlights that a situation of asymmetric information is a com-
mon problem in several markets, where the seller of a good
can have more information about its quality than the buyer or
vice versa, showing that this could produce adverse selection
in these markets. Stigler (1961), Nelson (1970), and Darby and
Karni (1973) identify three kinds of goods, depending on the
level of information detained by the buyer, that is search, expe-
rience, and credence goods. A search good is a good for which
the customer knows where to get information about and he
only faces the problem linked to the fact that he has to choose
among several options and to evaluate them before purchas-
ing; for these goods the main characteristics, such as quality or
price, are observable before consumption. An experience good
is a good a customer has to buy in order to evaluate it, that
is, the assessment of its quality needs the customer to experi-
ence the good; these goods’ characteristics, such as quality, are
not observable before purchasing, but can be ascertained upon
consumption. Finally, a credence good is a good whose charac-
teristics cannot be evaluate by the customer even after its use,
and the assessment of its quality requires supplementary infor-
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mation that could be costly to obtain; hence, consumers may
require information from experts.
Signaling and screening has been proposed as possible solu-
tions to asymmetric-information problems (adverse selection
and moral hazard): Spence (1973) shows that more informed
agents in markets with asymmetric information can have in-
centives to send costly and credible signal to less informed
agents (signaling); Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show how less
informed agents can obtain information from more informed
agents by providing a set of alternative incentives, through
which the informed ones can self-select for their characteristics
(screening).
However, these solutions are well-suited only for experience
goods, while for credence goods these strategies do not solve
the asymmetric-information problem. For this reason, credence
goods became a center of interest in literature, since Emons’s
works (Emons, 1997, 2001), who started a branch of literature
that defined more precisely the issues related to this market
and centered the attention in the characteristics of the agents
that operate in a credence good’s market that could avoid the
appearance of these issues.14 In particular, following Dulleck
and Kerschbamer (2006, p. 7), credence goods’ market is char-
acterized by three specific problems, that is: undertreament,
which occurs when the consumer requires a complex and ex-
pensive treatment but the expert provides a simple and inex-
pensive one; overtreatment, that occurs when the consumer re-
quires an inexpensive and simple intervention, but the experts
provides an expensive one, so that the consumer pays for an
14See, for example, Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003), Dulleck and Ker-
schbamer (2006), Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2009), Hyndman and Ozerturk
(2011), Dulleck et al. (2011), and Dulleck et al. (2012).
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additional benefit he does not need; overcharging, that occurs
when the consumer receives exactly the treatment he needs,
but pays for a more expensive treatment. As one can see, in
all these three cases the consumer suffers from the expert’s op-
portunistic behavior.15 Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) and
Dulleck et al. (2011) also identify the institutional and market
conditions that can be observed in the credence goods markets;
the institutional conditions are liability, that is, the expert must
provide the expensive intervention when it is needed, and veri-
fiability, that is, the impossibility for the expert to charge for the
expensive treatment if he has provided the cheap one.16 The
market conditions, introduced by Dulleck et al. (2011), refer to
the effect of the experts’ reputation in customers’ choices, that
is, the non-anonymity of the experts, and to the competition in
the market of the experts, that is, absence of bilateral monopoly
(Dulleck et al., 2011, pp. 527-528). Table 1 in Dulleck et al. (2011,
p. 533) presents all the possible combinations among institu-
tional and market conditions, while Table 2 in Dulleck et al.
(2011, p. 536) reports all the predictions of their model on trade
and pricing.
15Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) also highlight two other issues that could
emerge in the credence goods’ market, that is, price discrimination, and the
search cost a customer could incur in when he visits more experts in order to
obtain a diagnosis for the quality he needs.
16The authors also identify two additional characteristics of the customers
that can influence the effect of the asymmetric information; these are the com-
mitment, that is, the customer must undergo the intervention the expert rec-
ommended him, and the homogeneity, that is, the fact that the customers of
the market have the same information set (Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006, p.
12).
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The role of information in cultural economics
One of the first cultural economics contribution on the role
of information in the cultural markets is the chapter by Mc-
Cain (1980), in which the author highlights the presence of an
information-based market failure in the art market, due to the
“lemon” character of what he calls “pattern-complex” goods,
that is, artistic goods which are difficult to interpret and un-
derstand by people who have not enough knowledge of the
art. Later, Bonus and Ronte (1997, p. 104) claim that cultural
goods do not fall neither in the search goods’ category, nor
in the experience goods’ category, nor in the credence goods’
one, and at the same time define the “cultural quality” as the
fourth category of goods, which can be evaluated only thanks
to “[a] highly specific type of cultural knowledge” and through
“a process of generating credibility, a process in which experts
from the art scene have a key role”; Caves (2003, p. 75) asserts
that “in creative industries nobody knows, and the core problem
is one of symmetrical ignorance”; Blaug (2001, p. 125) states
that cultural goods are “typically experience goods for which
tastes have to be acquired by a temporal process of consump-
tion”; Zorloni (2013, p. 51) identifies the artworks sold in the
contemporary art market as “trust good, whose quality is not
assessable by the buyer neither before nor after purchase due
to lack of technical and cultural knowledge”, with a definition
which is very similar to the credence goods’ one.17 Finally, Can-
dela et al. (2012) empirically investigate the role of signaling in
tribal art market.
17Lupton (2005) introduces the concept of indeterminate good, as a commod-
ity whose quality is uncertain for everyone, using as an example the artistic
good, though she points out that the artist alone knows the quality in this case.
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As in the market for professional services, the experts are the
most informed agents among those that operate in the art mar-
ket. Their importance has been analyzed primarily by Cameron
(1995), who highlights their role in spreading the informa-
tion about the artworks, as well as other functions, among
which their contribution to the formation of artists’ reputation;
Velthuis (2012) stresses the importance of the experts in de-
termining the “artist’s commercial credibility”; Wijnberg and
Gemser (2000) state that the artists’ selection system in the art
market evolved from a system based on market and peer selec-
tion to a system where experts selection became more impor-
tant; Ginsburgh (2003) points out that experts’ function in the
contemporary art market is to help the collectors to evaluate the
artworks’ quality; Ginsburgh and van Ours (2003) study the ef-
fect of experts evaluation in the success of the artists who par-
ticipated to a musical competition; Khaire (2015) defines “in-
termediaries” those individuals who mediate between the con-
sumer and the producer/seller, increasing the information pro-
vided by the latter. Moreover, experts act as gatekeepers in the
art market, as pointed out by Candela and Scorcu (2004), and
may have an influence on the perception of artworks’ quality,
as empirically tested by Reinstein and Snyder (2005).18
Our contribution to the literature
In order to conceptualize the information problem in the art
market, we propose the existence of four levels of information
availability, depending on the type of agent that operates in the
18As Wijnberg (1995) points out, “[t]he experts function as ‘certifiers’ [...] de-
termining at the same time whether an object is a work of [...] art and its qual-
ity” (p. 229).
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market; starting from the most informed agent, we have:
1. the artist, who knows all the characteristics of the artwork
she created, clearly;
2. the art dealers as the galleries, for whom the art good is
a search good, since they face the various options of pur-
chase among various artists’ artworks and they incur in
negligible costs to inspect the artworks before they buy
one or more of them;
3. the sophisticated collectors, the “insiders” (see Chapter 2
and Bonus and Ronte (1997)), who detain the ability to
quantify the value of an artwork, but only after the pur-
chase, since they imperfectly observe the quality/talent
signals and realize the artworks’ real value; hence, the
artworks are experience goods for these agents;
4. the unsophisticated collectors, the “outsiders” (see Chap-
ter 2 and Bonus and Ronte (1997)), for which artworks are
nothing more than credence goods.
We can now introduce two new measures in the framework
depicted in Subsection 3.2.1 (see Figure 3.1), in order to bet-
ter define the information problem: the price, which can be
observed by everyone that takes part to the transaction and
that is generated from the economic value; the quality, which
can be observed before the trade only by the dealers and the
artist, and after the trade by the insider collectors, while it
can never be observed by the outsiders; it is generated by
the cultural value and influences the economic value. Fig-
ure 3.2 integrates the framework represented in Figure 3.1 by
adding these new measures and their links with the already
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defined variables; in this representation, we omitted the com-
ponents of the cultural value in order to highlight the relation-
ships between the artist-specific characteristics (the diamond-
shaped nodes), the artwork-specific and latent characteristics
(the circle-shaped nodes), and the just-introduced artwork-
specific and partially observable characteristics (the ellipse-
shaped nodes); the dashed arrow represents an indirect effect,
while the thick one represents a direct one.
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In particular, we assume that the insider collectors know ex-ante
the artist’s fame and ex-post the artist’s talent, and hence the art-
work’s cultural value and quality, while the outsider collectors
only know the artist’s fame ex-ante, but they can never observe
her talent (nor her artwork’s cultural value and quality). Both
collectors form their expectations on the artwork’s quality ob-
serving ex-ante the artist’s fame, but only the insider collectors
can observe ex-post the actual quality and economic value of
the artwork, understanding if his expectations on quality were
correct; if the insider discovers to have formed wrong expec-
tations on an artwork, over-evaluating its quality, he will then
suffer disappointment.19 Conversely, the outsider collectors is
not able to check the actual quality of the artwork without the
help of an expert, being the artwork a credence good for them.
In our framework, the experts can be classified in three types:
galleries and dealers, who sell the artworks; sophisticated col-
lectors (what we called insiders), who buy the artworks; critics,
who may also be dealers or collectors. We claim that the deal-
ers, who are also critics, are the only agents who provide infor-
mation to the outsiders and, hence, influence directly their per-
ception of quality. Their expertise, recognized in the market, is
formed through a reputation-building mechanism, which may
be based on a network system (Bonus and Ronte, 1997) or on a
“market of critics” (Cameron, 1995).20
19The behavioral economics model of disappointment (and elation) has been
introduced by Bell (1985); Bell defines disappointment as “a psychological re-
action to an outcome that does not match up to expectations. The greater the
disparity, the greater the disappointment”, while he defines elation as “the eu-
phoria associated with an outcome that exceeds expectations” (p. 1). For a
generalization of Bell’s model, see Loomes and Sugden (1986). See Spiegler
(2011) for a recent overview on irrational consumers’ behaviours.
20Greenfeld (1988) affirms that the reputation of a critic depends on the social
context in which his reviews are considered, using an example of the Israeli
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Following Dulleck et al. (2011) classification, then, the insti-
tutional configuration of art market’s credence goods is no lia-
bility/no verifiability, which interacts with one of the four pos-
sible market conditions in Table 2 of Dulleck et al. (2011, p. 536).
The most likely combination between institutional and market
conditions in art market is no liability/no verifiability together
with competition/reputation.21 In fact, the outsiders have no
information on the quality of the art good besides the artists’
reputation, hence they see all the artworks made by artists with
the same level of fame as perfect substitutes until the dealer
does not reveal or does not signal the artworks’ quality. For
this reason undertreatment and overcharging could potentially
emerge in the credence good market. In particular, given the
impossibility for the outsider to check for the actual quality,
he will trust the expert; on the other hand, given the absence
of commitment in this market, the gallery may propose a low-
quality artwork, describing it as a high-quality one and, then,
selling it as if it is a high-quality one. If, instead, the gallery sug-
gests to the outsider a certain artwork, revealing its real quality,
but make him pay a higher price than the fair one, we would
incur in overcharging. As we will see, this second case is not
what occurs in the art market because of the existence of dis-
counting, as well as the fact that in this market the uninformed
agents do not know the quality but are able to correctly form
reserve prices.
In order to shed light on the role of value and information in the
formation of quality and price in the art market, we extend the
avant-garde versus traditional art markets; her example is coherent with both
these two proposed reputation-formation mechanisms.
21With “competition” term we intend that informed agents compete on pro-
viding the expertise and not on selling the artwork.
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price-formation model that we depicted in Chapter 2, briefly
recalled in the Section 3.3; in doing so, we explicitly adopt a be-
havioral economics approach to explain the price distortions
generated both by the disappointment issue and by the cre-
dence good status of the art goods.
3.3 The full-information model
In this section we present a summary of the model we devel-
oped in Chapter 2, which analyses how an artwork created by
an artist and never exchanged before in the market can take
different paths to reach a collector or an auction house, that is,
how the private art market works and how the market power
of each of the agents that operates in it affects the price forma-
tion. This is done assuming that all the agents except the un-
sophisticated collectors have perfect information, and that all
the agents can form rational expectations. In the model, there
are only two types of trade mechanisms, auction (A) or bar-
gaining (B), and five types of agents: the auction house (h),
the artist (a, “she”), the gallery (g), and two types of collec-
tors, the insider collector (i), and the outsider collector (o). In
this framework, the auctioneer intermediates trades between
the seller (s) and the bidders/buyers (b), the artist makes art-
works which can be sold in the art market through auctions
or via bargaining with the gallery and/or with the insider, the
gallery and the insider buy and sell the artwork, while the out-
sider can only buy the artwork (final buyer). From the combi-
nation of all potential bargaining and auctions, nine supply and
demand channels arise: artist–auction house (ah) in the pri-
mary market; artist–insider–auction house (aih), artist–gallery–
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auction house (agh), and artist–gallery–outsider (ago) in the
primary and in the secondary market; artist–insider–gallery–
auction house (aigh), and artist–insider–gallery–outsider (aigo)
in the primary, the secondary and the tertiary market. Then,
there exist six sales channels available to agents with three dou-
ble bargaining, two triple bargaining and one single bargain-
ing. Figure 3.3 graphically shows all the bilateral bargaining
the five agents can carry through in each market and in every
channel.
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Figure 3.3: Potential bargaining in the full-information model
from Chapter 2
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Given as exogenous variables the reserve prices of the agents
P aR, P
b
R, and P
o
R (for artist’s, bidder’s, and outsider’s reserve
price, respectively), the price guaranteed by the auctioneer PA
and the price posted by the gallery PG, the model simultane-
ously determines, through a multiple Nash-bargaining game,
a series of bargaining prices, as P yBz , where y = ai, ag, ah, ih,
ig, gh, go indicates the pair of agents participating in the bar-
gaining and z = ah, aih, ago, aigh, aigo denotes the channel
where the trade takes place. In particular, assuming that the
seller’s bargaining power (market power), that lays between
0 and 1, is the complement to one of the buyer’s bargaining
power (buying power), in Chapter 2 we defined 0 < ξy < 1
and 0 < 1 − ξy < 1, as a measure of the relative market and
buyer power of every agent over each other for each bargain-
ing game y.22 In each bargaining game, the general problem
that the seller has to solve is:23
max
Pyz
[
(P yz − P ys )ξy (P yb − P yz )1−ξy
]
(3.1)
given that
P ys < P
y
z < P
y
b (3.2)
which is solved for
P yz = (1− ξy)P ys + ξyP yb (3.3)
The price generated through each bargaining depends on both
22In particular, ξai = α is the artist’s market power when facing the insider,
ξag = β is her market power when facing the gallery, ξah = η is her market
power when facing the auction house, ξih = µ is the insider’s market power
when facing the auction house, ξig = γ is his market power when facing the
gallery, ξgo = δ is the gallery’s market power when facing the outsider, and
ξgh = ν is its market power when facing the auction house.
23From now on, we drop the B from P yBz in order to simplify the notation.
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the bargaining power of the agents involved in each transac-
tion y, and by the channel z where every transaction occurs.
In Table 3.2, we report all the bargaining prices calculated in
Chapter 2. Given other assumptions on prices that we do not
report in this paper, starting from these bargaining prices and
through a backward induction procedure, we found the neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for each agent’s choice in every
market. In particular, in Table 3.3 we only report the conditions
for the emergence of the aigo and ago paths, the two channels
in which we will focus since the outsiders appear only in them
and, hence, the information issue is more likely to be observed.
In fact, to take into account the issues presented in Section 3.2,
we need to modify the model in Chapter 2 explicitly introduc-
ing both the role of information and the artist’s fame and talent
effects on the artworks’ price formation.
3.4 The “insider-outsider” model
Starting from the Figure 3.1 which depicts the relationship be-
tween the artist’s fame and talent and artwork’s cultural and
economic value, we can imagine that the artist m plays a game
against the Nature, where the Nature first chooses the artist’s
talent and then the artist’s fame: θj,m, with j ∈ {H,L}, is the
artist’s talent, that can be high (H) or low (L), and φk,m, with
k ∈ {H,L}, is the artist’s fame, which can be high (H) or low
(L), so that φH,m > φL,m and θH,m > θL,m. As for the re-
sults we present in Chapter 4, in fact, these two artists’ char-
acteristics have a bimodal distribution. Let 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 denote
the probability of having a high talented artist’s artwork and
0 ≤ 1 − ρ ≤ 1 define the probability of having a low-talented
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Table 3.2: Bargaining prices
Agents Paths Prices
ai aih P aiaih = (1− α)P aR + αP ihaih
aigh P aiaigh = (1− α)P aR + αP igaigh
aigo P aiaigo = (1− α)P aR + αP igaigo
ag agh P agagh = (1− β)P aR + βP ghagh
ago P agago = (1− β)P aR + βP goago
ah ah P ahah = (1− η)P aR + ηP oR
ih aih P ihaih = (1− µ)P aiaih + µP oR
ig aigh P igaigh = (1− γ)P aiaigh + γP ghaigh
aigo P igaigo = (1− γ)P aiaigo + γP goaigo
gh agh P ghagh = (1− ν)P agagh + νP oR
aigh P ghaigh = (1− ν)P igaigh + νP oR
go ago P goago = (1− δ)P agago + δP oR
aigo P goaigo = (1− δ)P igaigo + δP oR
Table 3.3: Conditions from the model in Chapter 2 for the paths
aigo and ago
Paths iff
aigo ν < δ ∧ µ < δγ1−γ(1−δ) ∧ η < αγδ1−α(1−γ)−γ(1−δ) ∧ β < αγ1−α(1−γ(2−δ))−γ(1−δ)
ago ν < δ ∧ η < βδ1−β(1−δ) ∧
µ < δγ1−γ(1−δ) ∧ β > αγ1−α(1−γ(2−δ))−γ(1−δ)
µ > δγ1−γ(1−δ) ∧ β > αµαµ+δ(1−α)
artist’s one, while 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 is the probability of having a high-
famed artist’s artwork and 0 ≤ 1 − τ ≤ 1 is the probability
of having low-famed artist’s one. In Figure 3.4, we depict the
game between the artist and the Nature.
After the Nature’s move, the artist m creates the artwork n,
whose quality qm,n will depend on the cultural value compo-
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nents influenced by the artist’s talent, and on its other compo-
nents (Ωn), independent on the artist’s characteristics. Hence,
the technology that produces the artwork’s quality is:
qm,n = F (θj,m,Ωn) (3.4)
We assume that F (·) is increasing in its arguments. While the
artist perfectly knows F (·), θj,m, and Ωn, as well as the gallery
does, the insider only knows Ωn and θj,m after purchasing,
while the outsider will never know qm,n without external help.
Hereafter we will drop both the m and n subscripts, since we
will focus on a single artwork of a single artist at a time.
Given that our model is static, Ω is not likely to change since
its components tend to change slowly overtime, and hence it
can be taken as fixed; this implies that a higher talent will cor-
respond to a higher quality and, in particular, that we can re-
fer either to the artist’s talent or to that artist artwork’s quality
without generating confusion.
After she creates the artwork, the artist can choose to sell it ei-
ther to the gallery or to the insider; in particular, we focus only
on two paths among those we presented in the Section 3.3, that
is, ago and aigo paths, since the outsider appears at the end of
each of them and, hence, the information-related issues we are
interested in are more likely to be observed. In the ago path, the
artist bargains the price of her artwork with the gallery, who
sells it to the outsider, while in the aigo path the artist sells her
artwork to the insider, who could resell it to the gallery, that
will then resell it to the outsider.
Observing the artist’s talent and fame, galleries know the
features and characteristics of an artwork before purchasing
it (search good), while insider collectors can ascertain artwork
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Figure 3.4: The Nature game
characteristics after purchasing, not knowing the artist’s talent
in advance (experience good). Outsider collectors can never
ascertain the quality of an artwork by themselves (credence
good), but their knowledge of the artist’s fame, together with
the experts’ advices given by the critics (dealers or galleries
in our framework), let them form a reserve price. Therefore,
the agents’ reserve prices and posted prices all depend on the
unobservable or partially observable talent and on the fame of
artists. We also assume that all the price functions are weakly
increasing in their arguments.
Given these assumptions, we analyse in-depth the price for-
mation mechanism in both the ago and the aigo path, focusing
on how the agents behave depending on the level of informa-
tion asymmetry. In particular, we first analyze the case of the
art good as credence good (Subsection 3.4.1), then as experi-
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ence good (Subsection 3.4.2), and finally we analyse the case
of full information when the art good is a search good for the
gallery and when the insider has already bought the artwork
(Subsection 3.4.3).
3.4.1 Art as a credence good
In our framework, cultural goods configure as a credence good
for the outsider when he interacts with the gallery, that is, at the
end of both the ago and the aigo path. Since the outsider com-
pletely lacks of information on the good’s quality, the gallery,
which is full informed, can take advantage of this information
asymmetry.
In these trades, gallery can post a price P g(θj , φk) that embod-
ies the information on artist’s talent that the gallery wants to
signal to the outsiders, that is, its expertise, since the artwork is
a credence good for these collectors. The gallery strategy about
posted prices depends on the combination between fame and
talent levels of the artist who created the artwork. In particu-
lar, when both talent and fame are high, the gallery will post
a price equal to P g(θH , φH) ≡ P gHH , which reflects the actual
quality of the artwork. If talent is low and fame is high, the
gallery’s choice will be again the same posted price P gHH (un-
dertreatment), since the outsider cannot check for the artist’s
talent and he will trust the gallery’s expertise and buy the art-
work. When talent is high and fame is low, the gallery will
post a price equal to P g(θH , φL) ≡ P gHL, assuming the power of
persuasion of the gallery is strong and hence the outsider will
trust its expertise and buy the artwork; moreover, we assume
that P gHL < P
g
HH , since the outsider uses the fame as a signal of
quality (Beckert and Ro¨ssel, 2013) and the gallery knows that.
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Finally, when both fame and talent are low, the gallery will post
a price equal to P gHL (undertreatment), since it can persuade the
outsider about the quality of the artwork letting him think that
it is high even if it is low.24 In other words, the gallery influ-
ences the outsider first letting him think that the artwork he
faces is a high-quality one, and then selling him an artwork at
a high-quality price even if it is not.
The outsider uses both the artist’s fame and the artwork’s po-
sted price to form his reserve price, so that Ro(P gl , φk) is the
outsider’s reserve price, where l ∈ {HL,HH}. Since the gallery
may post two different price levels (P gHL < P
g
HH ), the outsider,
combining the expertise signal with the fame signal, ends up to
have two possible reserve prices: Ro(P gHH , φH) ≡ RoH > RoL ≡
Ro(P gHL, φL).
Given that the gallery knows what the outsider’s reserve price
is, as well as that he wants some kind of discount on the price
(haggling, the most common commercial practice in the art mar-
ket) since it is a habit in the art market, it will post a price which
is bigger than the outsider’s reserve price, and it will allow for
a discount, so that it will gain exactly the outsider’s reserve
price; in fact, as suggested by Velthuis (2007), the gallery’s po-
sted price is likely higher than the bidders’ reserve price. For-
mally, the discounts are equal to P gHH − RoH = DH > 0 and to
P gHL − RoL = DL > 0. In this way, the outsider will buy the
artwork in both high- and low-fame cases, and the gallery will
always receive the outsider’s reserve price.
24For this reason, the gallery will never post P gLH and P
g
LL, that is, respec-
tively, the posted price for a low-talented and high-famed artist’s artwork and
the posted price for a low-talented and low-famed one that would have been
posted in case of full information, since in the current framework these two
strategies are strictly dominated.
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Claim 3.1 In the secondary and tertiary market, the outsider, for
which art is a credence good, will suffer undertreatment only when
artist’s talent is low.
3.4.2 Art as an experience good
When the insider and the artist interact in order to exchange an
artwork, at the beginning of the aigo path, the latter has private
information on her artwork’s quality which is not known by the
the former. In fact, the insider knows the artist’s fame before
purchasing and her talent only after purchasing the artwork,
so he forms an expectation on the artist’s talent based on his
private information and on artist’s fame; assuming the insider
is risk-neutral, and then E[θ] = ρθH +(1−ρ)θL ≡ θˆ, his reserve
price Rˆi(θˆ, φk) can take two levels: Rˆi(θˆ, φH) ≡ RiH > RiL ≡
Rˆi(θˆ, φL).25
On the other hand, the artist knows both her talent and her
fame after she played against the Nature, and then she forms
her reserve price Ra(θj , φk), where:
Ra(θH , φH)≡RaHH>Ra(θH , φL)≡RaHL>Ra(θL, φH)≡
≡ RaLH > Ra(θL, φL) ≡ RaLL
(3.5)
Notice that we are assuming that the artist has lexicographic
preferences on quality and fame, which are defined before the
Nature plays: she first prefers high quality to low quality, and
then high fame to low fame, that is, an increase in the fame level
does not compensate a decrease in the talent level.26 The artist
25Since Rˆ(·) is increasing in its arguments, we will have that Rˆi(θL, φH) <
RiH < Rˆ
i(θH , φH) and that Rˆi(θL, φL) < RiL < Rˆ
i(θH , φL).
26This assumption is equivalent to have an artist’s utility function defined on
both fame and talent, with increasing first derivatives, in which the marginal
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may also post a price P a(θj , φk), where P a(θH , φH) ≡ P aHH >
P a(θH , φL) ≡ P aHL > P a(θL, φH) ≡ P aLH > P a(θL, φL) ≡ P aLL.
We assume that RaHH ≤ P aHH , RaHL ≤ P aHL, RaLH ≤ P aLH , and
RaLL ≤ P aLL, that is, artists’ posted prices are never smaller than
their reserve prices.
When the artist sells the artwork to the insider, the combination
between the actual couple talent-fame and insider’s expected
talent together with the actual fame will lead to different out-
comes. We also assume that the artist knows the insider’s re-
serve prices, but the insider does not know the artist’s ones.27
If both talent and fame are high, and so the insider knows that
fame is high, the artist will post a price equal to P aHH which we
assume to be higher than the insider’s high reserve price RiH ,
and hence the artist will prefer not to sell to the insider in this
case. A similar case arises when talent is high and fame is low,
since the artist will post a price P aHL which, for a similar rea-
soning, will be higher than the insider’s low reserve price RiL,
and again high talent is washed out from the market. Notice
that these two cases configure as the standard Akerlof’s lemon
problem, in which high talent is washed out from the market,
even if there exists a signal of the quality. Instead, when talent
and fame are both low, the artist will post a price P aLL which
will be equal to the reserve price of the insider RiL, while when
talent is low and fame is high, the artist will post a price P aLH ,
that will be equal to the insider’s reserve price RiH . In both
these last cases, however, the insider will discover after the pur-
substitution rate between fame and talent is smaller than 1. We assume that
also galleries follows a similar lexicographic ordering of their preferences.
27Note that the insider does not know neither the artist’s low-quality reserve
price, nor her high-quality reserve price; this uncertainty permits to avoid that
low-quality artworks drive high-quality ones from the market.
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chase that the actual quality of the artwork is lower than the
expected one, and hence will suffer disappointment. Using the
notation in Bell (1985), the purchase of the artwork made by the
insider can be seen as a lottery, in which there is a certain prob-
ability (ρ) that the artwork will have a high quality and then a
value equal to Rˆi(θH , φk), and a probability equal to 1− ρ that
the artwork will have a value equal to Rˆi(θL, φk) < Rˆi(θH , φk).
This implies that, if the lottery pays Rˆi(θL, φk), the insider will
suffer a disappointment δˆ equal to:
δˆk = δ
[
ρRˆi(θH , φk) + (1− ρ)Rˆi(θL, φk)− Rˆi(θL, φk)
]
=
=δρ
[
Rˆi(θH , φk)− Rˆi(θL, φk)
]
≥ 0
(3.6)
where k ∈ {L,H}, and δ ≥ 0 is the disappointment parame-
ter.28
We crucially assume that, in case the insider suffers disappoint-
ment, he will resell the artwork to the gallery through a bar-
gaining mechanism.
28If, instead, the insider will find that the actual quality is high, he will expe-
rience an elation (εˆ) equal to:
εˆk = ε
[
Rˆi(θH , φk)− ρRˆi(θH , φk)− (1− ρ)Rˆi(θL, φk)
]
=
= ε(1− ρ)
[
Rˆi(θH , φk)− Rˆi(θL, φk)
]
≥ 0
where k ∈ {L,H}, ε ≥ 0 is the elation parameter. Notice that we could al-
low all the agents in the market to potentially suffer disappointment or enjoy
elation, but we need a certain level of information availability to let these situ-
ations occur, that is, we can potentially observe disappointment or elation only
in the case in which the quality is not observable ex-ante but it is ex-post. Also,
disappointment (and elation) is likely to occur only if the price paid is high
enough, that is, an agent will less likely suffer disappointment (enjoy elation) if
he pays a low price, so we hereafter assume that the price paid is enough high
to let the potential occurrence of disappointment (elation).
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Claim 3.2 In the primary market, the insider, for which art is an
experience good, will always suffer disappointment.
3.4.3 Art as a search good
As we show in the model in Chapter 2, in case the agents are
full-informed, the cultural goods can be seen as a search good.
Focusing on the aigo and ago channels, a bargaining occurs
between the insider and the gallery in the aigo path, and be-
tween the artist and the gallery in the ago path. Notice that
in both the trade between the gallery and the outsider and the
one between the artist and the insider we saw in previous sub-
sections there is not a proper bargaining process at work, gi-
ven the asymmetry in the information among the two agents in
each exchange. As we said, the outsider will always have a lack
of information, even after the purchase, while the insider only
has an expectation on θ when facing the artist. Conversely, after
the purchase, he has full information on the artwork he bought
and, in the case he suffers disappointment, he will resell the
artwork to the gallery. In this situation in which both agents
are full-informed, they can negotiate on the final price through
a bargaining based on their market powers. In particular, since
the insider will resell only in case the artist’s talent is low, and
since the gallery has its own reserve price Rgjk ≡ Rg(θj , φk),
where Rg(θj , φk) ≡ Rgjk and RaHH > RaHL > RaLH > RaLL,29 we
can have two possible couples of prices that define the inter-
val over which the bargaining is done, that is: Rˆi(θL, φL) and
RgLL, and Rˆ
i(θL, φH) and R
g
LH . Assuming Rˆ
i(θL, φL) ≤ RgLL,
and Rˆi(θL, φH) ≤ RgLH , the solutions of the two bargaining
29Notice that, as for the artist’s, the gallery’s reserve prices follow a lexico-
graphic ordering.
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problems are obtained from Table 3.2 by substituting in P igaigo =
(1 − γ)P aiaigo + γP goaigo, either Rˆi(θL, φL) or Rˆi(θL, φH) to P aiaigo
and, respectively, either RgLL or R
g
LH to P
go
aigo.
For what concerns the ag trade, we assume that P ajk < R
g
jk
where j, k ∈ {H,L}, and, as for the artist, ; we also assume
that the gallery’s posted prices are such that RgHH ≤ P gHH ,
RgHL ≤ P gHL, RgLH ≤ P gLH , and RgLL ≤ P gLL; hence, we have
that the bargaining price belongs to the interval (P ajk, R
g
jk) ∀j, k.
Given what we have in Table 3.2, the solution of the bargaining
problem in this trade will be P agago(θj , φk) = (1− β)P ajk + βRgjk.
Claim 3.3 When there are no search costs for the gallery, the primary
market that involves the galleries and the artists will behave in the
same way as in the full-information model. Similarly, if the insider
will resell the artwork he bought, he will bargain the price with the
gallery as in the full-information model.
3.5 Discussion
In Figure 3.5 we present the structure of the game in the ago
path. As one can see, all the combinations between artist’s fame
and talent are potentially observable in this path. At the end of
the path, the outsider’s payoff will be always equal to 0, since
the gallery will play strategically always posting a price in line
with the fame signal. The relationship between ΠaHL and Π
a
LL
depends on the market power of the artist (β), on the difference
between RaHL and R
a
LL and between R
g
HL and R
g
LL, and on the
gap between P aHL and P
a
LL, so that:
ΠaLL > Π
a
HL ⇐⇒
(1− β) [(P aHL − P aLL)] < RaHL −RaLL − β(RgHL −RgLL)
(3.7)
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Similarly, the relationship between ΠaHH and Π
a
LH depends on
β, on the difference between RaHH and R
a
LH , on the one be-
tween RgHH and R
g
LH , and on the one between P
a
HH and P
a
LH :
ΠaLH > Π
a
HH ⇐⇒
(1− β) [(P aHH − P aLH)] < RaHH −RaLH− β(RgHH −RgLH)
(3.8)
Galleries in the ago path will be able to capture all the out-
sider’s reserve price, which depends on fame. Given a certain
level of fame, do they gain more in selling a high-quality art-
work or a low-quality one? We first analyze the high-talented
artist’ case; low-quality is more profitable for the gallery if
ΠgHH < Π
g
LH , that is:
(1− β)(P aHH − P aLH) > β(RgLH −RgHH) (3.9)
since P aHH − P aLH > 0, while RgLH − RgHH < 0, the condition
in (3.9) is always respected. It is easy to proof that the same
reasoning holds for low-talented artists. In fact, ΠgHL < Π
g
LL is
always true; we can rewrite it as:
(1− β)(P aHL − P aLL) > β(RgLL −RgHL) (3.10)
Since P aHL − P aLL > 0 while RgLL − RgHL < 0, the condition in
(3.10) always holds as well.
This is intuitive, since the gallery can exploit the asymmetry in
information with the outsider, but when it faces the artist the
price is determined through a pure Nash-bargaining. In other
words, ceteris paribus, the gallery will gain less in a situation
of high-talented artist than in a situation of low-talented one,
since the price it will post is independent on talent, while artist
gives a higher value to one of her artwork which incorporates
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a higher talent and, hence, a higher quality. However, high
quality is not driven from the market, since the galleries gain a
positive payoff also selling a high-talented artist’s artwork.
Figure 3.6 contains the only observable transactions of an art-
work in the aigo path, that is, when it has been made by a
low-talented artist. As in the ago path, the outsider will al-
ways have a null payoff; however, this time the ordering be-
tween the gallery’s payoffs ΠgLH and Π
g
LL depends on the gap
between the gallery’s reserve prices RgLH and R
g
LL, on the one
between the outsider’s reserve prices RoL and R
o
H , and on the
gap between the two insider’s reserve prices Rˆi(θL, φH) and
Rˆi(θL, φL) Formally:
ΠgLL > Π
a
LH ⇐⇒
(1−γ)
[
Rˆi(θL, φH)− Rˆi(θL, φL)
]
> RoH −RoL− γ(RgLH −RgLL)
(3.11)
The insider’s payoff presents the disappointment measure
we introduced in (3.6), which makes the problem of compar-
ison between the payoffs harder to solve. Notice that, how-
ever, both ΠiLH and Π
i
LL may also be positive, since δ may be
0 and/or the insider’s market power can be high enough to
make P igaigo(θL, φk) > R
i
k + δˆk. Artist’s payoff in this path de-
pends only on the Nature’s choice for what concerns fame.
As one can see from Figures 3.5 and 3.6, the high-talented artist
can sell her artworks only through the ago path among the
paths we considered in our model; otherwise, when talent is
low, she can choose the path she prefers depending on her ex-
pected payoff, who can obtain considering the probability τ to
have φH or φL.
Claim 3.4 Due to the existence of a uncertainty problem for the in-
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sider when buying from the artist, and to the presence of alterna-
tive trade channels besides aigo, the lemon problem in the art market
is avoided. In particular, uncertainty implies that low-quality art-
works do not drive high-quality ones from market, while the alter-
native paths in the art market can absorb the high-quality artworks.
Despite the information problem present in the art market, high qual-
ity is not washed out.
Market power and asymmetric information may have either
a positive or a negative effect on the players’ payoffs, and then
on the game’s equilibrium: in fact, as we saw in the gallery’s
strategy in the ago path, the presence of asymmetric informa-
tion reduces the surplus it can extract from the artist in the
high-talent case, since this constrains the gallery to post a price
which is independent on talent, while a higher market power
against the artist (a lower β) would increase its payoff; on the
other hand, the insider’s imperfect information allows the artist
to obtain a higher payoff than in a situation of perfect informa-
tion in which the two agents would have bargained a price, and
hence the lack of information has the same effect of a higher
artist’s market power (a higher α).
Finally, we can see that in both ago and aigo path the to-
tal surplus will tend to be shared among the most informed
agents (the artist and the gallery), while, in a situation in which
information would be more spread, the collectors too would
get a part of the total surplus. In order to make the surplus
distribution among the agents more uniform, the policy maker
could then convey information about the artists’ talent to all the
agents in the market; for example, an incentive could be given
to the artists to reveal their true talent, as public art prizes or art
contests and competitions do. Notice, however, that a policy
like this could affect negatively the high-talented artists if the
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real talent is not perfectly revealed, since a market without out-
siders would reduce the channels through which high-quality
artworks could flow.
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Figure 3.5: The ago channel
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Figure 3.6: The aigo channel
3.6 Conclusions
Using a bargaining theoretical framework, we model the art
market’s agents interaction and its effect on price formation in
presence of asymmetric information about artwork’s quality.
In particular, we develop the model in Chapter 2 considering
both artists’ fame and talent, and their effect on artwork’s qual-
ity, as well as how this quality is perceived by the insider and
outsider collectors. Our behavioural pricing model predicts the
emergence of undertreatment in case of credence goods (for the
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outsider collectors, see Claim 3.1), and it exploits the concept
of disappointment in the case of experience goods (for the in-
sider collectors, see Claim 3.2); moreover, the search-good sta-
tus of the artworks for galleries does not affect the galleries’
behaviour in the market in case of absence of search costs (see
Claim 3.3). Besides the behavioural pricing model, we carry a
dual contribution to the literature: on one hand, we introduce
the mechanism through which the artist’s talent affects the cul-
tural value of her artworks and, hence, their quality; on the
other hand, we claim that the artist’s fame, together with the
artwork’s quality, affects the economic value of the artwork,
and, thus, the market price.
Given the market powers of the agents that operates in the
artist-gallery-outsider and in the artist-insider-gallery-outsider
channels, the distribution of the surplus among them is influ-
enced by the information availability; in particular, the larger
part of this surplus ends up in the hands of those agents who
have an information advantage (artists and galleries), since they
are able to play strategically and exploit this private informa-
tion. However, given the artist’s fame, it is not always true
that a high-talented artist gains more than a low-talented one
in selling one’s artwork, since the ordering of artist’s profits
depends both on her technology of formation of posted price,
given her reserve price, and on her market power. As regards
the gallery, when it operates in the aigo path, it may find more
profitable to sell a low-talented and low-famed artist’s artwork
than a low-talented and high-famed artist’s one, and this does
not depend solely on its choices on its reserve prices. In the ago
path, instead, the gallery will find always more profitable to
sell a low-quality artwork than a high-quality one; in this path,
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a low-talented artist may obtain a higher payoff than a high-
talented one, both in the high-fame and in the low-fame case.
What emerges from our results is that the more information
is available, the less the surplus will be concentrated; for this
reason, a policy implication of our model is that a centralized
policy maker or a neutral agent that would spread the informa-
tion about artists’ talent and artworks’ quality could avoid that
few agents in the market will gain most of the surplus. This re-
sult could also explain why prizes are widely used nowadays
in the art world. On the other hand, the presence of the agents
with low knowledge of the art market, the outsider, avoids the
washing out of high-quality artworks from the market due to a
lemon market effect (see Claim 3.4).
Our model is a static model, with rational expectations and
risk-neutrality, so a further step that could be made would be
to relax one or more of these hypothesis; for example, a dy-
namic model could consider both the fame-formation process
and how the cultural value components evolve overtime thanks
to their societal characteristic. In this case, each artist’s fame
will accumulate depending on her market performance, that
is, the selling prices of her artworks; fame, at the same time,
will affect her market power and, hence, her ability to obtain
a higher price when she bargains. The market performance
has an effect also on some of the components of the cultural
value of her artworks, and then, indirectly, on their quality and
prices. Consequently, reserve prices of all the agents adjust de-
pending on the process of fame, while only for some agents the
effect on cultural value implies a change on their reserve prices.
Other potential dynamics that could appear are the accumula-
tion of taste (or learning-by-consuming) in the outsider collec-
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tors, who could become insider, changing the collectors pop-
ulation shares, and the emergence of addiction effect (Becker
and Murphy, 1988). Furthermore, a seller could choose to be-
have non-opportunistically in order to accumulate a good rep-
utation and, then, be preferred by collectors.
Finally, as the insider becomes more risk-adverse, the market
could change its shape, with the increase of the share of art-
works exchanged in certain channels that will be preferred to
others. Another possible extension would consist in endoge-
nizing the artist’s market power, making it depend on her fame,
or, in the dynamic context, the gallery’s market power on its
reputation.
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Chapter 4
A new empirical
measure of
contemporaneous and
modern artists’ talent
and fame
4.1 Introduction
In the last years, art masterpieces sold for record prices in both
private and public market. For example in 2015, among the pri-
vate selling, Willem de Kooning’s “Interchange” sold for more
than 300 millions of dollars, “Nafea Faa Ipoipo” made by Paul
Gauguin sold for a similar price, while “Number 17A” by Jack-
son Pollock sold for around 200 millions of dollars. Among
public selling at Christie’s in New York, Pablo Picasso’s “Les
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Femmes d’Alger” sold for 179.4 millions of dollars, and “Nu
Couch” by Amedeo Modigliani reached 170.4 millions of dol-
lars. In Italy, in 2016, one of the artworks from the “Concetto
spaziale. Attese” series by Lucio Fontana reached 1.323 mil-
lions of Euro at Sotheby’s in Milan. In 2012, another Lucio
Fontana’s artwork from the same series sold for 3.181 millions
of Euro in the Italian private art market by Gagosian Gallery. If
one bases his valuations of artist’s value only on these prices,
he would say that Willem de Kooning, Paul Gauguin, Jackson
Pollock, Amedeo Modigliani, and Lucio Fontana are very im-
portant artists, with a very high value, as indeed they are, be-
ing superstars whose value is recognized worldwide. In fact,
the value of an artwork for the lay person can be measured
by its market price, hence the artists’ value can be measured
and ranked with respect to their prices. But how can an artist
be valued? Using her artworks’ prices (or her last sold art-
work’s price) as a measure of an artist’s value, however, is an
unsophisticated and trivial method to compare her with other
artists. On the other hand, for the art experts the artist’s value
cannot be measured, since it results from a societal judgement
and makes the artists difficult to compare.1 However, both
dealers and collectors need an artists’ ranking in order to build
their portfolio of artists; in fact, the practitioners of the art mar-
ket collect artists and not artworks, since the artworks are not
anonymous but the artist’s name influences the price of the art-
work.2 The main index available nowadays is the ArtFacts.net
1See Chapter 3.
2In the model in Chapter 2 the artist’s name affects her market power, and
hence the price. See also Chapter 3. Other scholars (Zorloni, 2005; Schroeder,
2005; Mun˜iz Jr. et al., 2014) too consider the artist’s name as a brand, that has
an effect on the price of her artworks.
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index, a trademark of ArtFacts.net Ltd., which ranks the mod-
ern and contemporaneous artists with respect to a score, ba-
sed on international auction houses’ prices and other informa-
tion which are not common knowledge (Quemin and van Hest,
2015). This index reflects, however, an international ranking,
which is based only on the public market (auction market), that
does not take into account neither the local nature of the art
market, nor the price generated in the private market (gallery
market).3
At the best of our knowledge, cultural economics literature did
not consider the theoretical construction of an artist-related in-
dex, but it focused more on the study of the artworks’ market
value rather than studying the artists’ market value, besides the
studies focused on superstars started with the seminal works
by Rosen (1981) and Adler (1985). Consequently, in the litera-
ture there are several works concerning the empirical price in-
dex of the art,4 but there are no empirical studies on an artists’
index, neither with a global nor with a local focus. A potential
explanation of this gap in both the theoretical and the empir-
ical literature is due to the prevalence of the idea that artists’
value is unmeasurable and difficult to compare, and to the lack
of available data on the private and local market. To bridge
this gap, we propose a novel index of artist’s value exploiting
the idea that this value depends on the artist’s fame and tal-
ent, and that these two individual characteristics are observable
3The government, on the other hand, starts to show the need to measure
quality and value to better choose which projects to fund and by how much;
one of the more recent example is the Quality Metrics by Arts Council England,
a new tool to measure the quality of the works of the major funded organi-
zations in UK, whose application to all the institutions funded for more than
250,000£ has been announced in September 2016 (Higgins, 2016; Romer, 2016).
4See Candela et al. (2002) and Ashenfelter and Graddy (2003).
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and measurable.5 Moreover, to make this index operational, we
build it using a unique hand-collected dataset on private and
public Italian art market that contains all the artworks’ trans-
actions intermediated by galleries and auction houses between
2007 and 2012.
Our empirical strategy consists in applying hedonic regression
methods, both OLS and quantile regression, in order to esti-
mate the artists’ coefficients that we will use as a measure of
the value of each artist.6 This method allows to remove the ef-
fect of all the non-individual characteristics of an artwork from
its price, so that we can measure the effect of the artists’ indi-
vidual characteristics on their artworks’ prices by using artists’
fixed effects; we cannot use a panel fixed effect approach since
the resell of the same artwork is rarely observed.7 The idea is
that different artworks made by the same artist reflect an equal
fixed effect.
Once we build our index, we could use it to answer to a series
of questions: what is the distribution of this index? Is it sensi-
tive to changes of variables such as time, art genre, price level,
or market size and place? Do these variables affect the rank-
ing that results from using the proposed index? Is there any
dynamics of the coefficients with respect to these variables? Is
it possible to identify common patterns or behaviours in these
potential dynamics? To answer to these questions in this pa-
per we empirically analyze the index distribution generated
5See Chapter 3 for an analysis of these two characteristics.
6Chanel et al. (1996) and Etro and Pagani (2013) used the artists’ fixed ef-
fects to form a ranking, but without referring to artists’ value, nor using more
models to see if their ranking were robust.
7In fact, models such as the repeat sales model can be used only in the cases
in which the same object has been sold more than once; see Ashenfelter and
Graddy (2003) and Locatelli Biey and Zanola (2005).
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from various regression models, as well as the robustness of
the ranking obtained using this index. Finally, the behaviour of
the coefficients in their dynamics is qualitatively studied.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section
4.2 contains an overview of the state of the art for what con-
cerns the empirical investigations of the art market, and our
contribution to this literature. Section 4.3 describes the unique
dataset we use in our work and presents the empirical models
we implement. Section 4.4 contains the results of our models
and a discussion. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Literature review: state of the art and
our contribution
Within the cultural economics framework that covers the study
of artists’ characteristics and the artworks’ price indices, the
few studies that connect these two strands are the works on
superstar theory, started by the seminal papers by Rosen (1981)
and Adler (1985), in which two different theories of stardom are
proposed, the former based on talent (the most talented artists
tend to be the most famed, the stars), the latter on conversation
(popularity/fame is increased by conversation among agents,
and agents are more prone to talk about a popular artist than
about a non-popular one).8
Economics scholars are interested in these two artists’ charac-
teristics since they affect the price of artworks. However, the-
oretical analysis of this market is not widespread, with only
few models focusing on it; among these, MacDonald (1988)
8See also Adler (2006). Pretz (2016) contains a critique of these two models
and introduces a third one based on overdetermination.
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develops a stochastic model in which each artist has a certain
probability of producing a high-quality artwork and the real-
izations of these probabilities influence her reputation; another
model is the one we developed in Chapter 3, where artist’s tal-
ent and fame affect the economic value (and hence the price)
of her artwork in different way, the former indirectly, passing
through the cultural value of the artwork and its quality, the
latter directly. Other scholars suggest that quality has no effect
on final price, since individuals in the art market are not able
to perceive and valuate it without the help of an expert, and
then reputation is the only characteristic of the artist that can
have an effect on price (Bonus and Ronte, 1997). As we pointed
out in Chapter 3, fame as well as cultural value components
are societal value, in the sense that they are built through the
consensus-formation mechanism at work in a certain society or
community; this is in line with the point made by Quemin and
van Hest (2015), that is, fame depends on the location in which
it is evaluated, that is, there exists a “local” fame linked to the
social space in which it is formed. In other words, there is a lo-
cation effect on prices, due to the different perception of fame
of the artists in different cities or countries, as confirmed by
Vosilov (2015a). Empirical investigations in cultural economics
on the fame characteristic have been carried through mainly
in the study of the stardom and its dynamic (Hamlen, 1991,
1994; Chung and Cox, 1994; Cox and Felton, 1995; Crain and
Tollison, 2002; Fox and Kochanowski, 2004; Filimon et al., 2011;
Candela et al., 2016), with also application to soccer players
(Lucifora and Simmons, 2003; Franck and Nu¨esch, 2008, 2012;
Lehmann and Schulze, 2008) and gastronomy (Ehrmann et al.,
2009). These studies, however, do not focus on each artist (or
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player, or restaurant) in the market, in order to measure one
or more of her characteristics and then to form a hierarchy of
value based on them, but try to study the superstar effect on
the income distribution. On the other hand, there exist some
non-academic institutions that create charts of artists based on
their fame, measured using a technique which is not disclosed,
as for example the one used by ArtFacts.net, which is network-
based and briefly explained by Quemin and van Hest (2015),
but which is not replicable for the reason we just mentioned.
While, as we demonstrated above, fame has been considered
in various studies in cultural economics, talent obtained less
attention, mainly because it is difficult to observe and it does
not have a dynamics, being it an innate characteristic (Towse,
2006). In the literature, at the best of our knowledge, only few
studies considered this artist’s characteristic under a theoretical
point of view: Throsby (2006) investigates the role of talent and
creativity in influencing the productivity of an artist; Cham-
parnaud (2014) develops a stochastic model to study the price-
to-quality relationship, determining how the connoisseurs and
consumer without knowledge of the art behave with respect to
artist’s talent; in Chapter 3, we consider an artist’s talent as a
partially observable variable which affects the cultural value
of her artwork, and, through its quality, its economic value
and price. For what concerns empirical investigations, Candela
et al. (2016), using a factor analysis, create a measure for talent
(and one for fame) to check Rosen’s and Adler’s theories.
So, how can this individual index of artist’s talent and fame,
or reputation, or in general characteristics that have an effect on
her artworks’ price, be identified? A way that has been used
only a few times with this goal in literature is the hedonic re-
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gression; the idea is to use the artist’s fixed effect coefficient
from an hedonic regression as an index of its importance in the
market, as Chanel et al. (1996) and Etro and Pagani (2013) did.
But how does hedonic regression work? Hedonic regression
has been modeled by Rosen (1974), as a regression in which
the price of a series of goods belonging to a certain category
(for example, estates, artworks, etc.) is regressed against the
characteristics of these goods, so that the coefficient of each of
the covariates in the regression captures the partial effect on the
price that each of these characteristics has (see also Candela and
Scorcu, 2004). The model is based on the conceptualization of
the consumer theory made by Lancaster (1966), for which each
good is evaluated by the consumer by considering its character-
istics: in other words, the consumers give value to each of the
characteristics of the good, and not directly to the good itself.
The hedonic regression is, then, one of the more straightfor-
ward way to measure which is the contribution to the good’s
price of each of its characteristics.
Hedonic regression has been widely applied to the analysis
of the determinants of artworks’ prices and the effect of the
artworks’ and their artists’ characteristics on the prices them-
selves, as, for example, in the works by Chanel et al. (1996),
Rengers and Velthuis (2002), Candela et al. (2002), Angelini
(2012), Renneboog and Spaenjers (2013), Georges and Sec¸kin
(2013), and Pradier et al. (2016); since the hedonic regression,
also called the “grey painting” method, allows to generate an
index of artworks’ price without the effect of their character-
istics, it can be used also to evaluate art market’s relationship
with other markets, as for example the financial market, as in
Anderson (1974), Chanel (1995), Ginsburgh and Jeanfils (1995),
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Agnello and Pierce (1996), Floˆres et al. (1999), and Kra¨ussl et al.
(2016),9 but also to consider non-market effects on prices, as,
for example, the effect of home bias or of experts opinions on
prices (see Vosilov, 2015a,b), or the artists’ career peaks (Hell-
manzik, 2009), as well as to be used in a comparison with new
indices for the art market (Candela et al., 2004).
Besides the OLS hedonic regression we just reviewed, the
hedonic approach have been also used together with other
models in applications to the art market, as for example the
autoregressive multilevel regression by Modugno et al. (2015)
and its stochastic version by Cagnone et al. (2016), the hybrid
model by Locatelli Biey and Zanola (2005) that uses together
the repeated sales and the hedonic approach, the sample-bias
correction la Heckman of the hedonic regression developed
by Collins et al. (2009), and the hedonic panel estimation used
by Ursprung and Wiermann (2011). Besides these application,
also a combination of quantile regression and hedonic regres-
sion has been used in cultural economics literature, as firstly
explained by Scorcu and Zanola (2011), and then applied by
Renneboog and Spaenjers (2013), Vosilov (2015a,b) and Can-
dela et al. (2016). Quantile regression, a model introduced by
Koenker and Bassett (1978) and further explained in Koenker
and Hallock (2001), consists in “the estimation of conditional
quantile functions, models in which quantiles of the condi-
tional distribution of the response variable are expressed as
functions of observed covariates” (Koenker and Hallock, 2001,
p.143); in other words, given the distribution of the dependent
variable, this technique allows to explain what is the effect of a
9Table 1 in Ashenfelter and Graddy (2003) (p. 769) reports other studies
which use hedonic regression in order to compute art market returns.
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series of covariates in a certain conditional quantile function of
the dependent variable, as for example the median, or the third
quartile. This method allows, then, to check if the effect of a
covariate changes depending on the quantile of the dependent
variable that is taken into account.
4.3 Data and empirical models
In this section we first present our data, in Subsection 4.3.1, and
then we introduce the models we use for the construction of the
artists’ indices, in Subsection 4.3.2.
4.3.1 Data description
We base our empirical analysis on a unique hand-collected da-
taset from the Artist Re-sale Rights (ARR) archives of the So-
cieta` Italiana degli Autori ed Editori (SIAE), the public Italian
society which handles royalty disbursement for artists.10 From
the ARR archives of the SIAE, we collected all available infor-
mation (artist, dealer, artwork, price, etc.) about all the sales
involving professional intermediaries that occurred in Italy in
the period from the beginning of the application of the ARR
laws in Italy (February 2006) to the end of March 2013. The first
year, 2006, besides being incomplete if we take into account so-
lar years, presents a lot of discontinuity in the reports of the
selling, as if the system slowly adopted the new law; another
possible explanation is that the market acted in an unusual way.
10In Italy, when an artwork is resold in the secondary art market by auction
houses or art galleries, SIAE is entitled by law to collect and distribute royalties
to the artist or his/her descendants. In most European Countries a similar
system is at work, as established by the EU Directive 2001/84/CE.
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Whichever of these two explanations is the real one, we de-
cided to drop the selling occurred in 2006, as well as the ones
occurred in the first months of 2013, since in this case there is a
potential lack of reports due to the fact that the professional in-
termediaries have 3 months to declare the selling. We are left,
then, with six full years of selling, from the beginning of Jan-
uary 2007 to the end of December 2012.
Our dataset is characterized by some important features. We
consider only artworks with a minimum sale price of 3,000e,
as the ARR applies only this price class. All artworks consid-
ered are produced by artists who are alive or who died less than
70 years before their selling, which is the range of application
of the ARR. The dataset contains information on transactions
about artists who sold at least 2 artworks in each of the 6 years
considered, resulting in a total of 230 artists and 25,197 transac-
tions.
Table 4.1 contains transaction-level descriptive statistics about
the variables of the dataset. As we can see, the artworks’ prices
have a very large variability, with a range that goes from 3,000e
to 3,181,076.70e, hence we use the natural logarithm of the
prices in all the models in order to reduce this variability.
The other variables in the dataset can be divided into two gro-
ups: the artist-specific characteristics, regarding information
about the artists, among which we have sex, a dummy equal to
1 if the artist is male, Italy, a dummy equal to 1 if the artist has
Italian citizenship, son of artists, a dummy which is equal to 1
if the artist’s father and/or mother were artists, art studies, a
dummy equal to 1 if the artist studied in an art school, multiple
genres, a dummy equal to 1 if the artist’s works belong to more
than one genre, year of birth, living artist, a dummy equal to
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Table 4.1: Transaction-level descriptive statistics
Obs. Average St. Dev. Min Max
price 25197 27303.37 83796.72 3000.00 3181076.70
ln(price) 25197 9.38 1.06 8.01 14.97
sharet 25197 0.05 0.06 0.0002 0.20
sharetot 25197 0.04 0.05 0.00004 0.15
public 25197 0.46 0.50 0 1
house 25197 0.46 0.50 0 1
gallery 25197 0.50 0.50 0 1
other sellers 25197 0.03 0.17 0 1
antique dealer 25197 0.01 0.11 0 1
painting 25197 0.74 0.44 0 1
photography 25197 0.01 0.09 0 1
drawing 25197 0.03 0.16 0 1
graphics 25197 0.01 0.12 0 1
sculpture 25197 0.07 0.26 0 1
other genres 25197 0.09 0.28 0 1
Italy 25197 0.83 0.37 0 1
sex 24414 0.97 0.16 0 1
living artist 24414 0.35 0.48 0 1
year of birth 24414 1921 23,50 1856 1977
multiple genres 24414 0.83 0.38 0 1
son of artists 24414 0.11 0.32 0 1
art studies 24414 0.76 0.43 0 1
Notes: price is in Euro. Averages and standard deviations are rounded at the second digits
when larger than 0.005, besides year of birth average which is rounded to the nearest
integer.
1 if the artist was alive in the years the dataset is about,11 and
the transaction-specific characteristics, as price (and its natural
logarithm ln(price)), art genre (divided into painting, drawing,
photography, graphics, sculpture, and other genres), seller (di-
vided into house, for auction houses, gallery, antique dealer,
and other sellers),12 sharetot and sharet, the seller’s shares of
11In the period 2007-2012, 6 artists died and hence the variable is not time-
invariant.
12The variable public refers to public prices, that, as we pointed out in Chap-
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Table 4.2: Artist-specific descriptive statistics
Obs. Average St. Dev min max Total
sex 230 0.98 0.13 0 1 226
multiple genres 230 0.81 0.39 0 1 186
living artist 229 0.42 0.49 0 1 95
son of artists 225 0.09 0.29 0 1 20
artstudies 226 0.73 0.44 0 1 165
Italy 230 0.83 0.38 0 1 191
year of birth 230 1923 26.13 1856 1977 /
number of transactions 230 109.55 110.82 14 765 25197
artist′s price average 230 24649.37 34074.22 3847.06 320864.58 /
Notes: Averages and standard deviations are rounded at the second digits, besides year of birth average
which is rounded to the nearest integer.
the market in the whole period (the former) and in the year in
which the transaction occurred (the latter). Some of the vari-
ables have not a value for each transaction, since information
about artists and sellers are missing, as well as, in some cases,
also about the artworks sold: for example, artistic genre is avail-
able for 23862 transactions. Table 4.2 reports the artist-specific
descriptive statistics. Most of the artists about which data are
available are male, work on more than one medium, studied in
an art school, and are Italian; less than 10% are sons of artists.
The dataset covers artists which are born between 1856 (At-
tilio Pratella) and 1977 (Valerio Berruti), with a total number
of transactions in the considered period which goes from 14 to
765, with a mean of 109.55. Artists’ price averages has an aver-
age equal to 24,649.37 Euro, and it ranges from 3847.06 Euro to
320,864.58 Euro; as we can see from the standard deviation, it
tends to be very disperse. The only time-variant variable about
artists, living artist, is not reported in Table 4.2.
Table 4.3 contains the year-by-year means of the covariates
used and of the artist-specific variables; as one can see, the bun-
ter 2, are those of the artworks sold by auction houses.
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Table 4.3: Year-by-year covariates’ and artist-specific variables’
averages
year 1 year 2 year 3 year 4 year 5 year 6
Italy 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.85
sex 0.98 0.96 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.96
multiple genres 0.84 0.81 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.81
living artist 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.38 0.34 0.37
son of artist 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.13
art studies 0.74 0.76 0.74 0.78 0.78 0.76
public 0.43 0.54 0.49 0.43 0.43 0.39
house 0.43 0.54 0.49 0.43 0.43 0.39
gallery 0.54 0.43 0.48 0.52 0.48 0.55
antique dealer 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.004
other sellers 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.05
other genres 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.13 0.09
drawing 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02
photography 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
graphics 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
painting 0.76 0.75 0.72 0.76 0.71 0.74
sculpture 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.09
Notes: Averages are rounded at the second digits when larger than 0.005.
dle of artists whose artworks are sold in each years has a stable
set of characteristics; slight variations are present on the shares
of the art market that galleries and auction houses have over-
time, while the distribution of techniques is almost stable over-
time, with paintings that constitutes always more than 70% of
exchanged artworks.
Table 4.4 contains information about the prices of artworks
sold in each years. Prices tend to have a stable average over-
time, besides the slightly higher average in 2012, in which also
the largest price of all the dataset is observed (3,181,076.70e,
obtained from the selling of one of the artworks from Lucio
Fontana’s “Concetto spaziale. Attese” series). From Table 4.4
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we can also see that the number of transactions decreases in
2009, maybe as a result of the crisis began in the fall of 2008;
this is reflected in the total value of exchanges, which dropped
from over 163 millions of Euro in 2008 to 73 millions of Euro in
2009, and then stabilized to slightly over 100 millions of Euro
from 2010 to 2012.
Table 4.4: Year-by-year descriptive statistics for price
Obs. Average St. Dev. Min Max Total
year 1 5117 26229.30 86975.86 3000 3000000 134215325.32
year 2 6165 26486.87 70341.51 3000 1675000 163291536.67
year 3 2997 24460.87 72341.28 3000 2600000 73309247.20
year 4 4004 26945.75 73503.99 3000 2300000 107890766.88
year 5 3770 27259.48 87793.85 3000 2750000 102768223.77
year 6 3144 33870.19 114486.37 3000 3181076.70 106487872.66
Notes: Averages and standard deviations are rounded at the second digits.
Table 4.5 reports the quartile-by-quartile descriptive statis-
tics for the variable price. As one can see, variability increases
as we move to higher quartiles, and hence our choice to use
the logarithm of price as dependent variable in our models is
justified by the non-linearity the data present.
Table 4.5: Quartile-by-quartile descriptive statistics for price
Obs. Average St. Dev. Min Max
First quartile 6787 4041.59 669.32 3000 5000
Second quartile 6633 7488.97 1513.35 5015 10000
Third quartile 5478 15083.48 3128.75 10000.80 21600
Fourth quartile 6299 83859.51 154126.59 21666.67 3181076.70
Notes: Averages and standard deviations are rounded at the second digits.
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4.3.2 Empirical models
The models we use in this paper are the hedonic OLS regression
and the hedonic quantile regression. The first model has the
following form:
ln(Pi) = k + βX
′
i + βjAj + τtIt,i + ϵi (4.1)
where i refers to the transaction i, created by the artist j and
sold at time t, with j = 1, ..., 230 and t = 1, ..., 6. In equation
(4.1), k is the constant, Xi contains the covariates which de-
scribe transaction i, Aj is the artist j’s fixed effect,13 τt is year
t fixed effect and It,i is the indicator function that is equal to
1 when the artwork i is sold in year t, while ϵi is the resid-
ual, that respects by assumption the hypotheses for the OLS
regression. The OLS regression allows us to check what are
the artists’ effects once we removed all the other artwork- and
transaction-specific effects on price, so that we are able to iden-
tify the artist’s contribution to the price and use it as her index.
Moreover, depending on the sub-sample we use in the com-
putation, we can focus on some specific characteristics of the
artwork (i.e. the art genre, studying what is the artists’ ranking
using our index computed only on paintings) or of the market
(i.e. considering only one year and seeing if there is some spe-
cific effect on the coefficients behaviour).
The quantile regression model, applied using a hedonic ap-
proach, allows us to consider a potential price effect on our in-
dex behaviour, as well as to check if some cross-effects exists.
13Table B.1.1 contains the correspondence between the j-s and the artists’
names.
106
The model we use is the following:
Qln(P )(q|A, t,X) = kq + τq,tIt,i + βqjAj + γqX ′i + ϵiq (4.2)
where Qln(P )(q|A, t,X) is the conditional quantile function for
the quantile q of the distribution of ln(P ), given the artists’
fixed effects, the years fixed effects, and a set of covariates X .
In both models, the covariates we are going to use will be differ-
ent in each estimation, and hence we will characterize X before
presenting each one of the results.
4.4 Results
In this section, we present the results of the estimation of the
models we introduced in Section 4.3. In particular, Subsec-
tion 4.4.1 contains the estimation of the OLS regression on all
the data, our benchmark model, Subsection 4.4.2 reports the
results of the estimations of the model with the variables de-
scribing the art genres and of the models on the sub-samples of
the main of these art genres, Subsection 4.4.3 reports the year-
by-year estimation results computed using the OLS hedonic re-
gression, while Subsection 4.4.4 and 4.4.5 contain respectively
the estimation of the hedonic quantile regression on all the data
and on the sub-samples of each of the 6 years. Finally, Subsec-
tion 4.4.6 contains an analysis of the artists’ ranking in the var-
ious models and of the dynamics overtime of the year-by-year
OLS artists’ coefficients and the of the quantile-by-quantile be-
haviour of the estimated artists’ coefficients.
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4.4.1 The benchmark model: Hedonic OLS regres-
sion
The results presented in this subsection are those of the mo-
del obtained taking (4.1) and using, as covariates, the variables
art genre, public, and sharet, besides the time dummies and the
artists’ dummies; all the available observations are used. The
estimated model, that we will use as a benchmark, is:
ln(Pi) = k + γ1art genre+ γ2public+ γ3sharet+
+ βjAj + τtIt,i + ϵi
(4.3)
with j = 1, ..., 230, and t = 2, ..., 6.14 The results of the OLS
estimation are contained in Table 4.6. The resulting estimated
coefficients for the artists, obtained using the backward step-
wise method with a significance level of 0.1, are 126 and range
from -1.15 to 2.33.15 Among the other covariates, those signif-
icantly different from 0 are the time fixed effect for 2008, 2010,
and 2012, and are all greater than 0, meaning that the effect in
the even years is significant with respect to the odd years; a
possible explanation is that there is a cycle that lasts two years,
with a peak in each of the even years.
In Figure 4.1, we plot the normal kernel density of the artists’
coefficients that result to be significantly different from 0.16 A
clear bimodal distribution can be recognized, with a higher
14Hereafter, year 1 dummy is not added to the models in order to avoid the
dummy trap issue. We always use all the artists’ fixed effect, given that at least
one of them is dropped because not significant in each estimation we make.
15Recall that, having as a dependent variable the logarithm of price, these
coefficients are semi-elasticities and not direct effect on price. However, we can
use them to generate an ordinal ranking of the artists.
16The kernel function used in the computation of this density is the Epanech-
nikov’s. Hereafter, all the kernel density estimation will be carried through
using the same function.
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probability concentrated in the lower peak. This is true also us-
ing the ArtFacts.net data we referred to above, that can be con-
sidered as the coefficients of the worldwide public market, that
is, auction houses market; Figure 4.2 contains the kernel den-
sity of these scores.17 Since ArtFacts.net ranking is made using
public prices only, we also plotted the distribution of the OLS
regression coefficients obtained from the Italian public prices
only (Panel 4.3a) to better compare the distributions; Panel 4.3b
contains the kernel density of the artists’ coefficients obtained
using the private prices only. Both the kernel distributions in
Figure 4.3 present a strong bimodal form.
Using other works’ data, that is, Chanel et al. (1996), Georges
and Sec¸kin (2013), and Pradier et al. (2016), we generated ker-
nel density distribution also for the artists’ coefficients from
these works, finding a bimodal distribution in both of them
(see, respectively, Figure 4.4a, Figure4.4b, and Figure 4.4c).18
In particular, the distribution in Pradier et al. (2016) presents a
more probable smaller peak and a less probable higher peak,
as in our results from Table 4.6, while Chanel et al. (1996) and
Georges and Sec¸kin (2013) distributions have a larger probabil-
ity for higher levels of the coefficients.
17In particular, we downloaded the available score from ArtFacts.net and re-
moved the names that appeared twice, ending up with 236,239 artists. As one
can see from the figure, the scale is quite different from ours, but the distribu-
tion presents two peaks as in our results. As we will see, Georges and Sec¸kin’s,
Pradier et al.’s, and Chanel et al.’s x-scale is different from the ArtFacts.net one,
and similar to ours.
18The data from Chanel et al. (1996) have been hand-collected from their Ta-
ble 1, pp.10-11, data from Georges and Sec¸kin (2013) have been hand-collected
from their Table 3, pp.47-48, while data from Pradier et al. (2016) have been
hand-collected from their Table 10 in Appendix 1, pp.474-478. In drawing the
graphs, we used only statistically significant coefficients with a confidence level
of 0.1. Among these two studies, only Chanel et al. (1996) and Georges and
Sec¸kin (2013) used the artists’ coefficients as indices to rank the artists.
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Table 4.6: Benchmark model: Hedonic regression on overall
data
Coeff. St. Er. p-val Coeff. St. Er. p-val
A1 0.210 0.053 0.000 A149 0.542 0.080 0.000
A2 0.161 0.058 0.006 A150 -0.351 0.103 0.001
A3 0.897 0.097 0.000 A151 -0.900 0.041 0.000
A4 -1.017 0.051 0.000 A152 -0.922 0.041 0.000
A5 -0.208 0.066 0.002 A153 -0.915 0.041 0.000
A6 -0.884 0.068 0.000 A154 -0.765 0.065 0.000
A7 -0.922 0.055 0.000 A155 -0.231 0.091 0.011
A8 0.586 0.166 0.000 A156 -0.380 0.061 0.000
A9 -0.728 0.122 0.000 A159 -0.697 0.046 0.000
A11 -0.343 0.033 0.000 A160 -0.241 0.091 0.008
A12 -1.082 0.039 0.000 A161 -0.986 0.054 0.000
A13 -0.807 0.062 0.000 A163 0.419 0.063 0.000
A14 -0.993 0.063 0.000 A164 0.372 0.119 0.002
A15 0.137 0.073 0.060 A165 -0.392 0.100 0.000
A16 0.960 0.182 0.000 A166 -0.610 0.106 0.000
A17 0.613 0.137 0.000 A167 -0.806 0.046 0.000
A18 -0.772 0.063 0.000 A168 -0.406 0.044 0.000
A19 -0.548 0.175 0.002 A169 -0.553 0.088 0.000
A20 -0.646 0.086 0.000 A172 -1.008 0.038 0.000
A22 -0.461 0.062 0.000 A175 0.373 0.074 0.000
A23 -0.906 0.082 0.000 A176 -0.449 0.069 0.000
A24 -0.909 0.064 0.000 A178 0.492 0.094 0.000
A25 -0.440 0.057 0.000 A179 -1.020 0.069 0.000
A27 -0.526 0.090 0.000 A180 -0.800 0.047 0.000
A28 -0.589 0.056 0.000 A182 -0.205 0.082 0.012
A100 -0.785 0.040 0.000 A183 1.393 0.116 0.000
A101 -0.902 0.031 0.000 A184 -0.221 0.130 0.089
A103 -0.595 0.089 0.000 A185 -0.321 0.094 0.001
A104 -0.746 0.065 0.000 A186 -0.740 0.071 0.000
A105 -0.472 0.049 0.000 A187 -0.894 0.055 0.000
A106 -0.141 0.063 0.025 A188 0.154 0.057 0.007
A107 -0.190 0.093 0.041 A189 -0.262 0.043 0.000
A108 0.830 0.078 0.000 A190 -0.823 0.049 0.000
A110 -0.613 0.076 0.000 A191 -0.579 0.079 0.000
A111 -0.372 0.117 0.002 A193 -0.436 0.063 0.000
A112 1.850 0.297 0.000 A194 -0.207 0.043 0.000
A113 0.810 0.193 0.000 A197 -0.324 0.099 0.001
A114 -0.779 0.065 0.000 A198 -0.264 0.116 0.024
A115 -0.968 0.029 0.000 A200 -0.643 0.080 0.000
A117 0.434 0.191 0.023 A201 -0.784 0.046 0.000
A118 -0.895 0.039 0.000 A202 -0.257 0.048 0.000
A120 -0.585 0.060 0.000 A204 0.679 0.096 0.000
110
A121 -0.248 0.055 0.000 A206 0.712 0.088 0.000
A122 -1.150 0.033 0.000 A207 -0.349 0.115 0.002
A123 -0.700 0.080 0.000 A208 -0.935 0.059 0.000
A124 -0.877 0.043 0.000 A209 -0.353 0.061 0.000
A127 -0.348 0.192 0.069 A210 -0.794 0.065 0.000
A128 -0.189 0.052 0.000 A211 -0.765 0.054 0.000
A129 -0.371 0.047 0.000 A212 1.063 0.121 0.000
A130 2.329 0.203 0.000 A213 0.958 0.073 0.000
A131 -0.304 0.170 0.073 A214 -0.493 0.100 0.000
A132 -1.149 0.091 0.000 A215 -0.617 0.095 0.000
A135 1.002 0.093 0.000 A216 -0.431 0.068 0.000
A136 0.815 0.144 0.000 A217 0.413 0.101 0.000
A137 -0.159 0.085 0.062 A218 -0.312 0.039 0.000
A139 0.464 0.162 0.004 A220 -0.947 0.092 0.000
A140 -0.512 0.091 0.000 A221 0.792 0.072 0.000
A141 -0.527 0.079 0.000 A222 -0.714 0.088 0.000
A143 0.924 0.090 0.000 A223 0.618 0.068 0.000
A144 -0.684 0.039 0.000 A224 0.145 0.051 0.005
A145 0.985 0.128 0.000 A225 -0.608 0.052 0.000
A147 -0.135 0.082 0.100 A229 -0.578 0.130 0.000
A148 -0.650 0.075 0.000 A230 0.308 0.107 0.004
art gen 0.071 0.005 0.000 t2 0.050 0.015 0.001
public -0.192 0.017 0.000 t4 0.045 0.018 0.011
sharet -1.064 0.120 0.000 t6 0.087 0.020 0.000
k 9.272 0.026 0.000
Obs. 25197
R2adj 0.213
Notes: Stepwise regression results, with backward elimination of the coeffi-
cients not significant at 0.10. Covariates used in the full model: art genre,
public, sharet, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6. Robust standard error are reported. All
results are rounded at the third digit.
Our first result is as follows.
Claim 4.1 The distribution of the artists’ coefficients presents a strong
bimodal form, with a higher peak for low levels of the coefficient and a
lower peak for high levels.
As a robustness check, we computed the OLS coefficients us-
ing the same set of covariates without sharet, the same set sub-
stituting sharetot to sharet, and the same set using a unique
variable year with six levels instead of the six dummies for the
years, and we obtained similar results for what concerns the
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of artists’ coefficients from model (4.3)
distribution of the artists’ coefficients, that is, bimodality is ro-
bust in the benchmark model using all the data. We also tried
to compute the model in Equation (4.3) using the truncated re-
gression method instead of the standard OLS regression, but
again the resulting coefficients maintain the bimodal distribu-
tion.19
4.4.2 The models for art genres on overall data and
art-genre sub-samples
Could the results of the previous subsection be due to some-
thing that art genre cannot capture, given that it is a unique
variable with six levels? To check for this potential issue we
computed the model in Equation (4.3) substituting art genre
with painting, photography, drawing, graphics, sculpture, and
19All the results from the robustness checks explained above are not reported
here, nor in the Appendices, but are available upon request.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of artists’ indices from ArtFacts.net
data
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(b) Private prices
Figure 4.3: Distribution of artists’ coefficients for public and
private prices in the Italian market
other genres.20 Results are reported in Table 4.7.
ln(Pi) = k + γ1public+ γ2sharet + γ3painting+
+ γ4drawing + γ5sculpture+ γ6photography
+ γ7graphics+ γ8other genres+
+ βjAj + τtIt,i + ϵi
(4.4)
20We use all the 6 variables without incurring in the dummy variables trap
because information about the genre is available for 23862 over 25197 observa-
tions.
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(a) Chanel et al. (1996) data
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(b) Georges and Sec¸kin (2013) data
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(c) Pradier et al. (2016) data
Figure 4.4: Distribution of artists’ coefficients, using data from
other studies
with j = 1, ..., 230, and t = 2, ..., 6.
The stepwise procedure drops only the other genre variable,
which is very heterogenous since it accounts for every artwork
which is not a painting, a drawing, a sculpture, a photography,
or a graphics; all the other five variables are statistically sig-
nificant. Four artists’ coefficients estimated in the benchmark
model are not in the final model in the current specification af-
ter the stepwise method is applied (the coefficients are those for
A106, A131, A147, and A15), but five coefficients that were not
significantly different from 0 in the first model are estimated
in the current model (A119, A158, A181, A196, and A199), so
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we estimated 127 artists’ coefficients that are statistically sig-
nificant at 90%. Among the estimated coefficients, only the
constant, the coefficient for public and the index for A175 are
different in the two models taking into account a confidence
interval of 95%, but this does not affect the ranking of the artist
if we take into consideration a 95% interval around the indices.
Coefficients for the other covariates slightly changed, but are
not statistically different from the estimates in Table 4.6.
Figure 4.5 is the kernel density estimation of the distribution of
the coefficients from the model in Equation (4.4). As one can
see, the distribution is very similar to the benchmark model’s
one, in Figure 4.1.
Table 4.7: The art genres’ model on overall data
Coeff. St. Er. p-val Coeff. St. Er. p-val
A1 0.167 0.051 0.001 A153 -0.945 0.040 0.000
A2 0.175 0.057 0.002 A154 -0.794 0.063 0.000
A3 0.954 0.089 0.000 A155 -0.247 0.089 0.005
A4 -1.048 0.047 0.000 A156 -0.413 0.057 0.000
A5 -0.209 0.067 0.002 A158 0.320 0.167 0.056
A6 -0.921 0.065 0.000 A159 -0.734 0.044 0.000
A7 -0.923 0.059 0.000 A160 -0.239 0.092 0.009
A8 0.562 0.163 0.001 A161 -1.008 0.053 0.000
A9 -0.787 0.119 0.000 A163 0.411 0.059 0.000
A11 -0.384 0.035 0.000 A164 0.334 0.118 0.005
A12 -1.122 0.040 0.000 A165 -0.428 0.098 0.000
A13 -0.851 0.061 0.000 A166 -0.629 0.103 0.000
A14 -1.040 0.062 0.000 A167 -0.861 0.046 0.000
A16 0.755 0.162 0.000 A168 -0.431 0.043 0.000
A17 0.664 0.127 0.000 A169 -0.547 0.090 0.000
A18 -0.821 0.063 0.000 A172 -1.068 0.035 0.000
A19 -0.707 0.138 0.000 A175 0.622 0.075 0.000
A20 -0.660 0.088 0.000 A176 -0.453 0.067 0.000
A22 -0.500 0.061 0.000 A178 0.442 0.094 0.000
A23 -0.928 0.083 0.000 A179 -1.084 0.061 0.000
A24 -0.934 0.064 0.000 A180 -0.830 0.046 0.000
A25 -0.477 0.055 0.000 A181 -0.242 0.126 0.055
A27 -0.558 0.089 0.000 A182 -0.235 0.082 0.004
A28 -0.625 0.056 0.000 A183 1.407 0.110 0.000
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A100 -0.805 0.040 0.000 A184 -0.249 0.126 0.048
A101 -0.933 0.031 0.000 A185 -0.361 0.093 0.000
A103 -0.645 0.090 0.000 A186 -0.804 0.074 0.000
A104 -0.761 0.065 0.000 A187 -0.929 0.055 0.000
A105 -0.502 0.048 0.000 A188 0.183 0.057 0.001
A107 -0.323 0.091 0.000 A189 -0.256 0.040 0.000
A108 0.817 0.075 0.000 A190 -0.861 0.049 0.000
A110 -0.570 0.066 0.000 A191 -0.621 0.071 0.000
A111 -0.419 0.115 0.000 A193 -0.449 0.060 0.000
A112 1.793 0.298 0.000 A194 -0.255 0.042 0.000
A113 0.750 0.198 0.000 A196 -0.085 0.035 0.015
A114 -0.892 0.064 0.000 A197 -0.353 0.099 0.000
A115 -1.003 0.029 0.000 A198 -0.330 0.110 0.003
A117 0.455 0.164 0.005 A199 0.280 0.129 0.030
A118 -0.934 0.037 0.000 A200 -0.688 0.080 0.000
A119 0.350 0.153 0.022 A201 -0.824 0.044 0.000
A120 -0.624 0.057 0.000 A202 -0.241 0.047 0.000
A121 -0.281 0.054 0.000 A204 0.757 0.102 0.000
A122 -1.180 0.040 0.000 A206 0.655 0.088 0.000
A123 -0.727 0.080 0.000 A207 -0.402 0.113 0.000
A124 -0.944 0.039 0.000 A208 -0.993 0.055 0.000
A127 -0.413 0.185 0.025 A209 -0.395 0.060 0.000
A128 -0.214 0.052 0.000 A210 -0.835 0.062 0.000
A129 -0.411 0.045 0.000 A211 -0.794 0.053 0.000
A130 2.291 0.194 0.000 A212 1.031 0.117 0.000
A132 -1.181 0.083 0.000 A213 0.857 0.072 0.000
A135 0.994 0.088 0.000 A214 -0.551 0.094 0.000
A136 0.732 0.125 0.000 A215 -0.682 0.084 0.000
A137 -0.198 0.082 0.016 A216 -0.484 0.063 0.000
A139 0.485 0.161 0.003 A217 0.420 0.093 0.000
A140 -0.574 0.088 0.000 A218 -0.339 0.038 0.000
A141 -0.550 0.070 0.000 A220 -0.962 0.091 0.000
A143 0.867 0.094 0.000 A221 0.757 0.070 0.000
A144 -0.722 0.039 0.000 A222 -0.738 0.096 0.000
A145 1.018 0.109 0.000 A223 0.595 0.065 0.000
A148 -0.709 0.076 0.000 A224 0.087 0.052 0.094
A149 0.529 0.078 0.000 A225 -0.646 0.050 0.000
A150 -0.391 0.105 0.000 A229 -0.458 0.125 0.000
A151 -0.964 0.038 0.000 A230 0.298 0.102 0.003
A152 -0.943 0.042 0.000 draw. -0.636 0.037 0.000
t2 0.050 0.015 0.001 graph. -0.771 0.042 0.000
t4 0.051 0.017 0.003 sculp. 0.193 0.033 0.000
t6 0.081 0.020 0.000 photo -0.486 0.062 0.000
sharet -0.986 0.116 0.000 paint. 0.123 0.019 0.000
k 9.553 0.020 0.000 public -0.238 0.016 0.000
Obs. 25197
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R2adj 0.231
Notes: Stepwise regression results, with backward elimination of the coef-
ficients not significant at 0.10. Covariates used in the full model: public,
sharet, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, painting, drawing, sculpture, photography,
graphics, and other genres. Robust standard error are reported. All re-
sults are rounded at the third digit.
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of artists’ coefficients from model (4.4)
Given that the genre-related variables besides other genres
are all significantly different from 0, we check now if the pat-
tern we observed is present also in the sub-samples of each
genre. To do that, we estimate the following model in the four
sub-samples of painting, drawing, graphics, and sculpture, with-
out considering photography given that only 6 artists have more
than 2 transactions concerning photography art, as well as other
genres because of its high heterogeneity:
ln(Pi) = k + γ1public+ γ2sharet + βjAj + τtIt,i + ϵi (4.5)
Figure 4.6 contains the kernel density distributions of the coef-
ficients for the art genre sub-samples; coefficients from paint-
ings’ sub-sample are in Panel 4.6a, drawings’ are in Panel 4.6b,
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sculptures’ in Panel 4.6c, while graphics’ are in Panel 4.6d.21
As one can see from the four graphs in Figure 4.6, the estima-
tion of the OLS model in the sub-samples results in a bimodal
distribution of the artists’ coefficients for paintings, drawings,
sculptures, and graphics. In particular, the first two panels (4.6a
and 4.6b) present a distribution very similar to the one obtained
from all the data, while sculptures (4.6c) have less difference in
the density of the high and the low peaks. Graphics, instead,
present a very accentuated bimodal form (4.6d). These differ-
ences between the four distributions are very likely due to the
different behaviour the market has with respect to different art
genres; in other words, it seems likely that drawings’ and paint-
ings’ markets behave similarly, while sculptures’ and graphics’
present some particularities, even if the general pattern of bi-
modality is found also in these two markets. We present then
the following claim.
Claim 4.2 The art genre effect does not affect the bimodality and the
scale of the peaks in the distribution of the artists’ coefficients com-
puted using the overall data. In the art genre sub-samples, the bi-
modality is robust, while the scale is robust only for paintings and for
drawings.
4.4.3 The year-by-year models
In order to check whether the bimodal distribution is a result
of the aggregation of the 6 years of selling of our dataset, in this
21Appendix B.2 contains the tables with the coefficients for the model in (4.5);
the results for the observations for which art genrei = painting are reported
in Table B.2.1, those for the artists who sold drawings are reported in Table
B.2.2, Table B.2.3 contains sculptures’ sub-sample results, and results for graph-
ics are reported in Table B.2.4.
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(d) Graphics
Figure 4.6: Genre-by-genre distribution of artists’ coefficients
from model (4.5)
Subsection we compute the OLS estimation of each year’s sub-
sample. The model we are going to estimate is the following:
ln(Pi) = k+γ1public+γ2sharet+γ3art genre+βjAj+ϵi (4.6)
where j = 1, ..., 230, for i sold in year t = 1, 2, ..., 6.22 As one
can see from Figure 4.7, all the six years’ coefficients present
bimodal distributions, more similar to the benchmark model’s
one in year 1, 2, and 4. Year 3, 5, and 6 present some small peaks
22As a robustness check, we also computed the model in (4.6) without
sharet, without any changes in the results, that are not reported here but avail-
able upon request.
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(a) Year 1
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(d) Year 4
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(f) Year 6
Figure 4.7: Year-by-year distribution of artists’ coefficients from
model (4.6)
after the second one, for values of the coefficient higher than 1,
which may be due to particular behaviour of the market with
respect to some artists in these years that could have reduced
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the smoothness of the distribution.23 We summarize this result
in the following claim.
Claim 4.3 There exists a year effect on the coefficients, as confirmed
by the significance of some of the time dummies in the benchmark
model, but it does not affect the form of the artists coefficients’ distri-
bution in each year.
4.4.4 The price-effect model: Hedonic quantile re-
gression
In this section we check if the pattern we found in the vari-
ous specifications so far, the bimodality in the distribution of
the artists’ coefficients, is stable throughout the quantiles of the
price distribution. The quantile hedonic model we will use is
the following one:
Qln(P )(q|A, t, art genre, public, sharet) = kq+
+ γ1art genre+ γ2public+ γ3sharet+
+ βqjAj + τq,tIt,i + ϵiq
(4.7)
where j = 1, ..., 230, t = 2, ..., 6, and q = {0.33, 0.5, 0.67}, that is,
we compute the quantile regression for the first tertile, for the
median, and for the second tertile; the results for the median
are reported in Table 4.8.24
23Appendix B.3 contains the tables with the estimated coefficients for each
of the six sub-samples. Results for year 1 are contained in Table B.3.1, year 2
results are reported in Table B.3.2, year 3 coefficients are in Table B.3.3, Table
B.3.4 contains results from year 4 sub-sample, results from year 5 are reported
in Table B.3.5, while year 6 results are reported in Table B.3.6. In Subsection
4.4.6 we shall check if the coefficients estimated in the benchmark model are
statistically equal to those estimated from the six models from Equation (4.6).
24The results of the estimation considering the first and second tertiles are
reported in Appendix B.4 in Table B.4.1 and B.4.2 respectively.
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Table 4.8: Hedonic quantile model on overall data for q = 0.5
Coeff. St. Er. p-val Coeff. St. Er. p-val
A1 0.440 0.058 0.000 A148 -0.423 0.042 0.000
A2 0.575 0.072 0.000 A149 0.733 0.099 0.000
A3 1.175 0.217 0.000 A150 -0.178 0.022 0.000
A4 -0.825 0.037 0.000 A151 -0.694 0.057 0.000
A6 -0.912 0.062 0.000 A152 -0.673 0.071 0.000
A7 -0.737 0.070 0.000 A153 -0.750 0.058 0.000
A8 0.777 0.206 0.000 A154 -0.450 0.072 0.000
A9 -0.687 0.127 0.000 A157 0.218 0.124 0.079
A10 0.286 0.024 0.000 A159 -0.581 0.067 0.000
A11 -0.240 0.025 0.000 A161 -0.795 0.050 0.000
A12 -0.918 0.077 0.000 A163 0.672 0.052 0.000
A13 -0.579 0.021 0.000 A164 0.513 0.200 0.010
A14 -0.806 0.105 0.000 A166 -0.527 0.103 0.000
A15 0.515 0.111 0.000 A167 -0.693 0.078 0.000
A16 1.380 0.437 0.002 A168 -0.277 0.060 0.000
A17 0.736 0.196 0.000 A169 -0.316 0.063 0.000
A18 -0.611 0.166 0.000 A170 -0.329 0.104 0.002
A20 -0.539 0.014 0.000 A171 0.339 0.088 0.000
A21 0.243 0.117 0.038 A172 -0.782 0.097 0.000
A22 -0.162 0.081 0.046 A175 0.634 0.053 0.000
A23 -0.627 0.018 0.000 A176 -0.254 0.053 0.000
A24 -0.876 0.086 0.000 A178 0.652 0.128 0.000
A25 -0.127 0.057 0.025 A179 -0.823 0.093 0.000
A26 0.287 0.107 0.008 A180 -0.583 0.083 0.000
A28 -0.341 0.125 0.006 A183 1.693 0.188 0.000
A100 -0.583 0.057 0.000 A185 -0.252 0.079 0.001
A101 -0.739 0.036 0.000 A186 -0.476 0.232 0.040
A103 -0.401 0.073 0.000 A187 -0.762 0.049 0.000
A104 -0.459 0.058 0.000 A188 0.484 0.045 0.000
A105 -0.439 0.068 0.000 A189 -0.268 0.068 0.000
A108 1.073 0.050 0.000 A190 -0.713 0.080 0.000
A109 0.219 0.062 0.000 A191 -0.327 0.176 0.063
A110 -0.290 0.054 0.000 A193 -0.299 0.089 0.001
A112 2.363 1.354 0.081 A198 -0.321 0.115 0.005
A113 0.963 0.053 0.000 A200 -0.566 0.071 0.000
A114 -0.716 0.071 0.000 A201 -0.524 0.056 0.000
A115 -0.789 0.039 0.000 A202 -0.254 0.045 0.000
A117 0.575 0.081 0.000 A204 0.761 0.035 0.000
A118 -0.747 0.045 0.000 A205 0.424 0.112 0.000
A120 -0.316 0.055 0.000 A206 1.013 0.124 0.000
A122 -0.861 0.034 0.000 A207 -0.275 0.094 0.003
A123 -0.583 0.045 0.000 A208 -0.750 0.027 0.000
A124 -0.678 0.049 0.000 A210 -0.588 0.170 0.001
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A125 0.170 0.021 0.000 A211 -0.468 0.086 0.000
A127 -0.604 0.112 0.000 A212 1.413 0.193 0.000
A129 -0.162 0.074 0.029 A213 1.115 0.118 0.000
A130 2.468 0.282 0.000 A215 -0.475 0.098 0.000
A131 -0.566 0.234 0.015 A216 -0.169 0.046 0.000
A132 -1.009 0.083 0.000 A217 0.792 0.154 0.000
A134 0.341 0.140 0.015 A220 -0.838 0.025 0.000
A135 1.481 0.244 0.000 A221 1.108 0.062 0.000
A136 1.011 0.034 0.000 A222 -0.629 0.020 0.000
A139 0.765 0.285 0.007 A223 0.725 0.073 0.000
A140 -0.287 0.161 0.075 A224 0.425 0.045 0.000
A142 -0.289 0.151 0.055 A225 -0.301 0.096 0.002
A143 1.336 0.109 0.000 A226 0.427 0.078 0.000
A144 -0.531 0.046 0.000 A227 0.286 0.046 0.000
A145 0.818 0.088 0.000 A228 0.307 0.044 0.000
A146 0.400 0.170 0.019 A230 0.541 0.168 0.001
art gen 0.057 0.004 0.000 t2 0.043 0.012 0.000
sharet -0.493 0.118 0.000 t4 0.046 0.019 0.013
public -0.281 0.016 0.000 t6 0.069 0.017 0.000
k 9.107 0.022 0.000
Obs. 23862
Notes: Quantile regression for q = 0.50. Stepwise regression results, with
backward elimination of the coefficients not significant at 0.10. Covariates
used in the full model: art genre, public, sharet, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6. Robust
standard error are reported. All results are rounded at the third digit.
Also in this estimation we implemented the quantile regres-
sion using a stepwise regression approach with the significance
level at 0.10. The estimated artists’ coefficients for the 0.50 quan-
tile are 118 and lay in a range that goes from -1.01 to 2.47, not
too different from the range of the benchmark model results.
The other covariates have all significant coefficients, with the
same sign they had in the benchmark model estimation as in
Table 4.6 and 4.7. The coefficients for the time dummies are
significant, again, only for even years (2008, 2010, 2012), as in
the other specifications.25
25As a robustness check, we also computed the quantile regression of the mo-
del in (4.7) dropping the variable sharet, finding similar results; the resulting
coefficients and their distribution are not reported here but are available upon
request.
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Figure 4.8: Distribution of artists’ coefficients from model (4.7)
for q = 0.50
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Figure 4.9: Distribution of artists’ coefficients from model (4.7)
for q = 0.33, 0.67
The kernel distribution of the coefficients for the median is
reported in Figure 4.8, and presents a bimodal form. Figure 4.9
contains the kernel distributions for q = 0.33 and q = 0.67, and
both present a bimodal distribution as well, even if in Panel
4.9a it is less pronounced and in Panel 4.9b the distribution has
also a small third peak after the second one; these particular
deviations from the form of most of the other results may be
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due to the fact that only some artists belong to certain level of
price. This allows us to present the following claim.
Claim 4.4 There exists a price effect on the coefficients that affects
the estimation of some of the indices. This effect slightly affects also
the distribution scale of the coefficients, without changing its bimodal
form.
4.4.5 The year-by-year price-effect models
In order to answer to a similar question to the one we asked in
Subsection 4.4.3, we compute the quantile hedonic regression
in all the 6 sub-samples given by the artworks sold in each year.
The model we use is the following:
Qln(P )(q|A, t, art genre, public, sharet) = kq,t+
+ γ1,q,tart genre+ γ2,q,tpublic+
+ γ3,q,tsharet + βq,j,tAj + ϵi,q,t
(4.8)
with j = 1, ..., 230, q = 0.50, and t = 1, ..., 6 that defines the
six sub-samples.26 Figure 4.10 reports the 6 years’ coefficients
kernel distributions. As one can see, the first two years (Pan-
els 4.10a and 4.10b) and year 5 (Panel 4.10e present a bimodal
form which is slightly different form the one of the benchmark
model distribution, while the other years’ distributions (Pan-
26The results of the estimation of the 6 models are reported in Appendix B.5.
Results for year 1 are reported in Tables B.5.1, year 2’s are in Table B.5.2, year 3’s
in Table B.5.3, year 4’s in Table B.5.4, year 5’s in Table B.5.5, and year 6’s in Table
B.5.6. Notice that, since the standard backward quantile regression reported
some issues in the computation for year 4 and 5, we implemented the quantile
regression using a bootstrap technique for these 2 years, and then dropping
all the non significantly different from 0 coefficients. As a robustness check,
we implemented the model in (4.8) for each year also dropping the variable
sharet, without significant changes in the results, which are not reported here
but available upon request.
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els 4.10c, 4.10d, and 4.10f) are similar to the benchmark model
distribution. We can present then the following claim.
Claim 4.5 The price effect together with the year effect does not affect
the bimodal form of the artists coefficients’ distribution. The scale is
not affected for year 3, year 4, and year 6 coefficients.
4.4.6 Analysis of artists’ coefficients dynamics and
ranking
Can we use a unique coefficient in a certain temporal span to
create an index of value of an artist? Or is it better to anal-
yse year-by-year her behaviour in the market, since the mar-
ket may be unstable and unpredictable (Baumol, 1986)? And,
does the value of an artist in the market remain stable indepen-
dently on the price of her artworks? Or is the value varying de-
pending on the level of price? In this subsection we attempt to
answer to these questions inspecting the year-by-year and the
price quantile-by-price quantile dynamics of the coefficients for
a certain artist, comparing it with the benchmark model coeffi-
cient.
Starting with the time-related questions, we first analyzed
graphically the dynamics of the coefficients overtime, compar-
ing it with the benchmark model coefficients. Recall that we
added the year dummies in our benchmark model (as in Equa-
tion 4.3), to account for the cycle and the behaviour of the art
market in a certain year, so if there is some gap between the
overall OLS and the year-by-year coefficients it is very likely
due to an artist effect, a change in her value in the market.
There are various possible dynamics that can be represented
mainly by four patterns, given the combinations of high and
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Figure 4.10: Year-by-year distribution of artists’ coefficients
from model (4.8) for q = 0.50
low value (above or below 0) and of stable and unstable evo-
lution (stability is considered with respect to the benchmark
model coefficient). Figure 4.11 represents the four combina-
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Figure 4.11: Year-by-year regressions and benchmark model
coefficients
Notes: Year-by-year regression 0.90 confidence interval is in grey, benchmark
model 0.90 confidence interval is dashed
tions: for example, Emilio Vedova (A223) has a stable dynamics
with a high value (Panel 4.11a), while Anish Kapoor (A112) has
a high value as well, but presents instability of his coefficient
overtime (Panel 4.11b). Similarly, Panel 4.11c contains Franco
Rognoni’s (A187) stable and low-value dynamics, while Renato
Mambor (A128) has a low value and an overtime dynamics
which is not stable (Panel 4.11d). Similarly to these four artists,
the other artists can be classified depending on their stability
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and their importance.27
Passing to a more quantitative analysis of the year-by-year dy-
namics, we compared the coefficients estimated through our
benchmark model with those estimated using OLS regression
on each of the years through a t-test. Among the 578 artists’
coefficients estimated for both the overall and the year-by-year
cases, 418 are statistically equal at a 95% significance, while 160
are not. In our case, then, if one uses the coefficients estimated
without considering the year effect, he will incur in coefficients
which are wrong on more than 25% of the cases. This leads us
to our next claim.
Claim 4.6 The year-by-year dynamics of coefficients presents four
different patterns of stability with respect to the OLS coefficient, that
is, high-value artist with stable dynamics, high-value artist with un-
stable dynamics, low-value artist with stable dynamics, and low-value
artist with unstable dynamics. Given the existence of this dynamics,
computing coefficients for a temporal span without taking the year
effect into account could lead to wrong estimates.
Focusing on the questions related to the quantile regression
coefficients, we apply a similar approach, starting to study the
graphs of the benchmark model coefficient versus the quan-
tile regression ones, computed for q = 0.05, 0.50, 0.95, so that
we have a quantile-by-quantile dynamics. As for the year-by-
year coefficients, we have various patterns; some of them are
reported in Figure 4.12. Accardi Carla (A1), in Panel 4.12a,
presents for example a coefficient higher than the OLS one and
quite stable up to the median, that then decreases. Panel 4.12b,
representing Giorgio Morandi’s (A145) coefficients, presents a
strongly increasing coefficient through the quantiles, while the
27For sake of space, we do not report all the artists’ figures here.
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Figure 4.12: Quantile regressions and benchmark model coeffi-
cients
Notes: Quantile regression 0.90 confidence interval for q = 0.05, 0.5, 0.95 is in
grey, benchmark model 0.90 confidence interval is dashed
quantile coefficients computed for Remo Squillantini (A208, in
Panel 4.12c) are decreasing as the price of his works reaches
higher quantiles of the distribution. Marc Quinn’s (A183) dy-
namics, represented in Panel 4.12d, presents the coefficients up
to the median which are not statistically different to the bench-
mark model’s ones (at 0.90 confidence level), and then a de-
creasing coefficient. Differently from the year-by-year dynam-
ics, the quantile-by-quantile dynamics is characterized by more
patterns; however, the ones in Figure 4.12 are the most frequent
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ones. Since not all the artists’ coefficients present the same in-
creasing or decreasing pattern, we could say that there exists
a price effect on the coefficients, even if, as we saw in Subsec-
tions 4.4.4 and 4.4.5, this effect does not affect the coefficients
distribution’s bimodality. To further check for that, we com-
puted a t-test to compare the benchmark model coefficients
with the quantile regression coefficients, as we did above for
the year-by-year dynamics. Among the 259 comparable coef-
ficients, that is, coefficients available for both the OLS regres-
sion and the quantile regression, 64 (24.71%) present no sta-
tistical difference between the two estimation methods, while
the other do, at a significance level of 95%. Among these 64
quantile regression coefficients statistically equal to the bench-
mark model’s ones, 48 are obtained from the median regres-
sion, 8 from the quantile regression with q = 0.95, and 8 from
the quantile regression with q = 0.05. In general, we can con-
firm that there exist a price effect that changes the coefficients
in the various price quantile, as we hinted above analysing the
graphs in Figure 4.12. We can present, then, our claim.
Claim 4.7 The price quantile-by-price quantile dynamics of coeffi-
cients presents several different patterns, some of which are strictly
increasing over price quantiles, other are statistically equal to OLS
coefficient up to the median and then they become statistically differ-
ent, while other are decreasing over price quantiles. Given the exis-
tence of a price effect, the index for all the levels of prices will likely be
different from an index aimed to measure only the low-price artworks’
artists.
Given the robustness of the bimodality result we found, we
can investigate if the estimated artists’ coefficients in the vari-
ous models generate different rankings. To do that, we report
the ranking of the first 25 artists from the benchmark model
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Table 4.9: Ranking of the first 25 artists in the benchmark model
in the various models
Artist (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Manzoni Piero 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 5
Kapoor Anish 2 2 2 3 6 1 3 1
Quinn Marc 3 3 5 2 4 4 2 -
Tancredi 4 5 3 9 5 16 - 4
Mathieu Georges 5 4 6 15 2 8 14 15
Morandi Giorgio 6 15 12 4 - 19 4 8
Iras 7 6 - 20 10 - 5 3
Tayou Jean Appolinaire 8 9 4 6 11 23 10 17
Mitoraj Igor 9 7 7 13 19 11 8 11
Afro 10 8 9 8 18 14 7 13
Hartung Hans 11 11 15 16 3 10 16 9
Matta Roberto 12 13 10 21 24 7 - -
Klein Yves 13 14 14 7 - - - 2
Vasarely Victor 14 10 8 12 8 21 - -
Spalletti Ettore 15 12 24 5 13 - 17 7
Solakov Nedko 16 19 11 18 17 24 - 16
Vedova Emilio 17 22 22 22 22 20 9 14
Balla Giacomo 18 20 13 - - 6 - 18
Appel Karel 19 17 18 - 7 9 6 -
Music Antonio Zoran 20 21 - 19 - 17 13 10
Pomodoro Arnaldo 21 24 17 - - 18 12 -
Merz Mario 22 18 - 17 9 5 - -
Lam Wifredo 23 - 19 - 14 - - -
Paladino Domenico 24 23 23 24 - - - 21
Tozzi Mario 25 16 - - 12 - 11 22
Notes: Column 1 contains the ranking generated by model (4.3) (benchmark model),
Column 2 the ranking generated from model in equation (4.7) with q = 0.50 (quan-
tile regression on the median), Column 3 to 8 the rankings generated by the model
in equation (4.6) from year 1 to year 6 respectively (year-by-year OLS regression).
and the rankings from models (4.7), and (4.6) for each of the 6
years.28 As we can see from Table 4.9, the 25 best artists from
28We focused on the first 25 artists only for the sake of space. We also omitted
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the benchmark model are not always included in the best 25
artists of the other rankings. For example, Marc Quinn is not
present among the best 25 of the sixth year model, and Tancredi
disappears from the year 5 model’s best 25; again, Yves Klein
is not present among the best 25 artists of the third, the fourth,
and the fifth year models, while it gets to the second position
in the sixth year’s one. To take into account the sensibility of
the ranking to the estimation model, one could create a super-
index which weights all our measures, since all these aspects
are relevant in the comparison of the individual characteristics
of the artists, that is, fame and talent. We can summarize these
results in the following claims.
Claim 4.8 There exists a year effect which affects the ranking of the
artists and it is independent on the cycle and on the behaviour of the
art market in a given year.
Claim 4.9 There exists a price effect that affects the artists’ coeffi-
cients ranking, and implies that the benchmark coefficients may not
be the right ones to describe artists who sell low-price artworks.
4.5 Conclusions
Starting from the construction of a benchmark model based on
hedonic OLS regression, we build a novel index to account for
the individual characteristics of the artists in the art market,
that is, fame and talent, which allows us to rank them and to
analyze the form of the distribution of the individual indices.
This is done by using a unique hand-collected dataset on all
from Table 4.9 the ranking obtained from model (4.4) since it is equal to the
benchmark’s one.
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the privately and publicly sold artworks in the Italian art mar-
ket, between 2007 and 2012; the data are taken from the public
SIAE database, which includes all the selling intermediated by
a gallery or an auction house. The coefficients obtained from
this first model present a strong bimodal distribution, with a
higher peak for low levels of the index and a low peak for
high levels (Claim 4.1). This pattern can be found also on other
works on art markets (Chanel et al., 1996; Georges and Sec¸kin,
2013; Pradier et al., 2016), as well as in the ArtFacts.net index
based on international auction prices; the bimodality result,
moreover, is confirmed also for sub-samples of public prices
only and private prices only. An interesting further extension
of this research’s results could be to consider the two peaks as
the peaks of two different distributions and, then, to study the
part of overlapping among these two as the artists who are
moving from one population to the other: this could happen
from the high-famed to the low-famed population and vicev-
ersa, and a time series analysis could help us understand this
dynamics.
To answer to the question if and how the distribution of the co-
efficients changes with respect to time and genre, we modify
the benchmark model through considering data sub-samples
of each year and of each genre. We find that the bimodality
and the scale of the peaks results are robust to these modifi-
cations (Claims 4.2 and 4.3). A time effect exists since all the
even-year dummies are positive and significant different from
zero in both the benchmark model and the art genres’ model on
overall data, as if there exists an economic cycle that lasts two
year and has a positive peak on even years (2008, 2010, and
2012).
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The hedonic quantile regression that we perform allows us to
check for price effects on the behaviour of the artists’ indices; in
particular, we find that the price effect exists and affects some of
the coefficients but it does not affect the bimodality of the dis-
tributions, even if the scale of the two peaks slightly changes
(Claim 4.4). Considering the price effect together with the year
effect, this modification of the scale of the two peaks is less pro-
nounced (Claim 4.5).
A potential interpretation of the bimodality result we find in all
our specifications of the model is related to the superstar the-
ory, since our results always present two peaks in the distribu-
tion of the coefficients, a higher one in correspondence of low
levels of the index (non-superstars) and a lower one for high
levels of the index (superstars). However, a theory of fame for-
mation which would result in this particular form of the distri-
bution has not yet been developed in literature.
There are common results shared between all the models on
overall data, that is, both sharet and public present a negative
sign; the negative sign of the share could be due to a scale effect
of the bigger intermediaries, since they sell more artworks and
then they can sell at a lower price; the negative sign of public
could depend on the market power of the intermediaries in the
market, which is different in the public market and in the pri-
vate one.
We also analyze more in-depth the behaviour of the coeffi-
cients as the considered year changes, as well as the price quan-
tile changes, and we find some regularity for these two dynam-
ics. In particular, coefficients either are stable or unstable for
what concerns the time dynamics (Claim 4.6), while quantile
dynamics presents more patterns, for example increasing, de-
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creasing, or first stable and then decreasing (Claim 4.7). This
implies that the use of time dummies in the construction of the
indices is not enough to overcome the year-by-year variation in
the coefficients, since it is likely due to an artist-specific varia-
tion; similarly, the existence of the price dynamics in the coef-
ficients signals that the use of a ranking based on all the prices
is not efficient in ranking the low-price artists. Therefore, these
dynamics of the coefficients have a significative effect on the
ranking of the artists; in particular, we find that the ranking is
sensitive to the year effect and the price effect (Claims 4.8 and
4.9), and hence the construction of a super-index as weighted
average of the indices we present could be an improvement of
the way the artists are ranked. Finally, further research could
investigate if some particular artists’ characteristics affects the
behaviour of their coefficients in these dynamics; for example,
a time variant characteristic could affect the time dynamics.
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Appendix A
Proofs of Lemmas and
Propositions in Chapter
2
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
The gallery will buy the artwork from the insider or directly
from the artist, depending if the gallery is in the aigo/aigh
channel or in the ago/agh channel. In any case, once the gallery
has bought the artwork, it can decide to sell it to the outsider
or to the auction house. We are going to demonstrate here that,
whatever the price the gallery paid to buy the artwork, it will
be sold to the auction house if (2.30) holds.
The proof is divided in four parts.
Proof. Assume the gallery received the artwork from the in-
sider, paying a price equal to P igaigo, as it is in equation (2.18),
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and it can choose to sell it to the outsider or to the auction
house. If the artwork is sold to the outsider, the price will be
equal to (2.8), while if it will be sold to the auction house, in
some sense “deviating” from the channel the insider consid-
ered when he bargained the price with the gallery, the price
will be:
P ghaigh|P igaigo = (1− ν)P igaigo + νP oR (A.1)
where P ghaigh|P igaigo indicates that the gallery sells the artwork to
the auction house also if it has been bought from the insider as
if he thought it will be sold to the outsider.
Equation (2.8), considering the form of (2.18) and of (2.24) (the
price paid by the insider to the artist), can be rewritten as:
P goaigo =
(1− δ)(1− α)(1− γ)P aR + δ [1− α(1− γ)]P oR
1− α(1− γ)− γ(1− δ) (A.2)
The price in (A.1) can be rewritten (using (2.18) and (A.2)) as:
P ghaigh|P igaigo =
=
(1− ν)(1− α)(1− γ)P aR + ν [1− α(1− γ)]P oR
1− α(1− γ) +
+
γ(1− ν)
1− α(1− γ)
[
(1− δ)(1− α)(1− γ)P aR + δ [1− α(1− γ)]P oR
1− α(1− γ)− γ(1− δ)
]
(A.3)
Selling the artwork to the auction house instead of selling it to
the outsider, that is aigh ≻ aigo, is the preferred choice if the
price obtained from the auction house will be higher than the
one obtained from the outsider, that is P ghaigh|P igaigo > P goaigo. This
is solved for:
ν > δ (A.4)
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For what concerns the “only if”-part of the relation, it is easy to
proof, since P ghaigh|P igaigo > P goaigo and ν > δ are equivalent, and
aigh ≻ aigo implies that the price obtained in the aigh channel
thanks to the “deviation” is higher than the one obtained from
the aigo channel.
This concludes the first part of the proof.
Assume now that the gallery receives the artwork from the
insider given that he thinks the gallery will sell the artwork to
the auction house after that, so that the gallery pays the price
as it is in equation (2.17). If the gallery sells the artwork to the
auction house, as expected by the insider, the price it receives
will be the one in (2.6); if, instead, the gallery “deviates” from
what the insider expected, the price that the outsider pays will
be:
P goaigo|P igaigh = (1− δ)P igaigh + δP oR (A.5)
The intuition behind the notation of the left-hand side of (A.5)
is the same explained above for (A.1).
Considering the price paid by the insider in (2.23) together with
(2.17), we can rewrite (2.6) as:
P ghaigh =
(1− ν)(1− α)(1− γ)P aR + ν [1− α(1− γ)]P oR
1− α(1− γ)− γ(1− ν) (A.6)
Using (A.6) together with (2.23) and (2.17), we can rewrite (A.5)
as:
P goaigo|P igaigh =
(1− δ)(1− α)(1− γ)P aR + δ [1− α(1− γ)]P oR
1− α(1− γ) +
+
γ(1− δ)
1− α(1− γ)
[
(1− ν)(1− α)(1− γ)P aR + ν [1− α(1− γ)]P oR
1− α(1− γ)− γ(1− ν)
]
(A.7)
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Thus, aigh ≻ aigo can be rewritten using the prices in (A.6) and
in (A.7) as P ghaigh > P
go
aigo|P igaigh, that is solved for:
ν > δ (A.8)
The “only if”-part of the relation is again easy to proof, since
the relation aigh ≻ aigo implies P ghaigh > P goaigo|P igaigh, which is
equivalent to (A.8).
This concludes the second part of the proof.
Assume now that, being on the ago/agh channel, the gallery
buys the artwork from the artist at a price equal to the one in
(2.29), that is, the one that is the result of the bargaining be-
tween the artist and the gallery when the artist thinks that the
gallery will sell the artwork to the outsider afterward. If the
gallery really sells the artwork to the outsider, the price will be
equal to the one in (2.12). If, instead, the gallery sells it to the
auction house, “deviating” from what the artist thought, the
price will be equal to:
P ghagh|P agago = (1− ν)P agago + νP oR (A.9)
Substituting (2.29), (2.12) can be rewritten as:
P goago =
(1− δ)(1− β)P aR + δP oR
1− β(1− δ) (A.10)
Substituting (A.10) and (2.29) in (A.9), we get:
P ghagh|P agago =
(1− ν)(1− β)P aR + [β(δ − ν) + ν]P oR
1− β(1− δ) (A.11)
The gallery will prefer to sell to the auction house (agh ≻ ago)
if the price obtained in this case will be higher, that is, using
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(A.10) and (A.11), if P ghagh|P agago > P goago, which is solved for:
ν > δ (A.12)
The “only if” part of the relation is again straightforward to
proof, since ν > δ is equivalent to P ghagh|P agago > P goago, and the
former expression is true if agh ≻ ago.
This concludes the third part of the proof.
Assume that the gallery pays the artwork at a price bar-
gained with the artist as if she thinks the gallery will sell the
artwork to the auction house afterward, that is, at (2.28). If the
gallery will sell the artwork to the auction house, the price it
will get is the one in (2.10); if, instead, the gallery sells the art-
work to the outsider, the price will be equal to:
P goago|P agagh = (1− δ)P agagh + δP oR (A.13)
Substituting (2.28) in (2.10), we get:
P ghagh =
(1− ν)(1− β)P aR + νP oR
1− β(1− ν) (A.14)
Substituting (A.14) and (2.28) into (A.13), we obtain:
P goago|P agagh =
(1− δ)(1− β)P aR + [β(ν − δ) + δ]P oR
1− β(1− ν) (A.15)
The gallery will prefer to sell to the auction house (agh ≻ ago)
if the price it will obtain will be higher, that is, using (A.14) and
(A.15), if P ghagh > P
go
ago|P agagh, that is solved for:
ν > δ (A.16)
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The “only if”-part of the relation is straightforward to proof,
since (A.16) is equivalent to P ghagh > P
go
ago|P agagh, and this last ex-
pression is implied by agh ≻ ago.
This completes the proof.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2.2
Similarly to what we saw in Appendix A.1, we demonstrate
here that the gallery will sell to the outsider after having bought
the artwork from either the artist or the gallery independently
on the price paid if (2.31) holds. Also this proof is made up of
4 parts.
Proof. Assume the gallery bought the artwork from the insider
paying a price equal to P igaigo, that is, having that the insider
thought that the gallery will sell it to the outsider afterwards.
If the gallery sells it to the outsider, the price will be P goaigo, as in
(A.2), while if it sells the artwork to the auction house, the price
will be the one in (A.3). Comparing these two prices, selling to
the outsider will be preferred to selling to the auction house
(aigo ≻ aigh) when P goaigo > P ghaigh|P igaigo, and this is equivalent
to:
δ > ν (A.17)
This completes the first part of the proof.
Assume now that the gallery received the artwork from the
insider, by paying P igaigh, since the insider thought he was on
the aigh channel. If the gallery sells the artwork to the auction
house as thought by the insider, the price will be P ghaigh, as in
(A.6), while if it “deviates” and sells it to the outsider, the price
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will be the one in (A.7). For the gallery, aigo ≻ aigh is equiva-
lent to P goaigo|P igaigh > P ghaigh, which is solved for:
δ > ν (A.18)
This completes the second part of the proof.
Assume, finally, that the gallery bought the artwork from
the artist, paying P agago, that is, paying a bargaining price that is
the result of the bargaining between the gallery and the artist
when she thinks the gallery will sell the artwork to the outsider
afterwards. If the gallery sells the artwork to the outsider, the
price it receives will be equal to (A.10), while if it sells the art-
work to the auction house, the price will be equal to the one
in (A.11). The gallery will sell the artwork to the outsider if
ago ≻ agh, which is equivalent to P goago > P ghagh|P agago, which is
solved for:
δ > ν (A.19)
This completes the third part of the proof.
Assume now that the gallery bought the artwork from the
artist, paying P agagh; the price is the solution of the bargain-
ing between the gallery and the artist when the latter thinks
that the gallery will sell the artwork to the auction house after-
wards. If the gallery actually sells the artwork to the auction
house, the price will be the one in (A.14), while if it “deviates”
and sells it to the outsider, the price will be (A.15). The gallery
will prefer selling the artwork to the outsider if ago ≻ agh, that
is, if P goago|P agagh > P ghagh, which is solved for:
δ > ν (A.20)
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This completes the proof.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2.3
We now demonstrate that, independently on what is the price
paid by the insider, that is, independently on what the artist
thinks about the channel the artwork will take, he will sell the
artwork to the auction house if and only if condition in (2.32)
holds, given that (2.30) holds by assumption. The proof is made
up of two parts.
Proof. Assume the insider paid P aiaih for the artwork, since the
artist thought he would have sold it to the auction house after-
wards. If the insider actually sells the artwork to the auction
house, he will receive a price equal to P ihaih, as it is in (2.14),
that, considering also the form of P aiaih as it is in (2.25), can be
rewritten as:
P ihaih =
(1− µ)(1− α)P aR + µP oR
1− α(1− µ) (A.21)
If, instead, the insider sells the artwork to the gallery, knowing
that the gallery will sell the artwork to the auction house (given
that (2.30) holds by assumption), he will get a price equal to
P igaigh|P aiaih, which will be equal to:
P igaigh|P aiaih = (1− γ)P aiaih + γP ghaigh|P aiaih (A.22)
where P ghaigh|P aiaih = (1 − ν)P igaigh|P aiaih + νP oR. Using (2.25) and
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(A.21), we can rewrite (A.22) as:
P igaigh|P aiaih =
(1− γ)(1− α)P aR + αµ(1− γ)P oR
[1− γ(1− ν)] [1− α(1− µ)] +
γνP oR
1− γ(1− ν)
(A.23)
The insider will prefer to sell the artwork to the auction house
(aih ≻ aigh) when the price in (A.21) is greater than the one in
(A.23), that is, when µ > γν1−γ(1−ν) . This completes the first half
of the proof.
Assume now that the insider paid P aiaigh to buy the artwork:
if he sells the artwork to the gallery as expected by the artist
(and, afterwards, the gallery will sell the artwork to the auction
house, given that (2.30) holds), he will get P igaigh, which, using
(2.17) together with (2.6) and (2.23), has the following form:
P igaigh =
(1− γ)(1− α)P aR + γνP oR
1− α(1− γ)− γ(1− ν) (A.24)
Instead, if the insider sells the artwork to the auction house
directly, he will get P ihaih|P aiaigh = (1 − µ)P aiaigh + µP oR, which,
using (A.24) and (2.23), can be rewritten as:
P ihaih|P aiaigh = µP oR+
+
(1− µ)(1− α) [1− γ(1− ν)]P aR + αγν(1− µ)P oR
1− α(1− γ)− γ(1− ν)
(A.25)
The insider will prefer to sell the artwork directly to the auction
house (aih ≻ aigh) when the price in (A.25) is greater than the
one in (A.24); this is equivalent to have the condition in (2.32)
to hold. This completes the proof.
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A.4 Proof of Lemma 2.4
We now demonstrate that the insider will sell the artwork to
the gallery (that will sell the artwork to the auction house after-
wards, for what Lemma 2.2 postulates when condition in (2.30)
holds) independently on what is the price he paid for it if and
only if (2.33) holds. The proof is made up of two parts.
Proof. Assume that the insider bought the artwork at a price
equal to P aiaih from the artist; if he sells the artwork to the auc-
tion house as expected by the artist, he will receive a price equal
to P ihaih, as it is in (A.21); if, instead, he will sell the artwork to
the gallery, he will get P ghaigh|P aiaih, as it is in (A.23). The insider
will prefer to sell the artwork to the gallery (aigh ≻ aih) when
(A.23) is greater than (A.21), which is equivalent to have (2.33)
to hold. This completes the first part of the proof.
Assume instead that the insider bought the artwork paying
P aiaigh from the artist; if he sells the artwork to the gallery, he
will obtain a price equal to the one in (A.24), while if he sells it
to the auction house, “deviating” from what the artists expects,
he will obtain P ihaih|P aiaigh, as it is in (A.25). He will prefer to sell
the artwork to the gallery (aigh ≻ aih) if the first of these two
prices is larger than the second one, that is, when (2.33) holds.
This completes the proof.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 2.5
We demonstrate here that, under (2.31), the insider will sell the
artwork to the auction house instead of to the gallery (knowing
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that it will sell the artwork to the outsider afterwards, for what
we said in Lemma 2.2 when (2.31) holds), independently on the
price he paid to buy the artwork, if and only if (2.34) holds. The
proof consists in two parts.
Proof. Assume that the insider bought the artwork from the
artist paying P aiaih; if he sells the artwork to the auction house
as expected by the artist, he will get P ihaih as it is in (A.21), while
if he sells the artwork to the gallery (that, then, will sell the
artwork to the outsider), he will get P igaigo|P aiaih = (1− γ)P aiaih +
γP goaigo|P aiaih, where P goaigo|P aiaih = (1− δ)P igaigo|P aiaih + δP oR. Using
(2.25) and (A.21), we have:
P igaigo|P aiaih =
=
(1− γ)(1− α)P aR + αµ(1− γ)P oR
[1− γ(1− δ)] [1− α(1− µ)] +
γδP oR
1− γ(1− δ)
(A.26)
The insider will prefer to sell the artwork to the auction house
instead of to the gallery (aih ≻ aigo) when the price in (A.21)
is greater than the one in (A.26), and this is equivalent to have
(2.34) to hold. This completes the first part of the proof.
Assuming now that the insider bought the artwork paying
P aiaigo; if he actually sells the artwork to the gallery as expected
by the artist, he will get P igaigo, which, considering the form in
(2.18) together with (2.8) and (2.24), will be equal to:
P igaigo =
(1− γ)(1− α)P aR + γδP oR
1− α(1− γ)− γ(1− δ) (A.27)
If, instead, the insider sells the artwork to the auction house
deviating from what the artist thought, he will get P ihaih|P aiaigo =
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(1− µ)P aiaigo + µP oR, which, using (2.24) and (A.27), becomes:
P ihaih|P aiaigo = µP oR+
+
(1− µ)(1− α) [1− γ(1− δ)]P aR + αγδ(1− µ)P oR
1− α(1− γ)− γ(1− δ)
(A.28)
The insider will prefer to sell the artwork to the auction house
(aih ≻ aigo) when the price in (A.28) is greater than the one
in (A.27), which is true when condition in (2.34) holds. This
completes the proof.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 2.6
In this section, we demonstrate that, under (2.31), the insider
will always sell the artwork to the gallery (that will sell the art-
work to the outsider afterwards, given what we said in Lemma
2.2), independently on the price he paid to the artist to buy it,
if and only if (2.35) holds. The proof is made up of two parts.
Proof. Assume the insider paid P aiaih to the artist; if he sells the
artwork to the auction house, he will get P ihaih as it is in (A.21),
while if he sells it to the gallery he will get P igaigo|P aiaih, as it is in
(A.26). He will prefer to sell the artwork to the outsider (that is,
aigo ≻ aih) when the price in (A.26) is higher than the one in
(A.21), which is true when (2.35) holds. This completes the first
half of the proof.
Assuming instead that the insider paid P aiaigo to buy the art-
work. If he actually sells the artwork to the gallery, he will get
P igaigo as it is in (A.27), while if he “deviates” from what the
artist thought and sells the artwork to the auction house, he
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will obtain the price in (A.28). The insider will prefer the aigo
channel to the aih channel when the price in (A.27) is greater
than the one in (A.28), which happens when (2.35) holds. This
completes the proof.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 2.1
A.7.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1.1
Proof. To prove that the artist prefers selling her artwork to the
insider instead of to the gallery and to the auction house, given
Lemma 2.3, that is, given that conditions in (2.30) and (2.32)
hold, we need the two prices the artist would get from selling
the artwork to the gallery (knowing that it will be sold directly
to the auction house afterwards) and to the auction house to be
smaller than the one that she will get if she sells it to the insider
(knowing that he will sell it to the auction house afterwards).
This is represented in the following system of conditions (that
contains also the two conditions we assume to hold in Proposi-
tion 2.1): ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(1−α)PaR+αµP oR
1−α(1−µ) >
(1−β)PaR+βνP oR
1−β(1−ν)
(1−α)PaR+αµP oR
1−α(1−µ) > (1− η)P aR + ηP oR
γν − µ+ µγ − µγν < 0
ν > δ
(A.29)
The system is solved for the conditions reported in (2.36). This
completes the proof.
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A.7.2 Proof of Proposition 2.1.2
Proof. Given Lemma 2.3, the artist will prefer to sell the art-
work to the gallery (agh) instead of to the insider (aih) or to the
auction house (ah) if the price she will get from the first one
will be greater than the ones she could get from the other two
potential buyers. This is analytically represented in the follow-
ing system (in which also the two conditions coming from the
Proposition are present):⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(1−β)PaR+βνP oR
1−β(1−ν) >
(1−α)PaR+αµP oR
1−α(1−µ)
(1−β)PaR+βνP oR
1−β(1−ν) > (1− η)P aR + ηP oR
γν − µ+ µγ − µγν < 0
ν > δ
(A.30)
The system is solved for the values of the parameters reported
in (2.37). This completes the proof.
A.7.3 Proof of Proposition 2.1.3
Proof. The artist will prefer to sell the artwork to the auction
house directly instead of selling the artwork to the insider or
to the gallery (that, given Lemma 2.3, can be written as ah ≻
aih∧ah ≻ agh) if the price she obtains from the first bargaining
is greater than the one she may obtain from the other two. This
is represented in the following system:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(1− η)P aR + ηP oR > (1−α)P
a
R+αµP
o
R
1−α(1−µ)
(1− η)P aR + ηP oR > (1−β)P
a
R+βνP
o
R
1−β(1−ν)
γν − µ+ µγ − µγν < 0
ν > δ
(A.31)
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The system above is equivalent to the conditions in (2.38). This
completes the proof.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 2.2
A.8.1 Proof of Proposition 2.2.1
Proof. Given Lemma 2.4, the artist will prefer to sell the art-
work to the insider (that, then, will sell the artwork to the galle-
ry and it will end up to be sold to the auction house) instead of
to the gallery (that will sell the artwork to the auction house) or
to the auction house, that is, aigh ≻ agh ∧ aigh ≻ ah, when the
price she obtains from the first bargaining is greater than the
ones she may obtain from the other two, namely:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(1−α)[1−γ(1−ν)]PaR+αγνP oR
1−γ(1−ν)−α(1−γ) >
(1−β)PaR+βνP oR
1−β(1−ν)
(1−α)[1−γ(1−ν)]PaR+αγνP oR
1−γ(1−ν)−α(1−γ) > (1− η)P aR + ηP oR
γν − µ+ µγ − µγν > 0
ν > δ
(A.32)
The system above, which contains also the two conditions we
assume in Proposition 2.2, is solved for the conditions reported
in (2.39). This completes the proof.
A.8.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2.2
Proof. The artist will prefer to sell the artwork to the gallery
(agh) instead of selling the artwork to the insider (aigh) or the
auction house (ah), given Lemma 2.4, when the price she ob-
tains in the bargaining with the gallery is the highest among all
the three prices. Analytically, this is represented in the follow-
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ing system:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(1−β)PaR+βνP oR
1−β(1−ν) >
(1−α)[1−γ(1−ν)]PaR+αγνP oR
1−γ(1−ν)−α(1−γ)
(1−β)PaR+βνP oR
1−β(1−ν) > (1− η)P aR + ηP oR
γν − µ+ µγ − µγν > 0
ν > δ
(A.33)
The system is solved for the conditions in (2.40). This completes
the proof.
A.8.3 Proof of Proposition 2.2.3
Proof. The artist will sell the artwork to the auction house in-
stead of selling the artwork to the insider (aigh) or to the gallery
(agh) when the price she obtains in the agh channel is higher
than the one she may obtain in the other two channels. This
is analytically equivalent to the following system, which con-
siders also the conditions in (2.30) and in (2.33) (implied by
Lemma 2.4):⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(1− η)P aR + ηP oR > (1−α)[1−γ(1−ν)]P
a
R+αγνP
o
R
1−γ(1−ν)−α(1−γ)
(1− η)P aR + ηP oR > (1−β)P
a
R+βνP
o
R
1−β(1−ν)
γν − µ+ µγ − µγν > 0
ν > δ
(A.34)
The system is solved for the conditions we reported in (2.41).
This completes the proof.
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A.9 Proof of Proposition 2.3
A.9.1 Proof of Proposition 2.3.1
Proof. Given Lemma 2.5, the artist will prefer to sell the art-
work to the insider (knowing that he will sell the artwork to
the auction house afterwards) to sell it to the gallery (know-
ing that it will be sold to the outsider) or to the auction house
(aih ≻ ago ∧ aih ≻ ah) when the price she obtains from the
first bargaining is the highest among the three bargained prices.
Analytically, this is equivalent to the following system:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(1−α)PaR+αµP oR
1−α(1−µ) >
(1−β)PaR+βδP oR
1−β(1−δ)
(1−α)PaR+αµP oR
1−α(1−µ) > (1− η)P aR + ηP oR
γδ − µ+ µγ − µγδ < 0
ν < δ
(A.35)
The system is solved for the conditions we reported in (2.42).
This completes the proof.
A.9.2 Proof of Proposition 2.3.2
Proof. Given Lemma 2.5, the artist will prefer to sell the art-
work to the gallery instead of to the insider or to the auction
house (ago ≻ aih ∧ ago ≻ ah) as long as the price she obtains
from the bargaining with the gallery is higher than the one she
may obtain from the bargaining with the other two potential
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buyers. This is equivalent to the following system:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(1−β)PaR+βδP oR
1−β(1−δ) >
(1−α)PaR+αµP oR
1−α(1−µ)
(1−β)PaR+βδP oR
1−β(1−δ) > (1− η)P aR + ηP oR
γδ − µ+ µγ − µγδ < 0
ν < δ
(A.36)
The system is solved for the conditions in (2.43). This completes
the proof.
A.9.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3.3
Proof. Given Lemma 2.5, the artist will prefer to sell the art-
work to the auction house directly instead of selling the art-
work indirectly to the auction house through the insider or to
sell it to the gallery (that will sell the artwork to the outsider)
when the price she obtains from the first bargaining is higher
than the ones she may obtain from the other two. This is ana-
lytically represented by the following system:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(1− η)P aR + ηP oR > (1−α)P
a
R+αµP
o
R
1−α(1−µ)
(1− η)P aR + ηP oR > (1−β)P
a
R+βδP
o
R
1−β(1−δ)
γδ − µ+ µγ − µγδ < 0
ν < δ
(A.37)
The system is solved for the condition in (2.44). This completes
the proof.
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A.10 Proof of Proposition 2.4
A.10.1 Proof of Proposition 2.4.1
Proof. Given Lemma 2.6, the artist will prefer to sell the art-
work to the insider (that will sell the artwork to the gallery,
which, in turn, will sell it to the outsider) to sell the artwork
to the the gallery (that will sell it to the outsider) or to the auc-
tion house (that is, aigo ≻ ago ∧ aigo ≻ ah), when the price
she obtains from the bargaining with the insider is the highest
among the three prices. This is analytically represented by the
following system:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(1−α)[1−γ(1−δ)]PaR+αγδP oR
1−γ(1−δ)−α(1−γ) >
(1−β)PaR+βδP oR
1−β(1−δ)
(1−α)[1−γ(1−δ)]PaR+αγδP oR
1−γ(1−δ)−α(1−γ) > (1− η)P aR + ηP oR
γδ − µ+ µγ − µγδ > 0
ν < δ
(A.38)
The system is solved for the conditions in (2.45). This completes
the proof.
A.10.2 Proof of Proposition 2.4.2
Proof. Given Lemma 2.6, the artist will sell the artwork to the
gallery (ago) instead of selling the artwork to the insider (aigo)
or to the auction house (ah) when the price she obtains from
the bargaining with the gallery is higher than the ones she may
obtain from the bargaining with each of the other two potential
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buyers. This is equivalent to the following system:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(1−β)PaR+βδP oR
1−β(1−δ) >
(1−α)[1−γ(1−δ)]PaR+αγδP oR
1−γ(1−δ)−α(1−γ)
(1−β)PaR+βδP oR
1−β(1−δ) > (1− η)P aR + ηP oR
γδ − µ+ µγ − µγδ > 0
ν < δ
(A.39)
The system above is solved for the conditions in (2.46). This
completes the proof.
A.10.3 Proof of Proposition 2.4.3
Proof. Given Lemma 2.6, the artist will prefer to sell the art-
work to the auction house instead of selling the artwork to the
gallery or to the insider (that is, ah ≻ aigo∧ah ≻ ago) when the
price she obtains from the bargaining with the auction house is
higher than the other two prices she may obtain from the bar-
gaining with the other potential buyers. Analytically, this is
equivalent to the following system:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(1− η)P aR + ηP oR > (1−α)[1−γ(1−δ)]P
a
R+αγδP
o
R
1−γ(1−δ)−α(1−γ)
(1− η)P aR + ηP oR > (1−β)P
a
R+βδP
o
R
1−β(1−δ)
γδ − µ+ µγ − µγδ > 0
ν < δ
(A.40)
The system is solved for the conditions in (2.47). This completes
the proof.
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Appendix B
Supplementary material
for Chapter 4
B.1 Artists’ codes
Table B.1.1: Artists’ names and codes used in the models
Artist Code Artist Code
Accardi Carla A1 Kounellis Jannis A116
Adami Valerio A2 Lam Wifredo A117
Afro A3 Licata Riccardo A118
Ajmone Giuseppe A4 Licini Osvaldo A119
Alviani Getulio A5 Lilloni Umberto A120
Angeli Franco A6 Lindstrom Bengt A121
Annigoni Pietro A7 Lodola Marco A122
Appel Karel A8 Lupo Alessandro A123
Arico` Rodolfo A9 Maccari Mino A124
Arienti Stefano A10 Maggi Cesare A125
Arman Fernandez A11 Magnelli Alberto A126
Asveri Gianfranco A12 Mainolfi Luigi A127
Attardi Ugo A13 Mambor Renato A128
Aubertin Bernard A14 Mangione Salvatore A129
Baj Enrico A15 Manzoni Piero A130
Iras A16 Manzu` Giacomo A131
Balla Giacomo A17 Marchegiani Elio A132
Barnils Sergi A18 Marini Marino A133
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Barni Roberto A19 Martini Arturo A134
Bartolena Giovanni A20 Mathieu Georges A135
Beecroft Vanessa A21 Matta Roberto A136
Bendini Vasco A22 Mattioli Carlo A137
Bentivoglio Cesare A23 Melotti Fausto A138
Berlingeri Cesare A24 Merz Mario A139
Berruti Valerio A25 Messina Francesco A140
Beuys Joseph A26 Migneco Giuseppe A141
Bianchi Domenico A27 Miro` Joan A142
Biasi Alberto A28 Mitoraj Igor A143
Birolli Renato A29 Mondino Aldo A144
Boetti Alighiero A30 Morandi Giorgio A145
Bonalumi Agostino A31 Moreni Mattia A146
Brindisi Remo A32 Morlotti Ennio A147
Bueno Antonio A33 Munari Bruno A148
Bueno Xavier A34 Music Antonio Zoran A149
Burri Alberto A35 Mus Italo A150
Calvetti Fabio A36 Natali Renato A151
Calzolari Pierpaolo A37 Nativi Gualtiero A152
Campigli Massimo A38 Nespolo Ugo A153
Cantatore Domenico A39 Nido Davide A154
Capogrossi Giuseppe A40 Nigro Mario A155
Carmassi Arturo A41 Nitsch Hermann A156
Carmi Eugenio A42 Nomellini Plinio A157
Carre´ Carlo A43 Novelli Gastone A158
Cascella Michele A44 Nunziante Antonio A159
Casorati Felice A45 Nunzio A160
Cassinari Bruno A46 Olivieri Claudio A161
Castellani Enrico A47 Ontani Luigi A162
Cecchini Loris A48 Paladino Domenico A163
Celiberti Giorgio A49 Paolini Giulio A164
Ceroli Mario A50 Papetti Alessandro A165
Cesetti Giuseppe A51 Pascali Pino A166
Chagall Marc A52 Paulucci Enrico A167
Chighine Alfredo A53 Perilli Achille A168
Chini Galileo A54 Petrus Marco A169
Christo A55 Picasso Pablo A170
Cingolani Marco A56 Pignatelli Luca Emanuele A171
Colombo Gianni A57 Pinelli Pino A172
Consagra Pietro A58 Pirandello Fausto A173
Corpora Antonio A59 Pistoletto Michelangelo A174
Corsi Carlo A60 Pivi Paola A175
Crali Tullio A61 Pizzi Cannella Piero A176
Crippa Roberto A62 Plessi Fabrizio A177
Cucchi Enzo A63 Pomodoro Arnaldo A178
Cuoghi Roberto A64 Possenti Antonio A179
Dangelo Sergio A65 Pozzati Concetto A180
De Bruyckere Berlinde A66 Prampolini Enrico A181
De Chirico Giorgio A67 Pratella Attilio A182
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De Corsi Nicolas A68 Quinn Marc A183
De Dominicis Gino A69 Radice Mario A184
Del Pezzo Lucio A70 Reggiani Mauro A185
De Maria Nicola A71 Roasio Maurizio A186
De Paris Enrico Tommaso A72 Rognoni Franco A187
Depero Fortunato A73 Rosai Ottone A188
De Pisis Filippo A74 Rotella Mimmo A189
Dottori Gerardo A75 Ruggeri Piero A190
Dova Giancarlo Gianni A76 Saetti Bruno A191
Emblema Salvatore A77 Santomaso Giuseppe A192
Epifani Paola A78 Sassu Aligi A193
Fabbri Agenore A79 Scanavino Emilio A194
Faccincani Athos A80 Scheggi Merlini Paolo A195
Festa Tano A81 Schifano Mario A196
Filippelli Cafiero A82 Schneider Gerard A197
Finzi Ennio A83 Scialoja Toti A198
Fiore Vincenzo A84 Severini Gino A199
Fiume Salvatore A85 Shafik Awad Medhat A200
Fontana Lucio A86 Simeti Turi A201
Frangi Giovanni A87 Sironi Mario A202
Galliani Omar A88 Soffici Ardengo A203
Gallo Giuseppe Francesco A89 Solakov Nedko A204
Garcia Rossi Horacio A90 Soldati Atanasio A205
Gastini Marco Giuseppe A91 Spalletti Ettore A206
Geers Kendell A92 Spoerri Daniel A207
Gentilini Franco A93 Squillantini Remo A208
Germana` Mimmo A94 Sughi Alberto A209
Gheduzzi Giuseppe A95 Tadini Emilio A210
Ghiglia Oscar A96 Tamburi Orfeo A211
Ghinato Enrico A97 Tancredi A212
Ghirri Luigi A98 Tayou Jean Appolinaire A213
Gilardi Piero A99 Tirelli Marco A214
Gonzaga Gianfranco A100 Tomea Fiorenzo A215
Griffa Giorgio A101 Tosi Arturo A216
Guccione Piero A102 Tozzi Mario A217
Guerzoni Gianfranco A103 Turcato Giulio A218
Guida Federico A104 Uncini Giuseppe A219
Guidi Virgilio A105 Valentini Walter A220
Guttuso Renato A106 Vasarely Victor A221
Hains Raymond A107 Vautier Ben A222
Hartung Hans A108 Vedova Emilio A223
Irolli Vincenzo A109 Ventrone Luciano A224
Isgro` Emilio A110 Veronesi Luigi A225
Issupoff Alessio A111 Villegle´ Jacques A226
Kapoor Anish A112 Vitali Velasco A227
Klein Yves A113 Winkler Ralf A228
Kolar Jiri A114 Zigaina Giuseppe A229
Kostabi Mark A115 Zorio Gilberto A230
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B.2 Results of the OLS estimation of the
model in (4.5) in the sub-samples of
the art genres
Table B.2.1: Hedonic regression on paintings sub-sample
Coeff. St. Er. p-val Coeff. St. Er. p-val
A1 0.211 0.054 0.000 A152 -0.914 0.043 0.000
A2 0.195 0.059 0.001 A153 -0.897 0.045 0.000
A3 1.076 0.100 0.000 A154 -0.767 0.066 0.000
A4 -1.048 0.051 0.000 A155 -0.218 0.096 0.023
A5 -0.155 0.073 0.034 A156 -0.412 0.061 0.000
A6 -0.907 0.073 0.000 A158 0.338 0.180 0.060
A7 -0.959 0.054 0.000 A159 -0.713 0.045 0.000
A8 0.605 0.169 0.000 A160 -0.389 0.215 0.071
A9 -0.753 0.123 0.000 A161 -0.984 0.054 0.000
A10 -0.229 0.116 0.049 A163 0.412 0.067 0.000
A12 -1.092 0.040 0.000 A164 0.394 0.163 0.016
A13 -0.822 0.071 0.000 A165 -0.385 0.099 0.000
A14 -0.999 0.066 0.000 A166 -0.658 0.128 0.000
A15 0.161 0.081 0.048 A167 -0.826 0.049 0.000
A16 1.035 0.167 0.000 A168 -0.403 0.047 0.000
A17 0.740 0.160 0.000 A169 -0.542 0.091 0.000
A18 -0.791 0.063 0.000 A172 -1.065 0.044 0.000
A19 -1.070 0.115 0.000 A174 -0.204 0.121 0.092
A20 -0.650 0.099 0.000 A175 -1.349 0.018 0.000
A21 -0.317 0.183 0.082 A176 -0.459 0.072 0.000
A22 -0.450 0.062 0.000 A177 -0.466 0.098 0.000
A23 -0.892 0.083 0.000 A179 -1.026 0.070 0.000
A24 -0.900 0.065 0.000 A180 -0.816 0.047 0.000
A25 -0.451 0.063 0.000 A182 -0.206 0.085 0.016
A27 -0.568 0.093 0.000 A183 1.375 0.114 0.000
A28 -0.591 0.060 0.000 A184 -0.219 0.132 0.096
A100 -0.793 0.043 0.000 A185 -0.360 0.095 0.000
A101 -0.907 0.033 0.000 A186 -0.730 0.085 0.000
A103 -0.602 0.092 0.000 A187 -0.897 0.055 0.000
A104 -0.736 0.065 0.000 A188 0.187 0.059 0.002
A105 -0.467 0.050 0.000 A190 -0.843 0.050 0.000
A108 0.836 0.082 0.000 A191 -0.584 0.085 0.000
A110 -0.694 0.081 0.000 A193 -0.400 0.068 0.000
A111 -0.369 0.117 0.002 A194 -0.207 0.045 0.000
A113 1.201 0.305 0.000 A195 0.202 0.106 0.056
A114 -0.870 0.119 0.000 A197 -0.322 0.099 0.001
160
A115 -0.978 0.030 0.000 A198 -0.267 0.121 0.027
A117 0.564 0.193 0.003 A199 0.653 0.197 0.001
A118 -0.906 0.040 0.000 A200 -0.658 0.080 0.000
A119 0.810 0.238 0.001 A201 -0.813 0.045 0.000
A120 -0.623 0.059 0.000 A202 -0.223 0.055 0.000
A121 -0.264 0.057 0.000 A204 0.445 0.155 0.004
A122 -1.172 0.058 0.000 A206 0.731 0.097 0.000
A123 -0.700 0.080 0.000 A208 -0.976 0.061 0.000
A124 -0.888 0.044 0.000 A209 -0.351 0.061 0.000
A127 -0.568 0.221 0.010 A210 -0.813 0.066 0.000
A128 -0.194 0.053 0.000 A211 -0.754 0.056 0.000
A129 -0.380 0.047 0.000 A212 1.086 0.125 0.000
A130 2.440 0.219 0.000 A213 0.881 0.107 0.000
A131 -0.903 0.133 0.000 A214 -0.492 0.102 0.000
A132 -1.138 0.092 0.000 A215 -0.568 0.105 0.000
A135 1.092 0.095 0.000 A216 -0.434 0.070 0.000
A136 0.833 0.147 0.000 A217 0.395 0.106 0.000
A140 -0.749 0.208 0.000 A218 -0.301 0.041 0.000
A141 -0.527 0.081 0.000 A220 -0.935 0.092 0.000
A142 0.877 0.420 0.037 A221 0.814 0.073 0.000
A144 -0.709 0.042 0.000 A222 -0.766 0.085 0.000
A145 1.479 0.162 0.000 A223 0.693 0.071 0.000
A148 -0.555 0.091 0.000 A224 0.132 0.051 0.010
A149 0.581 0.084 0.000 A225 -0.609 0.053 0.000
A150 -0.324 0.106 0.002 A229 -0.575 0.128 0.000
A151 -0.944 0.041 0.000 A230 0.273 0.104 0.009
public -0.236 0.019 0.000 t2 0.072 0.017 0.000
sharet -0.956 0.132 0.000 t4 0.061 0.020 0.002
k 9.634 0.016 0.000 t6 0.104 0.023 0.000
Obs. 18744
R2adj 0.231
Notes: Stepwise regression results, with backward elimination of the coef-
ficients not significant at 0.10. Covariates used in the full model: public,
sharet, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6. Only observations for which painting = 1 have
been used in the computation. Robust standard error are reported. All
results are rounded at the third digit.
Table B.2.2: Hedonic regression on drawings sub-sample
Coeff. St. Er. p-val Coeff. St. Er. p-val
A3 -0.196 0.116 0.090 A167 -0.223 0.045 0.000
A6 -0.937 0.045 0.000 A168 -0.410 0.130 0.002
A7 -0.638 0.319 0.046 A170 1.949 0.398 0.000
A10 0.551 0.045 0.000 A173 -0.612 0.131 0.000
A16 -0.861 0.046 0.000 A175 -0.470 0.246 0.057
161
A25 -1.015 0.104 0.000 A176 -0.715 0.175 0.000
A26 0.745 0.231 0.001 A177 0.724 0.226 0.001
A106 -0.458 0.115 0.000 A178 0.348 0.045 0.000
A108 0.785 0.141 0.000 A181 -0.797 0.077 0.000
A110 -0.803 0.045 0.000 A183 0.892 0.061 0.000
A114 -0.581 0.045 0.000 A188 -0.944 0.045 0.000
A118 -0.876 0.045 0.000 A189 -0.491 0.099 0.000
A119 -0.321 0.103 0.002 A190 0.545 0.045 0.000
A129 0.230 0.084 0.007 A193 -0.645 0.077 0.000
A131 -0.558 0.134 0.000 A194 0.884 0.068 0.000
A133 -0.560 0.121 0.000 A195 -0.363 0.089 0.000
A134 -0.633 0.065 0.000 A202 -0.245 0.100 0.015
A137 -0.969 0.046 0.000 A203 -0.969 0.046 0.000
A138 -0.628 0.118 0.000 A204 0.954 0.156 0.000
A141 -0.779 0.045 0.000 A207 -0.563 0.238 0.018
A143 0.901 0.056 0.000 A209 -0.164 0.075 0.030
A145 0.502 0.233 0.031 A211 -0.568 0.045 0.000
A146 -0.850 0.045 0.000 A212 -0.411 0.212 0.053
A147 -0.861 0.055 0.000 A217 -0.901 0.045 0.000
A155 -0.443 0.215 0.040 A219 -0.904 0.047 0.000
A156 -0.922 0.045 0.000 A222 0.827 0.045 0.000
A157 -0.369 0.045 0.000 A223 -0.205 0.112 0.067
A158 -0.888 0.157 0.000 A225 -0.582 0.045 0.000
A163 -0.695 0.134 0.000 A226 -0.587 0.192 0.002
sharet 5.643 1.433 0.000 t6 0.292 0.108 0.007
k 9.061 0.045 0.000 public -0.419 0.088 0.000
Obs. 666
R2adj 0.279
Notes: Stepwise regression results, with backward elimination of the coef-
ficients not significant at 0.10. Covariates used in the full model: public,
sharet, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6. Only observations for which drawing = 1 have
been used in the computation. Robust standard error are reported. All
results are rounded at the third digit.
Table B.2.3: Hedonic regression on sculptures sub-samples
Coeff. St. Er. p-val Coeff. St. Er. p-val
A11 -0.363 0.057 0.000 A148 -1.087 0.187 0.000
A13 -0.365 0.085 0.000 A149 -0.356 0.057 0.000
A14 -1.486 0.283 0.000 A152 -1.415 0.064 0.000
A15 -0.760 0.284 0.007 A153 -0.852 0.104 0.000
A21 0.620 0.331 0.061 A156 -0.371 0.056 0.000
A24 -1.167 0.077 0.000 A160 -0.261 0.122 0.032
A25 -0.429 0.113 0.000 A162 1.590 0.369 0.000
A26 0.235 0.101 0.020 A163 0.744 0.158 0.000
162
A100 -0.521 0.239 0.029 A164 1.022 0.275 0.000
A105 -0.864 0.270 0.001 A172 -1.157 0.084 0.000
A106 -0.744 0.081 0.000 A174 1.086 0.384 0.005
A108 1.073 0.063 0.000 A175 0.615 0.086 0.000
A112 2.259 0.279 0.000 A177 1.706 0.216 0.000
A113 0.301 0.147 0.041 A178 0.572 0.121 0.000
A114 -0.560 0.241 0.020 A183 1.939 0.413 0.000
A116 0.814 0.252 0.001 A189 -0.794 0.169 0.000
A117 -1.049 0.136 0.000 A193 -0.762 0.162 0.000
A122 -0.878 0.072 0.000 A194 -0.660 0.248 0.008
A128 0.887 0.251 0.000 A201 -0.723 0.087 0.000
A129 -0.535 0.064 0.000 A202 1.932 0.083 0.000
A130 1.675 0.233 0.000 A203 -1.647 0.080 0.000
A133 1.178 0.309 0.000 A204 1.407 0.088 0.000
A134 0.718 0.185 0.000 A206 0.621 0.139 0.000
A138 0.433 0.157 0.006 A207 -0.574 0.157 0.000
A139 1.185 0.081 0.000 A213 0.768 0.102 0.000
A140 -0.490 0.132 0.000 A218 -0.950 0.055 0.000
A143 0.945 0.103 0.000 A230 2.035 0.167 0.000
public -0.481 0.083 0.000 t2 -0.134 0.060 0.026
sharet -1.975 0.598 0.001 t3 -0.241 0.080 0.003
k 9.886 0.056 0.000 t6 -0.176 0.069 0.011
Obs. 1774
R2adj 0.400
Notes: Stepwise regression results, with backward elimination of the coef-
ficients not significant at 0.10. Covariates used in the full model: public,
sharet, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6. Only observations for which sculpture = 1 have
been used in the computation. Robust standard error are reported. All
results are rounded at the third digit.
Table B.2.4: Hedonic regression on graphics sub-sample
Coeff. St. Er. p-val Coeff. St. Er. p-val
A3 -0.542 0.117 0.000 A145 0.452 0.132 0.001
A19 -0.582 0.103 0.000 A149 0.620 0.056 0.000
A21 0.488 0.090 0.000 A153 -0.533 0.055 0.000
A26 -0.641 0.104 0.000 A156 -0.674 0.055 0.000
A100 -0.470 0.090 0.000 A163 -0.495 0.101 0.000
A105 0.384 0.075 0.000 A174 0.540 0.230 0.020
A108 -0.585 0.055 0.000 A175 0.758 0.135 0.000
A116 -0.506 0.057 0.000 A189 -0.448 0.065 0.000
A128 -0.701 0.056 0.000 A196 0.623 0.059 0.000
A133 -0.502 0.124 0.000 A199 -0.445 0.141 0.002
A142 -0.327 0.096 0.001 t3 0.272 0.076 0.000
sharet -4.392 1.100 0.000 t5 0.269 0.099 0.007
163
k 8.832 0.056 0.000
Obs. 342
R2adj 0.236
Notes: Stepwise regression results, with backward elimination of the coef-
ficients not significant at 0.10. Covariates used in the full model: public,
sharet, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6. Only observations for which graphics = 1 have
been used in the computation. Robust standard error are reported. All
results are rounded at the third digit.
B.3 Results of the OLS estimation of the
model in (4.6) in the sub-samples of
each of the years
Table B.3.1: Hedonic regression for year 1
Coeff. St. Er. p-val Coeff. St. Er. p-val
A3 0.877 0.189 0.000 A150 -0.557 0.127 0.000
A4 -0.961 0.040 0.000 A151 -0.806 0.070 0.000
A5 -0.546 0.127 0.000 A152 -0.810 0.088 0.000
A6 -0.802 0.136 0.000 A153 -0.863 0.057 0.000
A7 -0.879 0.070 0.000 A154 -0.284 0.045 0.000
A8 0.651 0.268 0.015 A156 -0.587 0.110 0.000
A9 -0.390 0.202 0.054 A157 -0.342 0.192 0.075
A10 -0.242 0.137 0.078 A159 -0.878 0.051 0.000
A11 -0.146 0.076 0.053 A161 -0.830 0.105 0.000
A12 -1.078 0.059 0.000 A163 0.453 0.124 0.000
A13 -0.711 0.177 0.000 A164 0.674 0.353 0.056
A14 -0.753 0.162 0.000 A166 -0.365 0.219 0.096
A17 0.796 0.287 0.006 A167 -0.724 0.070 0.000
A20 -0.912 0.067 0.000 A168 -0.281 0.084 0.001
A22 -0.455 0.086 0.000 A172 -0.551 0.113 0.000
A23 -0.915 0.117 0.000 A175 0.601 0.059 0.000
A24 -0.909 0.091 0.000 A178 0.667 0.279 0.017
A25 -0.911 0.055 0.000 A179 -0.986 0.124 0.000
A27 -0.889 0.156 0.000 A180 -1.004 0.086 0.000
A28 -0.877 0.084 0.000 A181 -0.758 0.222 0.001
A100 -0.715 0.062 0.000 A183 1.455 0.156 0.000
A101 -0.827 0.084 0.000 A187 -0.789 0.085 0.000
A104 -0.599 0.213 0.005 A188 0.378 0.088 0.000
A105 -0.550 0.096 0.000 A189 0.171 0.097 0.077
A108 0.739 0.162 0.000 A190 -0.829 0.080 0.000
164
A110 -0.540 0.202 0.008 A191 -0.437 0.132 0.001
A112 2.041 0.362 0.000 A192 0.360 0.197 0.068
A113 0.763 0.380 0.045 A193 -0.333 0.129 0.010
A114 -0.459 0.209 0.029 A196 -0.246 0.081 0.002
A115 -0.689 0.069 0.000 A197 -0.556 0.109 0.000
A117 0.638 0.362 0.078 A199 0.525 0.264 0.047
A118 -0.789 0.088 0.000 A200 -0.775 0.198 0.000
A120 -0.530 0.104 0.000 A201 -0.793 0.117 0.000
A122 -1.196 0.075 0.000 A204 0.815 0.201 0.000
A123 -0.442 0.190 0.020 A206 0.433 0.161 0.007
A124 -0.724 0.095 0.000 A208 -0.754 0.111 0.000
A128 -0.956 0.094 0.000 A210 -0.585 0.173 0.001
A129 -0.347 0.094 0.000 A211 -0.548 0.134 0.000
A130 2.629 0.438 0.000 A212 1.598 0.196 0.000
A132 -1.377 0.119 0.000 A213 1.575 0.298 0.000
A135 1.259 0.175 0.000 A214 -0.832 0.177 0.000
A136 0.854 0.215 0.000 A215 -0.722 0.292 0.013
A141 -0.446 0.121 0.000 A218 -0.234 0.060 0.000
A143 1.166 0.203 0.000 A220 -0.597 0.266 0.025
A144 -0.485 0.071 0.000 A221 0.950 0.171 0.000
A145 0.804 0.191 0.000 A222 -0.597 0.188 0.002
A148 -0.682 0.211 0.001 A223 0.520 0.133 0.000
A149 0.356 0.117 0.002 A225 -0.402 0.107 0.000
art genre 0.114 0.010 0.000 sharet -1.665 0.154 0.000
k 8.978 0.046 0.000
Obs. 4801
R2adj 0.234
Notes: Stepwise regression results, with backward elimination of the coeffi-
cients not significant at 0.10. Covariates used in the full model: art genre,
public, sharet. Only observations regarding artworks sold in year 1 have
been used in the computation. Robust standard error are reported. All
results are rounded at the third digit.
Table B.3.2: Hedonic regression for year 2
Coeff. St. Er. p-val Coeff. St. Er. p-val
A1 0.552 0.117 0.000 A145 1.484 0.346 0.000
A2 0.315 0.130 0.016 A148 -0.516 0.149 0.001
A3 1.302 0.261 0.000 A149 0.963 0.240 0.000
A4 -0.970 0.090 0.000 A151 -0.774 0.109 0.000
A5 -0.281 0.100 0.005 A152 -0.838 0.076 0.000
A6 -0.891 0.100 0.000 A153 -0.887 0.078 0.000
A7 -0.832 0.083 0.000 A154 -0.369 0.095 0.000
A9 -0.513 0.158 0.001 A156 -0.232 0.135 0.086
A11 -0.340 0.048 0.000 A157 1.203 0.373 0.001
165
A12 -0.969 0.078 0.000 A159 -0.944 0.081 0.000
A13 -0.696 0.114 0.000 A161 -0.969 0.067 0.000
A14 -1.152 0.105 0.000 A163 0.637 0.118 0.000
A16 0.961 0.494 0.052 A164 0.616 0.223 0.006
A18 -0.652 0.106 0.000 A166 -0.442 0.217 0.042
A19 -0.924 0.155 0.000 A167 -0.798 0.080 0.000
A21 -0.509 0.219 0.020 A168 -0.330 0.106 0.002
A22 -0.227 0.127 0.074 A169 -0.512 0.107 0.000
A23 -0.590 0.199 0.003 A170 1.168 0.674 0.083
A24 -0.453 0.168 0.007 A172 -0.922 0.111 0.000
A25 -0.541 0.110 0.000 A175 0.503 0.138 0.000
A28 -0.739 0.158 0.000 A176 -0.409 0.109 0.000
A100 -0.569 0.082 0.000 A178 0.594 0.199 0.003
A101 -0.718 0.080 0.000 A179 -0.687 0.158 0.000
A103 -0.622 0.186 0.001 A180 -0.542 0.072 0.000
A104 -0.554 0.071 0.000 A183 1.803 0.190 0.000
A105 -0.194 0.093 0.037 A186 -0.694 0.069 0.000
A108 1.085 0.205 0.000 A187 -1.010 0.068 0.000
A110 -0.552 0.108 0.000 A190 -0.740 0.109 0.000
A112 1.545 0.928 0.096 A191 -0.376 0.141 0.008
A113 1.310 0.170 0.000 A192 0.345 0.207 0.095
A114 -0.745 0.097 0.000 A193 -0.510 0.124 0.000
A115 -0.776 0.066 0.000 A196 0.280 0.066 0.000
A116 0.448 0.179 0.013 A200 -0.502 0.126 0.000
A118 -0.769 0.088 0.000 A201 -0.787 0.112 0.000
A120 -0.462 0.158 0.004 A204 0.998 0.172 0.000
A122 -1.050 0.039 0.000 A205 0.606 0.231 0.009
A123 -0.519 0.135 0.000 A206 1.429 0.217 0.000
A124 -0.797 0.079 0.000 A208 -0.789 0.131 0.000
A125 0.450 0.192 0.019 A210 -0.699 0.133 0.000
A127 -0.851 0.167 0.000 A211 -0.712 0.113 0.000
A128 0.397 0.071 0.000 A212 1.219 0.279 0.000
A129 -0.203 0.099 0.041 A213 1.377 0.139 0.000
A130 2.570 0.248 0.000 A214 -0.658 0.192 0.001
A131 -0.995 0.141 0.000 A215 -0.522 0.161 0.001
A132 -1.243 0.032 0.000 A218 -0.161 0.081 0.046
A134 1.116 0.471 0.018 A220 -1.117 0.064 0.000
A135 1.089 0.187 0.000 A221 1.151 0.116 0.000
A136 0.798 0.065 0.000 A223 0.665 0.137 0.000
A139 1.006 0.215 0.000 A224 0.490 0.088 0.000
A140 -0.467 0.163 0.004 A225 -0.504 0.115 0.000
A141 -0.507 0.148 0.001 A226 0.478 0.162 0.003
A143 1.134 0.222 0.000 A228 0.371 0.163 0.023
A144 -0.541 0.076 0.000 A230 0.660 0.161 0.000
art genre 0.038 0.010 0.000 public -0.220 0.027 0.000
k 9.331 0.054 0.000
Obs. 5866
166
R2adj 0.216
Notes: Stepwise regression results, with backward elimination of the coeffi-
cients not significant at 0.10. Covariates used in the full model: art genre,
public, sharet. Only observations regarding artworks sold in year 2 have
been used in the computation. Robust standard error are reported. All
results are rounded at the third digit.
Table B.3.3: Hedonic regression for year 3
Coeff. St. Er. p-val Coeff. St. Er. p-val
A3 0.666 0.311 0.032 A144 -0.842 0.099 0.000
A4 -1.008 0.181 0.000 A148 -0.631 0.185 0.001
A6 -0.700 0.240 0.004 A150 -0.524 0.180 0.004
A7 -0.732 0.371 0.049 A151 -0.775 0.118 0.000
A8 1.084 0.428 0.011 A152 -0.981 0.125 0.000
A9 -0.720 0.032 0.000 A153 -0.778 0.100 0.000
A10 0.528 0.189 0.005 A154 -0.604 0.150 0.000
A11 -0.381 0.088 0.000 A157 0.702 0.386 0.069
A12 -1.159 0.128 0.000 A159 -0.573 0.318 0.071
A13 -0.548 0.128 0.000 A160 -0.491 0.244 0.044
A14 -1.152 0.145 0.000 A161 -0.880 0.158 0.000
A16 0.894 0.150 0.000 A165 -0.492 0.027 0.000
A18 -1.162 0.105 0.000 A167 -0.603 0.196 0.002
A19 -0.781 0.039 0.000 A168 -0.507 0.154 0.001
A20 -0.626 0.163 0.000 A169 -0.661 0.380 0.082
A22 -0.612 0.220 0.005 A170 -0.652 0.205 0.001
A23 -0.992 0.266 0.000 A172 -1.003 0.141 0.000
A24 -1.024 0.130 0.000 A173 0.599 0.290 0.039
A25 -0.789 0.104 0.000 A174 0.617 0.350 0.078
A27 -0.500 0.212 0.018 A176 -0.709 0.138 0.000
A28 -0.677 0.139 0.000 A179 -1.006 0.153 0.000
A100 -0.544 0.116 0.000 A180 -0.781 0.162 0.000
A101 -0.776 0.085 0.000 A181 -0.820 0.324 0.012
A104 -0.979 0.181 0.000 A183 1.236 0.405 0.002
A105 -0.479 0.150 0.001 A185 -0.353 0.189 0.061
A106 -0.325 0.117 0.005 A186 -0.807 0.112 0.000
A107 -1.061 0.094 0.000 A187 -1.050 0.053 0.000
A108 1.260 0.288 0.000 A189 -0.280 0.143 0.050
A109 -0.389 0.161 0.016 A190 -0.813 0.104 0.000
A110 -0.333 0.121 0.006 A191 -0.446 0.174 0.011
A111 -0.676 0.076 0.000 A193 -0.315 0.167 0.060
A112 1.134 0.388 0.004 A197 -0.488 0.189 0.010
A114 -1.014 0.109 0.000 A200 -0.676 0.186 0.000
A115 -1.072 0.073 0.000 A201 -0.953 0.121 0.000
A117 0.780 0.340 0.022 A204 0.668 0.241 0.006
167
A118 -0.973 0.103 0.000 A206 0.803 0.075 0.000
A120 -0.724 0.128 0.000 A207 -0.581 0.239 0.015
A121 -0.300 0.143 0.036 A208 -1.013 0.169 0.000
A122 -1.121 0.178 0.000 A209 -0.489 0.187 0.009
A123 -0.819 0.186 0.000 A210 -0.666 0.167 0.000
A124 -1.393 0.126 0.000 A211 -0.961 0.093 0.000
A126 -0.763 0.047 0.000 A212 1.181 0.372 0.002
A128 -1.020 0.191 0.000 A213 0.858 0.259 0.001
A129 -0.213 0.116 0.067 A214 -0.479 0.242 0.048
A130 2.271 0.585 0.000 A217 0.824 0.251 0.001
A131 -0.793 0.193 0.000 A218 -0.334 0.100 0.001
A132 -1.293 0.047 0.000 A220 -0.846 0.135 0.000
A134 -0.836 0.365 0.022 A221 1.026 0.198 0.000
A135 1.665 0.222 0.000 A222 -0.599 0.191 0.002
A136 0.465 0.231 0.044 A223 0.578 0.173 0.001
A137 -0.367 0.215 0.087 A225 -0.590 0.118 0.000
A139 0.943 0.299 0.002 A226 0.673 0.273 0.014
A142 -0.744 0.170 0.000 A228 -0.380 0.208 0.068
A143 0.650 0.277 0.019 A229 -0.449 0.242 0.064
art gen 0.077 0.014 0.000 public -0.345 0.037 0.000
k 9.309 0.069 0.000
Obs. 2754
R2adj 0.234
Notes: Stepwise regression results, with backward elimination of the coeffi-
cients not significant at 0.10. Covariates used in the full model: art genre,
public, sharet. Only observations regarding artworks sold in year 3 have
been used in the computation. Robust standard error are reported. All
results are rounded at the third digit.
Table B.3.4: Hedonic regression for year 4
Coeff. St. Er. p-val Coeff. St. Er. p-val
A1 0.290 0.115 0.012 A149 0.815 0.189 0.000
A2 0.323 0.131 0.014 A151 -0.738 0.129 0.000
A3 0.922 0.237 0.000 A152 -0.768 0.104 0.000
A4 -1.056 0.109 0.000 A153 -0.931 0.140 0.000
A7 -0.799 0.115 0.000 A154 -0.984 0.099 0.000
A8 0.999 0.380 0.009 A156 -0.339 0.129 0.009
A9 -0.808 0.383 0.035 A157 0.897 0.311 0.004
A12 -0.875 0.095 0.000 A158 0.926 0.134 0.000
A13 -0.930 0.093 0.000 A159 -0.607 0.121 0.000
A14 -0.846 0.176 0.000 A161 -0.534 0.189 0.005
A15 0.446 0.152 0.003 A163 0.544 0.191 0.004
A17 1.058 0.355 0.003 A164 0.510 0.267 0.056
A18 -0.540 0.104 0.000 A165 -0.497 0.208 0.017
168
A20 -0.735 0.173 0.000 A166 -0.749 0.126 0.000
A21 0.336 0.145 0.020 A167 -0.800 0.098 0.000
A22 -0.456 0.198 0.021 A168 -0.365 0.095 0.000
A24 -0.963 0.102 0.000 A169 -0.329 0.125 0.009
A25 -0.317 0.087 0.000 A170 -0.297 0.152 0.051
A27 -0.669 0.054 0.000 A171 0.187 0.103 0.070
A28 -0.563 0.150 0.000 A172 -0.790 0.112 0.000
A29 1.489 0.351 0.000 A174 0.638 0.251 0.011
A100 -0.943 0.092 0.000 A176 -0.553 0.192 0.004
A101 -0.919 0.053 0.000 A178 0.746 0.234 0.001
A102 -0.310 0.162 0.056 A179 -1.038 0.173 0.000
A103 -0.696 0.132 0.000 A180 -0.823 0.076 0.000
A104 -1.270 0.028 0.000 A183 1.221 0.243 0.000
A105 -0.439 0.130 0.001 A184 0.335 0.202 0.098
A108 0.985 0.241 0.000 A185 -0.991 0.127 0.000
A110 -0.586 0.204 0.004 A186 -0.772 0.115 0.000
A112 3.354 0.068 0.000 A187 -0.881 0.098 0.000
A114 -0.450 0.135 0.001 A188 0.299 0.117 0.010
A115 -1.038 0.054 0.000 A190 -0.841 0.113 0.000
A118 -0.749 0.079 0.000 A191 -0.740 0.167 0.000
A120 -0.636 0.137 0.000 A193 -0.431 0.157 0.006
A121 -0.184 0.103 0.073 A195 0.560 0.172 0.001
A122 -1.133 0.060 0.000 A198 -0.702 0.190 0.000
A123 -0.524 0.260 0.044 A201 -0.501 0.105 0.000
A124 -0.884 0.090 0.000 A204 0.592 0.274 0.031
A127 -0.651 0.373 0.081 A206 0.400 0.107 0.000
A128 -0.526 0.098 0.000 A207 -0.738 0.086 0.000
A129 -0.368 0.094 0.000 A208 -1.027 0.137 0.000
A130 2.127 0.643 0.001 A209 -0.311 0.177 0.080
A132 -1.268 0.037 0.000 A210 -1.056 0.115 0.000
A134 0.507 0.295 0.085 A211 -0.691 0.099 0.000
A135 1.003 0.195 0.000 A212 0.824 0.401 0.040
A136 1.030 0.268 0.000 A213 0.597 0.105 0.000
A137 -0.428 0.162 0.009 A215 -0.666 0.156 0.000
A138 0.951 0.275 0.001 A216 -0.767 0.083 0.000
A139 1.188 0.185 0.000 A218 -0.243 0.136 0.074
A140 -0.379 0.183 0.038 A220 -0.750 0.246 0.002
A141 -0.879 0.260 0.001 A221 0.693 0.142 0.000
A143 0.954 0.171 0.000 A222 -0.906 0.067 0.000
A144 -0.740 0.088 0.000 A223 0.712 0.204 0.000
A145 0.726 0.343 0.034 A225 -0.538 0.118 0.000
A146 -0.618 0.318 0.052 A229 -0.845 0.168 0.000
A148 -0.475 0.206 0.021 public -0.210 0.040 0.000
art gen 0.095 0.014 0.000 sharet -1.001 0.321 0.002
k 9.164 0.066 0.000
Obs. 3795
169
R2adj 0.223
Notes: Stepwise regression results, with backward elimination of the coeffi-
cients not significant at 0.10. Covariates used in the full model: art genre,
public, sharet. Only observations regarding artworks sold in year 4 have
been used in the computation. Robust standard error are reported. All
results are rounded at the third digit.
Table B.3.5: Hedonic regression for year 5
Coeff. St. Er. p-val Coeff. St. Er. p-val
A3 0.830 0.234 0.000 A147 -0.464 0.161 0.004
A4 -0.889 0.084 0.000 A148 -0.984 0.181 0.000
A5 -0.296 0.152 0.051 A149 0.663 0.202 0.001
A6 -1.103 0.064 0.000 A151 -1.265 0.078 0.000
A7 -1.387 0.108 0.000 A152 -1.039 0.165 0.000
A8 0.928 0.397 0.019 A153 -1.046 0.140 0.000
A9 -1.332 0.106 0.000 A154 -0.893 0.124 0.000
A10 -0.496 0.085 0.000 A156 -0.304 0.145 0.036
A11 -0.380 0.105 0.000 A159 -0.575 0.112 0.000
A12 -1.311 0.034 0.000 A160 -0.330 0.140 0.018
A13 -0.923 0.113 0.000 A161 -1.415 0.132 0.000
A14 -1.139 0.087 0.000 A165 -0.613 0.272 0.024
A16 1.300 0.164 0.000 A166 -0.807 0.413 0.051
A18 -1.216 0.069 0.000 A167 -0.803 0.173 0.000
A20 -0.668 0.286 0.020 A168 -0.469 0.126 0.000
A21 -0.424 0.124 0.001 A169 -0.592 0.277 0.033
A22 -0.758 0.138 0.000 A170 -0.360 0.190 0.058
A23 -1.037 0.219 0.000 A172 -1.231 0.058 0.000
A24 -1.383 0.071 0.000 A178 0.680 0.261 0.009
A25 -0.198 0.110 0.072 A179 -1.271 0.141 0.000
A27 -0.824 0.208 0.000 A180 -1.113 0.149 0.000
A28 -0.602 0.112 0.000 A181 -0.210 0.109 0.055
A100 -0.921 0.091 0.000 A182 -0.724 0.106 0.000
A101 -1.068 0.083 0.000 A183 1.873 0.180 0.000
A103 -0.388 0.079 0.000 A184 -0.646 0.227 0.004
A104 -0.777 0.165 0.000 A185 -0.320 0.174 0.067
A105 -0.910 0.126 0.000 A186 -0.379 0.032 0.000
A108 0.414 0.125 0.001 A187 -0.957 0.109 0.000
A109 -0.355 0.189 0.061 A188 0.258 0.142 0.070
A110 -0.709 0.188 0.000 A189 -0.690 0.070 0.000
A111 -0.558 0.231 0.015 A190 -0.805 0.186 0.000
A112 1.735 0.787 0.028 A193 -0.700 0.163 0.000
A114 -0.952 0.141 0.000 A194 -0.408 0.102 0.000
A115 -1.208 0.053 0.000 A196 -0.414 0.081 0.000
A116 0.420 0.211 0.047 A200 -0.652 0.225 0.004
170
A118 -1.119 0.092 0.000 A201 -0.823 0.106 0.000
A120 -0.602 0.151 0.000 A202 -0.617 0.077 0.000
A121 -0.502 0.132 0.000 A203 -1.104 0.032 0.000
A122 -1.300 0.144 0.000 A206 0.386 0.154 0.012
A123 -1.147 0.130 0.000 A208 -0.998 0.144 0.000
A124 -1.021 0.109 0.000 A209 -0.746 0.124 0.000
A128 -0.599 0.090 0.000 A210 -0.952 0.143 0.000
A129 -0.667 0.109 0.000 A211 -0.991 0.163 0.000
A130 2.330 0.378 0.000 A213 0.714 0.082 0.000
A131 -0.689 0.326 0.034 A215 -0.469 0.200 0.019
A133 -0.625 0.239 0.009 A216 -0.710 0.168 0.000
A135 0.433 0.238 0.069 A217 0.703 0.174 0.000
A137 -0.491 0.181 0.007 A218 -0.505 0.135 0.000
A140 -0.918 0.235 0.000 A220 -1.122 0.146 0.000
A141 -0.687 0.159 0.000 A222 -0.985 0.098 0.000
A143 0.726 0.221 0.001 A223 0.719 0.188 0.000
A144 -0.767 0.119 0.000 A225 -0.879 0.110 0.000
A145 1.549 0.358 0.000 A226 -0.451 0.262 0.085
A146 -0.790 0.307 0.010 A229 -1.433 0.132 0.000
art gen 0.034 0.013 0.010 sharet -1.701 0.355 0.000
k 9.604 0.062 0.000 public -0.226 0.044 0.000
Obs. 3578
R2adj 0.238
Notes: Stepwise regression results, with backward elimination of the coeffi-
cients not significant at 0.10. Covariates used in the full model: art genre,
public, sharet. Only observations regarding artworks sold in year 5 have
been used in the computation. Robust standard error are reported. All
results are rounded at the third digit.
Table B.3.6: Hedonic regression for year 6
Coeff. St. Er. p-val Coeff. St. Er. p-val
A3 0.680 0.200 0.001 A153 -1.132 0.099 0.000
A4 -0.867 0.091 0.000 A154 -0.776 0.356 0.029
A6 -0.682 0.189 0.000 A155 -0.796 0.180 0.000
A9 -0.734 0.418 0.079 A156 -0.634 0.238 0.008
A11 -0.646 0.131 0.000 A159 -0.598 0.091 0.000
A12 -1.103 0.068 0.000 A160 -0.450 0.240 0.061
A13 -1.156 0.160 0.000 A161 -0.867 0.091 0.000
A14 -1.275 0.130 0.000 A163 0.386 0.216 0.075
A16 1.563 0.138 0.000 A165 -1.336 0.091 0.000
A17 0.518 0.295 0.079 A166 -0.775 0.227 0.001
A18 -0.861 0.190 0.000 A167 -0.888 0.174 0.000
A19 -0.702 0.234 0.003 A168 -0.548 0.113 0.000
A21 -0.539 0.110 0.000 A169 -0.609 0.287 0.034
171
A22 0.225 0.126 0.073 A172 -1.152 0.071 0.000
A23 -1.296 0.168 0.000 A174 -0.430 0.240 0.073
A24 -1.450 0.105 0.000 A175 0.491 0.069 0.000
A25 -0.691 0.133 0.000 A176 -0.755 0.119 0.000
A27 -0.800 0.230 0.001 A179 -1.266 0.186 0.000
A28 -0.441 0.122 0.000 A180 -1.191 0.104 0.000
A100 -1.230 0.046 0.000 A181 -0.552 0.104 0.000
A101 -1.103 0.065 0.000 A182 -0.592 0.220 0.007
A103 -0.735 0.139 0.000 A184 -1.011 0.161 0.000
A104 -0.776 0.152 0.000 A185 -0.533 0.307 0.083
A105 -0.612 0.117 0.000 A186 -0.991 0.078 0.000
A108 0.853 0.148 0.000 A187 -0.817 0.275 0.003
A109 -0.429 0.237 0.070 A188 -0.266 0.129 0.039
A110 -0.880 0.304 0.004 A189 -0.883 0.118 0.000
A111 -1.287 0.186 0.000 A190 -0.694 0.130 0.000
A112 2.988 0.042 0.000 A191 -0.885 0.196 0.000
A113 2.268 1.142 0.047 A194 -0.339 0.110 0.002
A114 -0.747 0.191 0.000 A196 -0.306 0.115 0.008
A115 -1.113 0.112 0.000 A198 -1.096 0.110 0.000
A118 -1.146 0.117 0.000 A199 -0.514 0.255 0.044
A119 0.925 0.547 0.091 A200 -0.605 0.182 0.001
A120 -0.675 0.122 0.000 A201 -0.953 0.092 0.000
A121 -0.526 0.159 0.001 A202 -0.354 0.155 0.023
A122 -1.381 0.095 0.000 A203 -0.438 0.252 0.083
A123 -0.919 0.276 0.001 A204 0.598 0.136 0.000
A124 -0.931 0.103 0.000 A206 0.913 0.331 0.006
A125 -0.517 0.243 0.034 A207 0.471 0.176 0.007
A128 -0.295 0.102 0.004 A208 -1.125 0.110 0.000
A129 -0.509 0.191 0.008 A209 -0.724 0.154 0.000
A130 1.059 0.463 0.022 A210 -0.719 0.093 0.000
A132 -0.939 0.115 0.000 A211 -0.893 0.171 0.000
A135 0.618 0.280 0.028 A212 1.089 0.226 0.000
A140 -0.803 0.174 0.000 A213 0.538 0.130 0.000
A141 -0.660 0.202 0.001 A215 -1.017 0.132 0.000
A142 -0.903 0.176 0.000 A216 -0.510 0.140 0.000
A143 0.779 0.250 0.002 A217 0.346 0.156 0.027
A144 -0.906 0.140 0.000 A218 -0.547 0.114 0.000
A145 0.853 0.382 0.026 A220 -1.011 0.189 0.000
A146 0.771 0.251 0.002 A222 -1.116 0.062 0.000
A148 -0.701 0.173 0.000 A223 0.653 0.185 0.000
A149 0.849 0.334 0.011 A225 -1.010 0.140 0.000
A150 -1.139 0.044 0.000 A228 -0.425 0.125 0.001
A151 -1.178 0.071 0.000 A229 -0.585 0.243 0.016
A152 -1.254 0.087 0.000 public -0.244 0.053 0.000
art gen 0.072 0.017 0.000 sharet -2.380 0.380 0.000
k 9.529 0.085 0.000
Obs. 3068
172
R2adj 0.225
Notes: Stepwise regression results, with backward elimination of the coeffi-
cients not significant at 0.10. Covariates used in the full model: art genre,
public, sharet. Only observations regarding artworks sold in year 6 have
been used in the computation. Robust standard error are reported. All
results are rounded at the third digit.
B.4 Results of the quantile regression es-
timation of the model in (4.7) with q =
0.33 and q = 0.67
Table B.4.1: Hedonic quantile model for q = 0.33 on overall
data
Coeff. St. Er. p-val Coeff. St. Er. p-val
A1 0.533 0.062 0.000 A152 -0.502 0.087 0.000
A2 0.570 0.121 0.000 A153 -0.476 0.023 0.000
A3 0.810 0.179 0.000 A155 0.118 0.070 0.093
A4 -0.514 0.015 0.000 A157 0.130 0.041 0.002
A6 -0.566 0.028 0.000 A159 -0.388 0.041 0.000
A7 -0.471 0.094 0.000 A161 -0.553 0.026 0.000
A8 0.683 0.224 0.002 A162 0.253 0.031 0.000
A10 0.279 0.072 0.000 A163 0.629 0.029 0.000
A12 -0.553 0.016 0.000 A164 0.452 0.064 0.000
A13 -0.229 0.045 0.000 A166 -0.426 0.095 0.000
A14 -0.624 0.016 0.000 A167 -0.423 0.013 0.000
A15 0.326 0.055 0.000 A168 -0.142 0.060 0.019
A16 1.513 0.156 0.000 A170 -0.152 0.018 0.000
A17 0.613 0.097 0.000 A171 0.458 0.030 0.000
A18 -0.287 0.024 0.000 A172 -0.499 0.025 0.000
A19 -0.342 0.041 0.000 A174 -0.278 0.049 0.000
A20 -0.236 0.052 0.000 A175 1.012 0.036 0.000
A21 0.364 0.139 0.009 A176 -0.160 0.045 0.000
A23 -0.419 0.114 0.000 A178 0.456 0.125 0.000
A24 -0.581 0.058 0.000 A179 -0.693 0.033 0.000
A28 -0.207 0.086 0.017 A180 -0.423 0.026 0.000
A29 0.304 0.049 0.000 A181 0.199 0.023 0.000
A100 -0.423 0.026 0.000 A182 0.205 0.023 0.000
A101 -0.389 0.012 0.000 A183 1.555 0.296 0.000
A103 -0.211 0.091 0.021 A184 0.232 0.027 0.000
A104 -0.272 0.083 0.001 A186 -0.261 0.030 0.000
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A105 -0.241 0.071 0.001 A187 -0.451 0.045 0.000
A106 -0.146 0.078 0.061 A188 0.604 0.086 0.000
A107 0.114 0.019 0.000 A189 -0.192 0.012 0.000
A108 1.146 0.025 0.000 A190 -0.484 0.022 0.000
A110 -0.199 0.022 0.000 A191 -0.235 0.028 0.000
A112 1.612 0.055 0.000 A192 0.171 0.082 0.036
A113 0.905 0.121 0.000 A195 0.405 0.106 0.000
A114 -0.383 0.019 0.000 A196 0.069 0.039 0.077
A115 -0.598 0.025 0.000 A200 -0.287 0.045 0.000
A116 0.271 0.022 0.000 A201 -0.360 0.066 0.000
A117 0.681 0.146 0.000 A202 -0.115 0.036 0.002
A118 -0.461 0.021 0.000 A204 1.033 0.054 0.000
A122 -0.638 0.017 0.000 A205 0.529 0.047 0.000
A123 -0.420 0.035 0.000 A206 1.106 0.092 0.000
A124 -0.451 0.033 0.000 A207 -0.152 0.028 0.000
A125 0.345 0.108 0.001 A208 -0.539 0.018 0.000
A127 -0.435 0.073 0.000 A210 -0.467 0.066 0.000
A130 2.432 0.184 0.000 A211 -0.248 0.028 0.000
A131 -0.402 0.096 0.000 A212 1.231 0.073 0.000
A132 -0.676 0.036 0.000 A213 1.306 0.115 0.000
A133 -0.189 0.113 0.095 A214 -0.237 0.015 0.000
A134 0.385 0.131 0.003 A215 -0.316 0.032 0.000
A135 1.098 0.132 0.000 A217 0.881 0.113 0.000
A136 1.219 0.151 0.000 A220 -0.549 0.062 0.000
A140 -0.230 0.129 0.075 A221 1.243 0.154 0.000
A141 -0.172 0.076 0.024 A222 -0.336 0.138 0.015
A142 -0.294 0.039 0.000 A223 0.709 0.089 0.000
A143 1.247 0.168 0.000 A224 0.639 0.131 0.000
A144 -0.351 0.045 0.000 A225 -0.182 0.077 0.018
A145 0.603 0.126 0.000 A226 0.536 0.187 0.004
A149 0.615 0.181 0.001 A228 0.405 0.086 0.000
A151 -0.471 0.065 0.000 A230 0.628 0.217 0.004
sharet -0.170 0.082 0.039 t2 0.051 0.010 0.000
art gen 0.048 0.003 0.000 t4 0.024 0.010 0.015
public -0.252 0.010 0.000 t5 -0.029 0.012 0.018
k 8.697 0.017 0.000 t6 0.042 0.017 0.012
Obs. 23862
Notes: Quantile regression for q = 0.33. Stepwise regression results, with
backward elimination of the coefficients not significant at 0.10. Covariates
used in the full model: art genre, public, sharet, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6. Robust
standard error are reported. All results are rounded at the third digit.
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Table B.4.2: Hedonic quantile model for q = 0.67 on overall
data
Coeff. St. Er. p-val Coeff. St. Er. p-val
A1 0.288 0.057 0.000 A150 -0.302 0.145 0.038
A2 0.301 0.070 0.000 A151 -1.018 0.038 0.000
A3 1.222 0.099 0.000 A152 -1.056 0.020 0.000
A4 -1.102 0.244 0.000 A153 -1.148 0.057 0.000
A6 -1.233 0.056 0.000 A154 -0.824 0.075 0.000
A7 -1.115 0.051 0.000 A155 -0.324 0.165 0.050
A8 0.916 0.260 0.000 A156 -0.387 0.036 0.000
A9 -0.666 0.206 0.001 A159 -0.693 0.035 0.000
A10 -0.097 0.030 0.001 A160 -0.205 0.112 0.067
A11 -0.408 0.050 0.000 A161 -1.242 0.075 0.000
A12 -1.293 0.024 0.000 A163 0.503 0.054 0.000
A13 -0.869 0.139 0.000 A165 -0.451 0.111 0.000
A14 -1.196 0.059 0.000 A166 -0.642 0.225 0.004
A15 0.375 0.096 0.000 A167 -0.980 0.091 0.000
A16 1.174 0.095 0.000 A168 -0.422 0.075 0.000
A17 0.671 0.114 0.000 A169 -0.717 0.174 0.000
A18 -0.891 0.113 0.000 A170 -0.498 0.114 0.000
A19 -0.604 0.145 0.000 A172 -1.216 0.021 0.000
A20 -0.870 0.078 0.000 A175 0.244 0.054 0.000
A22 -0.549 0.123 0.000 A176 -0.527 0.099 0.000
A23 -1.019 0.135 0.000 A178 0.593 0.125 0.000
A24 -1.080 0.092 0.000 A179 -1.184 0.088 0.000
A25 -0.498 0.071 0.000 A180 -0.946 0.122 0.000
A27 -0.542 0.076 0.000 A182 -0.201 0.092 0.029
A28 -0.616 0.059 0.000 A183 1.532 0.090 0.000
A29 0.377 0.127 0.003 A184 -0.138 0.039 0.000
A100 -0.980 0.035 0.000 A185 -0.175 0.088 0.047
A101 -1.077 0.026 0.000 A186 -1.012 0.383 0.008
A103 -0.595 0.069 0.000 A187 -1.087 0.058 0.000
A104 -0.869 0.126 0.000 A188 0.204 0.060 0.001
A105 -0.546 0.107 0.000 A189 -0.303 0.083 0.000
A108 0.929 0.144 0.000 A190 -0.991 0.101 0.000
A110 -0.703 0.034 0.000 A191 -0.639 0.185 0.001
A112 2.707 0.206 0.000 A193 -0.527 0.099 0.000
A113 0.676 0.017 0.000 A194 -0.180 0.074 0.014
A114 -0.954 0.086 0.000 A195 0.366 0.214 0.088
A115 -1.136 0.053 0.000 A197 -0.393 0.081 0.000
A116 0.448 0.129 0.001 A199 0.666 0.266 0.012
A117 0.751 0.362 0.038 A200 -0.687 0.188 0.000
A118 -1.056 0.097 0.000 A201 -0.919 0.026 0.000
A119 0.524 0.284 0.065 A202 -0.363 0.077 0.000
A120 -0.696 0.086 0.000 A204 0.669 0.092 0.000
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A121 -0.226 0.037 0.000 A206 0.588 0.019 0.000
A122 -1.393 0.042 0.000 A207 -0.348 0.059 0.000
A123 -0.728 0.093 0.000 A208 -1.102 0.111 0.000
A124 -1.051 0.047 0.000 A209 -0.379 0.066 0.000
A126 0.322 0.044 0.000 A210 -0.869 0.122 0.000
A129 -0.411 0.045 0.000 A211 -0.816 0.052 0.000
A130 2.756 0.170 0.000 A212 1.360 0.231 0.000
A131 -0.402 0.048 0.000 A213 0.815 0.077 0.000
A132 -1.379 0.205 0.000 A214 -0.362 0.142 0.011
A135 1.361 0.109 0.000 A215 -0.728 0.177 0.000
A136 0.607 0.130 0.000 A216 -0.526 0.119 0.000
A139 0.744 0.217 0.001 A217 0.600 0.128 0.000
A140 -0.514 0.082 0.000 A218 -0.319 0.042 0.000
A141 -0.547 0.034 0.000 A220 -1.058 0.082 0.000
A142 -0.589 0.110 0.000 A221 0.940 0.091 0.000
A143 1.101 0.089 0.000 A222 -0.991 0.177 0.000
A144 -0.784 0.055 0.000 A223 0.645 0.066 0.000
A145 0.808 0.155 0.000 A225 -0.730 0.035 0.000
A148 -0.725 0.097 0.000 A227 -0.101 0.019 0.000
A149 0.740 0.119 0.000 A230 0.485 0.106 0.000
art gen 0.072 0.004 0.000 t2 0.059 0.015 0.000
public -0.256 0.018 0.000 t4 0.041 0.017 0.013
sharet -0.804 0.131 0.000 t6 0.059 0.018 0.001
k 9.582 0.025 0.000
Obs. 23862
Notes: Quantile regression for q = 0.67. Stepwise regression results, with
backward elimination of the coefficients not significant at 0.10. Covariates
used in the full model: art genre, public, sharet, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6. Robust
standard error are reported. All results are rounded at the third digit.
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B.5 Results of the quantile regression es-
timation of the model in (4.8) with q =
0.50 for each of the six years
Table B.5.1: Hedonic quantile model for q = 0.5 for year 1
Coeff. St. Er. p-val Coeff. St. Er. p-val
A1 0.326 0.140 0.020 A157 -0.254 0.054 0.000
A2 0.594 0.297 0.046 A158 1.809 0.021 0.000
A3 0.749 0.226 0.001 A159 -0.644 0.076 0.000
A5 -0.304 0.095 0.001 A161 -0.700 0.135 0.000
A6 -0.856 0.134 0.000 A163 0.798 0.117 0.000
A7 -0.582 0.195 0.003 A167 -0.527 0.092 0.000
A12 -0.920 0.081 0.000 A172 -0.375 0.134 0.005
A13 -0.529 0.134 0.000 A175 0.812 0.077 0.000
A14 -0.626 0.220 0.004 A177 -0.619 0.207 0.003
A15 0.515 0.123 0.000 A178 0.644 0.123 0.000
A17 0.777 0.162 0.000 A179 -1.014 0.281 0.000
A20 -0.610 0.044 0.000 A180 -0.788 0.185 0.000
A23 -0.644 0.135 0.000 A183 1.635 0.037 0.000
A24 -0.718 0.184 0.000 A187 -0.470 0.214 0.028
A27 -1.003 0.201 0.000 A188 0.652 0.177 0.000
A28 -0.695 0.178 0.000 A189 0.429 0.115 0.000
A101 -0.598 0.190 0.002 A190 -0.694 0.102 0.000
A105 -0.470 0.189 0.013 A191 -0.144 0.028 0.000
A108 1.003 0.334 0.003 A193 -0.302 0.154 0.049
A111 0.164 0.022 0.000 A196 -0.181 0.080 0.023
A113 0.794 0.038 0.000 A197 -0.299 0.026 0.000
A115 -0.470 0.038 0.000 A200 -0.656 0.102 0.000
A118 -0.598 0.121 0.000 A201 -0.599 0.019 0.000
A119 -0.323 0.079 0.000 A203 0.717 0.048 0.000
A120 -0.288 0.069 0.000 A204 0.802 0.036 0.000
A124 -0.610 0.067 0.000 A207 0.269 0.038 0.000
A128 -0.718 0.214 0.001 A208 -0.598 0.216 0.006
A130 2.609 0.410 0.000 A210 -0.456 0.036 0.000
A135 1.711 0.107 0.000 A211 -0.319 0.074 0.000
A136 0.900 0.034 0.000 A212 1.872 0.207 0.000
A138 0.739 0.114 0.000 A213 1.680 0.342 0.000
A139 -0.237 0.040 0.000 A214 -0.609 0.265 0.022
A143 1.449 0.102 0.000 A215 -0.681 0.019 0.000
A144 -0.310 0.147 0.035 A216 0.188 0.048 0.000
A145 0.717 0.219 0.001 A220 -0.426 0.045 0.000
A146 0.410 0.019 0.000 A221 1.166 0.220 0.000
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A147 0.612 0.238 0.010 A223 0.649 0.129 0.000
A149 0.638 0.190 0.001 A224 0.386 0.019 0.000
A151 -0.609 0.103 0.000 A227 0.318 0.058 0.000
A152 -0.644 0.169 0.000 A230 0.401 0.142 0.005
A153 -0.657 0.034 0.000 art gen 0.096 0.008 0.000
k 8.833 0.039 0.000 sharet -1.646 0.132 0.000
Obs. 4801
Notes: Quantile regression for q = 0.50, using data from year 1 only. Step-
wise regression results, with backward elimination of the coefficients not
significant at 0.10. Covariates used in the full model: art genre, public,
share1. Robust standard error are reported. All results are rounded at the
third digit.
Table B.5.2: Hedonic quantile model for q = 0.5 for year 2
Coeff. St. Er. p-val Coeff. St. Er. p-val
A1 0.811 0.173 0.000 A149 1.034 0.321 0.001
A2 0.648 0.169 0.000 A151 -0.575 0.157 0.000
A3 2.015 0.091 0.000 A152 -0.498 0.020 0.000
A4 -0.766 0.091 0.000 A153 -0.693 0.113 0.000
A6 -0.855 0.095 0.000 A159 -0.598 0.212 0.005
A7 -0.575 0.022 0.000 A160 0.560 0.113 0.000
A8 0.629 0.276 0.023 A161 -0.744 0.100 0.000
A11 -0.146 0.020 0.000 A162 0.223 0.075 0.003
A12 -0.692 0.115 0.000 A163 0.965 0.143 0.000
A13 -0.326 0.144 0.024 A164 0.486 0.098 0.000
A15 0.577 0.327 0.078 A167 -0.575 0.047 0.000
A16 1.253 0.478 0.009 A168 -0.208 0.121 0.086
A18 -0.418 0.080 0.000 A171 0.405 0.153 0.008
A19 -0.718 0.214 0.001 A172 -0.693 0.098 0.000
A21 -0.421 0.166 0.011 A175 0.770 0.065 0.000
A24 -0.355 0.105 0.001 A176 -0.208 0.107 0.052
A25 -0.192 0.107 0.073 A178 0.636 0.242 0.009
A27 0.363 0.162 0.025 A179 -0.644 0.072 0.000
A100 -0.375 0.087 0.000 A181 0.405 0.226 0.073
A104 -0.288 0.128 0.025 A183 2.076 0.053 0.000
A108 1.504 0.431 0.000 A187 -0.693 0.053 0.000
A110 -0.134 0.042 0.001 A188 0.588 0.052 0.000
A113 1.386 0.081 0.000 A190 -0.644 0.031 0.000
A114 -0.662 0.026 0.000 A192 0.318 0.132 0.016
A115 -0.470 0.037 0.000 A193 -0.288 0.121 0.017
A116 0.646 0.377 0.086 A194 0.272 0.078 0.000
A118 -0.575 0.115 0.000 A196 0.560 0.083 0.000
A120 -0.208 0.086 0.015 A198 0.754 0.118 0.000
A122 -0.734 0.091 0.000 A200 -0.294 0.138 0.034
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A123 -0.470 0.100 0.000 A201 -0.495 0.183 0.007
A124 -0.470 0.190 0.013 A206 1.686 0.397 0.000
A125 0.746 0.071 0.000 A210 -0.693 0.113 0.000
A128 0.831 0.043 0.000 A211 -0.393 0.104 0.000
A130 2.788 0.572 0.000 A212 1.609 0.121 0.000
A131 -0.835 0.066 0.000 A213 1.546 0.049 0.000
A135 1.355 0.559 0.015 A214 -0.575 0.050 0.000
A136 1.139 0.080 0.000 A217 0.629 0.149 0.000
A137 0.629 0.347 0.070 A218 0.159 0.037 0.000
A139 1.322 0.251 0.000 A221 1.476 0.227 0.000
A141 -0.208 0.059 0.000 A222 -0.208 0.057 0.000
A143 1.399 0.109 0.000 A223 0.693 0.100 0.000
A144 -0.421 0.074 0.000 A224 0.760 0.047 0.000
A145 1.566 0.377 0.000 A225 -0.208 0.116 0.074
A146 0.653 0.233 0.005 A226 1.075 0.349 0.002
A148 -0.329 0.033 0.000 A230 1.129 0.261 0.000
art gen 0.041 0.006 0.000 public -0.288 0.017 0.000
k 9.070 0.036 0.000
Obs. 5866
Notes: Quantile regression for q = 0.50, using data from year 2 only. Step-
wise regression results, with backward elimination of the coefficients not
significant at 0.10. Covariates used in the full model: art genre, public,
share2. Robust standard error are reported. All results are rounded at the
third digit.
Table B.5.3: Hedonic quantile model for q = 0.5 for year 3
Coeff. St. Er. p-val Coeff. St. Er. p-val
A1 0.431 0.141 0.002 A141 0.571 0.243 0.019
A2 0.345 0.060 0.000 A142 -0.705 0.337 0.037
A3 0.767 0.276 0.005 A143 0.804 0.442 0.069
A6 -0.551 0.079 0.000 A144 -0.584 0.148 0.000
A11 -0.194 0.067 0.004 A147 0.325 0.164 0.048
A14 -0.956 0.119 0.000 A148 -0.365 0.201 0.069
A16 1.124 0.056 0.000 A151 -0.665 0.064 0.000
A24 -0.956 0.052 0.000 A153 -0.591 0.213 0.005
A25 -0.611 0.109 0.000 A156 0.325 0.028 0.000
A28 -0.511 0.149 0.001 A157 0.995 0.198 0.000
A100 -0.531 0.055 0.000 A161 -0.754 0.179 0.000
A101 -0.560 0.145 0.000 A163 0.431 0.256 0.093
A104 -0.658 0.343 0.055 A164 -0.434 0.247 0.080
A108 1.306 0.403 0.001 A166 -0.531 0.077 0.000
A111 -0.348 0.192 0.069 A167 -0.560 0.142 0.000
A112 1.258 0.270 0.000 A168 -0.425 0.196 0.030
A113 0.190 0.048 0.000 A171 0.693 0.144 0.000
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A114 -0.867 0.051 0.000 A172 -0.754 0.219 0.001
A115 -0.754 0.148 0.000 A175 0.423 0.041 0.000
A116 0.423 0.233 0.069 A183 1.019 0.201 0.000
A118 -0.754 0.254 0.003 A187 -0.879 0.085 0.000
A120 -0.348 0.128 0.006 A190 -0.658 0.064 0.000
A122 -1.025 0.036 0.000 A191 -0.223 0.074 0.003
A123 -0.754 0.230 0.001 A197 -0.348 0.079 0.000
A125 0.452 0.164 0.006 A201 -0.732 0.043 0.000
A127 -0.593 0.075 0.000 A208 -0.779 0.195 0.000
A128 -0.859 0.185 0.000 A209 -0.491 0.095 0.000
A130 2.377 0.693 0.001 A210 -0.382 0.208 0.066
A131 -0.668 0.208 0.001 A211 -0.531 0.117 0.000
A132 -0.946 0.245 0.000 A212 1.421 0.088 0.000
A135 2.050 0.068 0.000 A213 0.848 0.367 0.021
A136 0.951 0.144 0.000 A219 0.277 0.057 0.000
A139 1.118 0.047 0.000 A223 0.654 0.140 0.000
art gen 0.049 0.009 0.000 public -0.425 0.032 0.000
k 9.230 0.054 0.000
Obs. 3754
Notes: Quantile regression for q = 0.50, using data from year 3 only. Step-
wise regression results, with backward elimination of the coefficients not
significant at 0.10. Covariates used in the full model: art genre, public,
share3. Robust standard error are reported. All results are rounded at the
third digit.
Table B.5.4: Hedonic quantile model for q = 0.5 for year 4
Coeff. St. Er. p-val Coeff. St. Er. p-val
A1 0.466 0.151 0.002 A151 -0.425 0.233 0.069
A2 0.581 0.150 0.000 A152 -0.570 0.195 0.004
A3 0.907 0.422 0.032 A153 -0.956 0.177 0.000
A4 -0.959 0.086 0.000 A154 -0.898 0.203 0.000
A5 0.219 0.200 0.274 A155 -0.100 0.287 0.728
A6 -0.233 0.536 0.663 A156 -0.081 0.265 0.760
A7 -0.662 0.207 0.001 A157 1.344 0.477 0.005
A8 1.092 0.610 0.074 A158 1.130 0.282 0.000
A9 -1.081 0.599 0.071 A159 -0.323 0.200 0.106
A10 0.526 0.470 0.263 A160 -0.072 0.600 0.905
A11 0.109 0.195 0.577 A161 -0.227 0.246 0.356
A12 -0.698 0.137 0.000 A162 0.018 0.187 0.924
A13 -0.743 0.121 0.000 A163 0.755 0.258 0.003
A14 -0.762 0.166 0.000 A164 0.743 0.524 0.156
A15 0.650 0.185 0.000 A165 -0.401 0.311 0.197
A16 0.755 0.925 0.415 A166 -0.550 0.176 0.002
A17 0.841 0.355 0.018 A167 -0.776 0.140 0.000
180
A18 -0.364 0.152 0.017 A168 -0.264 0.112 0.018
A19 0.115 0.048 0.016 A169 -0.219 0.111 0.048
A20 -0.657 0.365 0.072 A170 -0.355 0.118 0.003
A21 0.478 0.155 0.002 A171 0.363 0.241 0.132
A22 -0.388 0.131 0.003 A172 -0.721 0.185 0.000
A23 -0.447 0.341 0.190 A173 0.650 0.420 0.122
A24 -0.793 0.161 0.000 A174 0.833 0.377 0.027
A25 -0.087 0.054 0.104 A175 0.601 0.527 0.254
A26 0.587 0.543 0.280 A176 -0.681 0.227 0.003
A27 -0.448 0.096 0.000 A177 0.340 0.293 0.246
A28 -0.475 0.203 0.019 A178 1.030 0.299 0.001
A29 1.498 0.656 0.022 A179 -1.064 0.234 0.000
A100 -0.818 0.129 0.000 A180 -0.553 0.133 0.000
A101 -0.793 0.048 0.000 A181 0.219 0.416 0.600
A102 -0.256 0.101 0.011 A182 -0.003 0.556 0.996
A103 -0.574 0.262 0.029 A183 1.515 0.517 0.003
A104 -1.120 0.040 0.000 A184 0.380 0.434 0.381
A105 -0.471 0.121 0.000 A185 -0.839 0.264 0.001
A106 0.652 0.461 0.157 A186 -0.590 0.235 0.012
A107 0.115 0.368 0.755 A187 -0.861 0.148 0.000
A108 1.498 0.425 0.000 A188 0.461 0.186 0.013
A109 0.529 0.331 0.110 A189 -0.051 0.160 0.751
A110 -0.530 0.371 0.153 A190 -0.776 0.137 0.000
A111 -0.662 0.736 0.369 A191 -0.474 0.227 0.037
A112 3.432 0.100 0.000 A192 -0.081 0.160 0.613
A113 0.208 0.782 0.790 A193 -0.449 0.125 0.000
A114 -0.408 0.293 0.163 A194 -0.126 0.241 0.601
A115 -0.793 0.099 0.000 A195 0.679 0.369 0.066
A116 0.408 0.314 0.194 A196 -0.074 0.108 0.495
A117 0.989 0.634 0.119 A197 -0.233 0.733 0.750
A118 -0.584 0.117 0.000 A198 -0.388 0.284 0.173
A119 -0.205 0.094 0.030 A199 -0.253 0.417 0.543
A120 -0.317 0.206 0.124 A200 0.043 0.474 0.928
A121 0.065 0.150 0.665 A201 -0.426 0.096 0.000
A122 -0.956 0.098 0.000 A202 -0.205 0.128 0.108
A123 -0.100 0.547 0.855 A203 -0.083 0.836 0.921
A124 -0.584 0.187 0.002 A204 0.653 0.474 0.168
A125 -0.003 0.186 0.988 A205 0.325 0.370 0.380
A126 0.037 0.599 0.950 A206 0.650 0.137 0.000
A127 -0.776 0.587 0.186 A207 -0.655 0.110 0.000
A128 -0.377 0.277 0.173 A208 -0.776 0.237 0.001
A129 -0.294 0.130 0.023 A209 -0.182 0.177 0.305
A130 2.176 0.402 0.000 A210 -0.956 0.178 0.000
A131 -0.570 0.651 0.381 A211 -0.316 0.204 0.122
A132 -1.081 0.055 0.000 A212 0.816 0.994 0.411
A133 0.660 0.323 0.041 A213 0.677 0.113 0.000
A134 0.325 0.392 0.407 A214 0.106 0.256 0.680
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A135 1.345 0.481 0.005 A215 -0.320 0.198 0.106
A136 1.069 0.163 0.000 A216 -0.568 0.147 0.000
A137 -0.668 0.321 0.038 A217 0.689 0.466 0.140
A138 1.261 0.408 0.002 A218 -0.100 0.165 0.546
A139 1.161 0.282 0.000 A219 0.529 0.409 0.196
A140 -0.357 0.254 0.160 A220 -0.698 0.335 0.037
A141 -0.763 0.351 0.030 A221 1.044 0.227 0.000
A142 -0.203 0.444 0.648 A222 -0.744 0.113 0.000
A143 1.270 0.131 0.000 A223 0.771 0.206 0.000
A144 -0.662 0.151 0.000 A224 0.071 0.219 0.745
A145 0.208 0.080 0.009 A225 -0.319 0.140 0.022
A146 0.076 0.675 0.910 A226 0.297 0.731 0.685
A147 -0.222 0.305 0.466 A227 -0.248 0.326 0.447
A148 -0.285 0.174 0.102 A228 0.466 0.205 0.023
A149 0.851 0.192 0.000 A229 -0.513 0.345 0.137
A150 0.123 0.269 0.647 A230 0.990 0.361 0.006
art gen 0.092 0.018 0.000 public -0.295 0.071 0.000
k 9.016 0.087 0.000 share4 -0.618 0.473 0.191
Obs. 3795
Notes: Quantile regression for q = 0.50, using data from year 4 only. Co-
efficients and standard errors are obtained through bootstrap technique.
Only variables statistically different from 0 with confidence level at 0.90
are reported. Covariates used in the full model: art genre, public, share4.
All results are rounded at the third digit.
Table B.5.5: Hedonic quantile model for q = 0.5 for year 5
Coeff. St. Er. p-val Coeff. St. Er. p-val
A1 0.247 0.174 0.156 A151 -1.059 0.098 0.000
A2 0.531 0.088 0.000 A152 -0.692 0.266 0.009
A3 1.099 0.360 0.002 A153 -1.044 0.115 0.000
A4 -0.629 0.142 0.000 A154 -0.812 0.172 0.000
A5 -0.045 0.230 0.846 A155 -0.120 0.266 0.653
A6 -0.817 0.121 0.000 A156 -0.118 0.161 0.463
A7 -1.218 0.229 0.000 A157 -0.417 1.038 0.688
A8 0.758 0.656 0.248 A158 0.065 0.599 0.914
A9 -1.139 0.159 0.000 A159 -0.243 0.264 0.358
A10 -0.148 0.123 0.230 A160 -0.165 0.195 0.397
A11 -0.321 0.131 0.014 A161 -1.131 0.198 0.000
A12 -1.139 0.069 0.000 A162 0.003 0.386 0.994
A13 -0.641 0.124 0.000 A163 0.288 0.183 0.117
A14 -1.139 0.153 0.000 A164 0.470 0.154 0.002
A15 0.132 0.307 0.667 A165 -0.375 0.342 0.273
A16 1.504 0.194 0.000 A166 -1.107 0.718 0.123
A17 0.346 0.208 0.096 A167 -0.722 0.293 0.014
182
A18 -0.996 0.095 0.000 A168 -0.366 0.154 0.018
A19 -1.036 1.787 0.562 A169 -0.098 0.417 0.814
A20 -0.616 0.114 0.000 A170 -0.158 0.351 0.653
A21 -0.249 0.150 0.097 A171 0.362 0.138 0.009
A22 -0.588 0.302 0.051 A172 -1.098 0.084 0.000
A23 -0.746 0.392 0.057 A173 -0.172 0.336 0.608
A24 -1.281 0.083 0.000 A174 -0.711 0.439 0.106
A25 0.068 0.158 0.664 A175 0.396 0.308 0.198
A26 0.644 0.940 0.494 A176 -0.029 0.218 0.896
A27 -0.496 0.245 0.043 A177 0.392 0.312 0.209
A28 -0.351 0.072 0.000 A178 0.685 0.464 0.140
A29 -0.362 0.257 0.160 A179 -0.877 0.292 0.003
A100 -0.803 0.129 0.000 A180 -1.057 0.105 0.000
A101 -0.919 0.078 0.000 A181 0.003 0.128 0.983
A102 0.894 0.469 0.057 A182 -0.467 0.089 0.000
A103 -0.179 0.126 0.154 A183 2.030 0.188 0.000
A104 -0.262 0.211 0.215 A184 -0.706 0.407 0.083
A105 -0.712 0.203 0.000 A185 -0.241 0.381 0.526
A106 0.101 0.315 0.750 A186 -0.184 0.063 0.003
A107 0.401 0.688 0.560 A187 -0.852 0.099 0.000
A108 0.776 0.147 0.000 A188 0.470 0.126 0.000
A109 -0.315 0.214 0.140 A189 -0.943 0.048 0.000
A110 -0.210 0.376 0.576 A190 -0.589 0.269 0.029
A111 -0.469 0.396 0.236 A192 -0.002 0.315 0.996
A112 1.044 1.489 0.483 A193 -0.370 0.214 0.084
A113 -0.294 0.334 0.379 A194 -0.292 0.215 0.175
A114 -0.852 0.189 0.000 A195 0.065 0.477 0.892
A115 -1.224 0.073 0.000 A196 -0.362 0.103 0.000
A116 0.801 0.426 0.060 A197 0.104 0.170 0.539
A117 -0.079 0.373 0.832 A198 -0.496 0.166 0.003
A118 -0.962 0.141 0.000 A199 0.988 0.582 0.090
A119 0.736 0.818 0.369 A200 -0.792 0.396 0.046
A120 -0.375 0.198 0.058 A201 -0.629 0.187 0.001
A121 -0.353 0.196 0.071 A202 -0.703 0.075 0.000
A122 -1.188 0.242 0.000 A203 -0.910 0.063 0.000
A123 -1.059 0.067 0.000 A204 0.630 0.376 0.094
A124 -0.957 0.110 0.000 A205 0.512 0.641 0.425
A125 0.053 0.277 0.848 A206 0.692 0.208 0.001
A126 -0.236 0.488 0.629 A207 0.304 0.616 0.622
A127 -0.446 0.659 0.498 A208 -0.877 0.255 0.001
A128 -0.365 0.134 0.007 A209 -0.400 0.217 0.066
A129 -0.446 0.219 0.041 A210 -0.629 0.197 0.001
A130 2.579 0.514 0.000 A211 -0.709 0.296 0.017
A131 -0.399 0.586 0.496 A212 0.788 0.574 0.170
A132 -0.957 0.514 0.063 A213 0.797 0.122 0.000
A133 -0.758 0.250 0.002 A214 -0.366 0.571 0.522
A134 0.228 0.654 0.727 A215 -0.494 0.386 0.200
183
A135 0.283 0.299 0.343 A216 -0.366 0.258 0.155
A136 1.021 0.441 0.021 A217 0.856 0.227 0.000
A137 -0.362 0.260 0.165 A218 -0.366 0.123 0.003
A138 -0.353 0.389 0.364 A219 0.382 0.659 0.562
A139 0.514 0.628 0.413 A220 -1.139 0.209 0.000
A140 -0.940 0.195 0.000 A221 0.327 0.232 0.158
A141 -0.525 0.236 0.026 A222 -0.852 0.190 0.000
A142 -0.295 0.403 0.464 A223 0.997 0.307 0.001
A143 1.207 0.181 0.000 A224 0.226 0.247 0.361
A144 -0.629 0.178 0.000 A225 -0.629 0.257 0.015
A145 0.970 1.222 0.427 A226 -0.446 0.413 0.280
A146 -0.653 0.607 0.282 A227 -0.366 0.510 0.472
A147 -0.061 0.289 0.833 A228 0.247 0.349 0.479
A148 -0.678 0.343 0.048 A229 -1.416 0.160 0.000
A149 0.803 0.481 0.095 A230 -0.120 0.427 0.779
A150 -0.366 0.307 0.233 share5 -0.610 0.463 0.188
art gen 0.023 0.010 0.024 public -0.342 0.056 0.000
k 9.460 0.050 0.000
Obs. 3578
Notes: Quantile regression for q = 0.50, using data from year 5 only. Co-
efficients and standard errors are obtained through bootstrap technique.
Only variables statistically different from 0 with confidence level at 0.90
are reported. Covariates used in the full model: art genre, public, share5.
Robust standard error are reported. All results are rounded at the third
digit.
Table B.5.6: Hedonic quantile model for q = 0.5 for year 6
Coeff. St. Er. p-val Coeff. St. Er. p-val
A2 0.543 0.067 0.000 A152 -1.009 0.236 0.000
A3 1.161 0.142 0.000 A153 -0.916 0.080 0.000
A11 -0.439 0.061 0.000 A155 -0.404 0.105 0.000
A12 -0.923 0.430 0.032 A159 -0.251 0.065 0.000
A13 -0.771 0.225 0.001 A162 0.302 0.042 0.000
A14 -0.911 0.136 0.000 A165 -0.916 0.398 0.021
A16 2.003 0.482 0.000 A168 -0.405 0.071 0.000
A18 -0.915 0.039 0.000 A169 -0.397 0.061 0.000
A21 -0.203 0.036 0.000 A170 -0.318 0.144 0.027
A24 -1.225 0.144 0.000 A172 -0.836 0.049 0.000
A101 -0.821 0.119 0.000 A174 -0.821 0.101 0.000
A105 -0.504 0.061 0.000 A176 -0.396 0.103 0.000
A108 1.086 0.072 0.000 A178 0.394 0.218 0.071
A110 -0.769 0.028 0.000 A179 -0.916 0.083 0.000
A111 -0.965 0.076 0.000 A180 -0.760 0.100 0.000
A112 3.267 0.102 0.000 A187 -0.853 0.147 0.000
184
A115 -0.821 0.041 0.000 A189 -0.916 0.230 0.000
A118 -0.898 0.148 0.000 A190 -0.382 0.164 0.020
A119 1.695 0.158 0.000 A195 0.504 0.113 0.000
A120 -0.405 0.062 0.000 A196 -0.296 0.093 0.002
A121 -0.310 0.153 0.043 A197 0.759 0.427 0.075
A122 -1.093 0.195 0.000 A201 -0.636 0.122 0.000
A124 -0.762 0.283 0.007 A202 -0.274 0.105 0.009
A127 -0.942 0.230 0.000 A203 0.104 0.033 0.001
A129 -0.251 0.136 0.065 A204 0.688 0.073 0.000
A130 1.540 0.185 0.000 A205 0.504 0.156 0.001
A136 1.381 0.422 0.001 A206 1.100 0.077 0.000
A138 -0.413 0.137 0.003 A209 -0.405 0.107 0.000
A140 -0.537 0.065 0.000 A212 1.378 0.408 0.001
A143 0.941 0.397 0.018 A213 0.822 0.298 0.006
A144 -0.728 0.150 0.000 A215 -0.670 0.068 0.000
A145 0.655 0.272 0.016 A217 0.988 0.069 0.000
A146 1.299 0.187 0.000 A219 0.649 0.318 0.041
A148 -0.404 0.139 0.004 A221 1.289 0.074 0.000
A149 1.401 0.297 0.000 A222 -0.708 0.132 0.000
A150 -0.919 0.213 0.000 A223 0.855 0.317 0.007
A151 -0.921 0.196 0.000 public -0.407 0.046 0.000
art gen 0.068 0.013 0.000 share6 -1.896 0.370 0.000
k 9.287 0.062 0.000
Obs. 5866
Notes: Quantile regression for q = 0.50, using data from year 6 only. Step-
wise regression results, with backward elimination of the coefficients not
significant at 0.10. Covariates used in the full model: art genre, public,
share6. Robust standard error are reported. All results are rounded at the
third digit.
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